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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with the pricing behavior of firms 
participating in a sealed tender market. The pricing behavior of firms 
in a concentrated industry has long received attention in economic 
literature. Recently, some of this interest has been focused upon the 
pricing actions of firms participating in a sealed tender market, at 
least in part, because economists are increasingly called upon by anti­
trust investigators to analyze some of these markets and to offer their 
conclusions on the degree of independence of the firms' pricing behavior. 
In many instances a sealed tender market is utilized by public 
purchasing agencies in an attempt to purchase goods and services from 
the private sector at the lowest possible cost to the public. By 
requesting sealed bids the public purchasing agencies can minimize the 
cost of searching for the lowest priced product as well as allow all 
willing firms to compete for the contract. Since the products are 
purchased by public agencies, in many cases the bids that are received 
and the contract specifications are public information; therefore, such 
information is relatively easily available for empirical study. 
This study will focus upon the purchase of packaged fluid milk 
products by Iowa school districts in a sealed tender market and will 
analyze the pricing behavior of the dairy firms competing for the 
districts' dairy contracts. Of particular interest will be whether 
there is any economic evidence of overt collusion aiaong the participants. 
To allow the formulation of conclusions regarding the price behavior 
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of firms it is necessary to have a benchmark that reflects a 
competitive pricing environment. Hence, this study will include an 
analysis of the differential pricing behavior between on the one hand, 
firms in an area where the dairy processing industry is relatively 
concentrated and, on the other hand, firms in an area where the dairy 
processing industry is less concentrated. 
The dairy processing industry, which will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 4, tends to be local in nature due to the cost of 
refrigerated transportation, and in the state of Iowa there are few 
metropolitan areas where there are many dairy processors. Nationally, 
the number of dairy processors has diminished as the smaller, and often 
more inefficient firms have either ceased operations or been purchased 
by larger concerns; this same trend has been occurring in Iowa. Therefore, 
because of the fewness of competitors in most geographic areas, it was 
especially difficult to find an area where one would expect a competitive 
pricing situation in the school district market for dairy products. 
A review of the bids submitted on dairy products to school districts 
located in Folk County, Iowa (which is the Des Moines Metropolitan area) 
revealed that only four firms had submitted bids for the districts' 
contracts since 1973. In addition, only two of these four firms had 
been consistent participants since 1972, and these two firms were among 
the largest dairy processors in the state of Iowa. Given these two 
firms' relative size and the small number of participants in the Polk 
County school district market, these districts were included in this 
study as it was believed possible that the bids would be reflective of 
overt or tacit collusive behavior. 
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To serve as a comparative benchmark in the analysis, the bids 
submitted to school districts located in Linn County, Iowa, (which is 
the Cedar Rapids Metropolitan area) will also be reviewed. In the 
Linn County area there are more participants in the school district 
market for dairy products, although some of the firms only bid on 
an irregular basis. However, it was believed that the irregular 
bidding of some firms might exert a healthy competitive influence upon 
the market especially by making collusion more difficult to maintain. 
Given that there are more participants in the Linn County area market 
than in the Polk County area market, this study will try to determine 
if the differing structural conditions of the school district market 
in the two areas are reflected in differences in the pricing behavior 
of the participants in the two areas. 
Since quantity data is important in the forthcoming analysis, it is 
necessary to narrow the scope of the product market to include only 
packaged fluid milk products sold in half pints. The Iowa Department 
of Public Information uiaiatains records on the aggregate number of half 
pints of dairy products purchased by each district to facilitate the 
subsidization of this product by the federal government. However, the 
agency does not maintain records of the quantity of other dairy products 
that are used in cooking; therefore, this study will only review the 
pricing of half pints by the firms included in this study. 
The conclusions of this study could have legal implications, but 
the author wishes to state that this is purely an academic study and 
that no malicious intent was involved and no attempt is made herein to 
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determine the legality of the specific actions observed and analyzed in 
this study. In an antitrust investigation extensive sampling would 
have to be completed to determine the relevant geographic zarkct. 
However, since this is only an academic case study on pricing 
behavior, the geographic markets chosen by the author may bs considered 
too small to be appropriate for an antitrust investigation. To protect 
the anonymity of the firms whose bids are included in this study, 
the dairies will be identified only by letters of the alphabet. 
Before the pricing behavior of the firms in both areas is 
reviewed, it is necessary to review some economic information and 
theory that will be helpful to the analysis. Chapter 2 will review 
the literature pertaining to the nature of collusive behavior, especially 
in sealed tender markets. This will be followed in Chapter 3 with a 
discussion of the economic theory relating to industrial organization, 
the measures of monopoly power, and the approaches developed by 
economists to study collusive behavior. Also, the methodology to be 
utilized in the study's analysis of pricing behavior will be presented. 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide some background information concerning 
che dairy processing industry to enable the reader to fully understand 
the market for packaged fluid milk products. Chapter 4 will concentrate 
upon the evolution of the structure of the national processing industry, 
for which there has been extensive prior research. Chapter 5 will then 
discuss the structural aspects of the Des Moines area dairy processing 
industry to enable the reader to have some knowledge of the market 
environment in the Des Moines area. 
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Chapter 6 will then review the bids submitted to the school districts 
in Ames, Polk County, and Linn County by drawing upon the information 
contained in Chapters 2-5. Also, the analysis should allow some 
conclusions regarding the relationship between industry structure and 
industry performance in sealed tender markets. Finally, Chapter 7 
summarizes the results of this study and makes some suggestions for 
further study of pricing behavior in sealed tender markets. 
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CHAPTER II. THE NATURE OF COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR 
An oligopolistic industry is usually characterized as one having 
a few, relatively large firms. Although there may be a fringe of smaller 
competitors, the relatively large firms typically control a sizeable 
share of the product market in the relevant geographic area. The 
presence of some barriers to entry normally retards or blocks the entry 
of potential competitors into the industry. In contrast, in a perfectly 
competitive industry, each firm is only one of many, relatively small 
firms and the actions of any one firm are imperceptible to the other 
competitors. However, in an oligopoly where the number of firms is 
few, the actions of any one firm have a noticeable effect upon the 
profit-maximizing decisions of its rivals; this condition is referred to 
as "mutual interdependence," 
Since all firms in an oligopolistic industry are consciously aware of 
rivals' actions, the price that will maximize a firm's profits will depend 
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price that exceeds the prices of other firms, the result may be the erosion 
of the firm's market share especially if the products are viewed as close 
substitutes by consumers. On the other hand, if the firm sets a price below 
that of rivals, the result may be retaliatory price cutting that diminishes 
the profits of all firms. Therefore, a firm's decision regarding price 
will depend upon the assumptions made with respect to its rivals' actions 
and reactions. This mutual interdependence of the actions of rivals is in 
sharp contrast to the independent actions of perfectly competitive firms. 
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Given this mutual interdependence, each firm is acutely aware of the 
risk of pricing decisions that cause changes in the firms' market shares 
in the industry. To reduce the risk of conflicts over mutually unsatis­
factory prices, different types of industry coordination and communication 
have evolved. The intent of all types of coordination is to find a 
method of determining a mutually satisfactory price that will allow 
the firms in the industry to behave as a monopoly and receive monopoly 
profits. Although the primary concern of this study is overt collusion, 
tacit collusion is another type of coordination that is commonly observed 
in an oligopoly. 
In tacit collusion, no formal agreement among the firms is necessary. 
When the number of firms is small and the industry's product is homo­
geneous, the firms in the industry will recognize their mutual inter­
dependence. Where these firms' resources are purchased from an 
oligopolistic industry, it is quite likely that the firms will have 
similar input prices. In addition, much of the information regarding 
the production of each firm and the industry will be shared by all 
firms. Such information sharing may be done formally (for example, 
in publications of the industry's trade association) or informally. 
Under these circumstances, the firms may be able to establish a 
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a higher price. Such techniques as price leadership, focal point 
pricing, and rule-of-thumb pricing are all ways to establish and 
maintain some type of industry coordination without resorting to overt 
collusion [26]-
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Overt collusion involves an explicit agreement among rivals, 
but the exact nature of the agreement may range from verbal reassurances 
regarding actions to written contracts. Successful overt collusion 
requires an agreement about price and/or output and soTùe method of 
monitoring and enforcing adherence to the agreement. Such collusion 
provides an effective means of coordination of the rivals' actions, 
thereby enabling the participants to fix price and quantity at levels 
yielding monopoly profits to the firm. 
Overt collusive conduct which results in price fixing either 
directly or indirectly (e.g., through output or market share agree­
ments) is illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for 
interstate commerce and is illegal under many state antitrust laws 
for intrastate commerce. However, the Justice Department and the 
various state antitrust enforcement agencies annually prosecute 
numerous cases involving such violations and it is frequently alleged 
Collusive conduct benefits the conspirators through higher profits 
and a reduced risk of price cutting, but one may wonder why the threat 
of antitrust action does not deter such agreements. This threat probably 
has been an effective deterrent in many cases, but the continuing 
detection of conspiracies may indicate that the participants may consider 
the benefits to be relatively less than the expected cost of litigation. 
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The expected cost of antitrust action is equal to the probability that 
the agreement will be detected times the sum of the cost of litigation 
and the penalties levied if guilt is successfully proven. There may 
be several reasons why conspirators may not expect the costs to be 
excessive. First, the funds allocated to the Justice Department and 
state antitrust agencies for antitrust actions are limited, and many 
cases may noc be prosecuted since the cost of the lengthy investigation 
and trial proceedings is prohibitive. Second, in the past the penalities 
imposed upon guilty parties have generally not been excessive.^ Thus, 
because the participants may view the expected benefits to be in excess 
of the expected costs, it is likely that many collusive agreements 
continue to be negotiated and maintained. 
Collusive agreements that fix prices have been commonly known as price 
fixing rings. John M. Kuhlman, in a case study of federally investigated 
price fixing rings, discusses the major functions of the ring [16]. 
Penalties in criminal cases brought under the Sherman Act are 
as follows: from 1890 to 1955 the maximum fine was $5,000 and a 
maximum prison sentence of one year; from 1955 to 1974 the maximum 
fine was $50,000 and a maximum prison sentence of one year; the 
current penalty for individuals is a maximum fine of $100,000 and 
a maximum prison sentence of three years and the current penalty 
for corporations is a maximum fine of $1,000,000. In the past, 
monetary fine? have often been levied, but imprisonment of corporate 
executives has been rare. Instead of or in addition to the criminal 
penalties, there may be private treble damage civil suits brought 
against the conspiracy, but these damages have generally not been 
excessive. 
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First, the ring must establish a price that is above the competitive 
level and that is satisfactory to all of the conspirators. The 
profitability cf the arrangement will depend upon the ring's ability 
to accomplish this function. 
Second, the ring must also distribute market shares. When a price 
is established by an agreement, each member may view the price as a 
parameter and be tempted to expand output to the point where price 
equals marginal cost. This temptation to expand output is an incentive 
to cheat on the agreement, and cheating could cause a breakdown of 
the conspiracy. Thus, Kuhlman believes that market shares will be 
distributed by a quota system that is established during the negotiation 
of the arrangement. The quota system essentially allocates market shares 
by distributing industry idle capacity among all participants. This 
leads Kuhlman to make the following observation concerning the allocation 
of market shares : 
This is in sharp contrast, of course, to the situation 
that prevails in a competitive market, where idle capacity 
is automatically concentrated in the high cost firms, and 
in a market controlled by a single firm, where idle capacity 
would be concentrated in the monopolist's high cost plant(s) 
during periods of declining demand. The price fixing ring, 
being forced to give both the high-cost and low-cost firms 
a portion of the existing business, thus turns in an especially 
poor performance, i.e., one marked by lower output, higher 
costs, and higher prices . . . [16, p. 70]. 
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the quota system is 
important during periods of insufficient demand or declining demand 
to keep the participants from making secret price cuts. During periods 
when demand is sufficient for each firm to operate at capacity, the exist­
ing capacity of each firm automatically allocates market shares. 
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Finally, the price fixing ring is charged with the enforcement 
of the guarantee that the price and output distribution is being 
adhered to by all participants. Unless the ring can enforce the 
agreement, the conspiracy will be short-lived. However, the 
enforcement of the agreement does impose a cost upon the ring. 
One of the benefits of the ring is the ability of the participants 
as a whole to increase the price above the competitive level and 
thereby enjoy increased profits. If the cost of policing the 
agreement is greater than the benefits, the conspiracy will 
probably be abandoned. For those agreements that continue to 
survive or to be initiated, there are some structural market 
characteristics that influence the cost of enforcement [8, 10, 13]. 
George Hay and Daniel Kelley, in a survey of federally prosecuted 
price fixing conspiracies, discuss the structural characteristics 
that have typically been identified as contributing to the likelihood 
of a conspiracy [131. These characteristics; can he ôivifîpri inrm 
two categories. The first group includes those characteristics which 
diminish the difficulty of finding a mutually satisfactory agreement 
and thereby decrease the cost of enforcement. Seco. i, there are some 
conditions that tend to increase the cost of remaining in anoncollusive 
situation. These conditions promote market instability when demand 
conditions change, and collusive conduct can lower the cost of such 
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instability. Since each of the factors in both categories are important, 
each factor will be examined below in some detail. Other relevant 
factors not mentioned by Hay and Kelley are discussed under the 
appropriate category. 
Factors that Lower the Cost of Enforcement 
Similar cost structures 
A factor that was not discussed by Hay and Kelley but would 
facilitate collusive conduct is similar costs. Vlhen all of the participants 
have similar cost structures then this will ease the task of negotiating 
a successful agreement, because the participants are more likely to 
have similar ideas regarding price. Whereas if costs differ among the 
firms, there is likely to be differing opinions on a suitable price 
by the low-cost and high-cost firms. Not only are the physical production 
costs important, but so are the costs of procurement, promotion, and 
distribution. In some industries, the costs cf promotion and distribution 
are a substantial proportion of the total costs of production; the more 
these costs vary, the greater the difficulty in determining a mutually 
satisfactory price. 
The nnmhpr of participants 
In an industry it is not unlikely that firms will have different 
cost structures or different expectations regarding demand. When 
these differ from firm to firm, the firms are likely to have varying 
opinions as to the optimal pricing strategy in the market. As the number 
of firms increase, the number of views will also increase. 
13 
Therefore, the ability of a group of firms to reach a successful 
agreement will be influenced by the number of participants. Since 
one optimal price must be agreed upon by all, the fewer the number 
of participants, the easier it is that a mutually satisfactory 
arrangement can be found. In addition, George Stigler has argued 
that a ring is more capable of enforcing the agreement and detecting 
any cheaters when the number of firms is smaller [27]. 
The degree of market concentration 
In addition to the number of firms, Hay and Kelley also argue 
that the degree of market concentration may also be important. 
They point out that the mutual interdependence of an oligopoly often 
allows the industry to maintain a monopoly price through tacit collusion 
or conscious parallelism. However, they also argue that. 
It is possible that the high degree of interdependence 
which characterizes oligopolistic markets naturally leads to 
collusive activity. If the latter is true, high degrees of 
concentration lead to a great likelihood that this inter­
dependence vrLll be recognized and that actual collusion 
will follow [13, p. 15J. 
The degree of product homogeneity 
The costs of enforcement are also related to the degree of 
product homogeneity in the industry. This actually has several 
dimensions that are of interest. When consumers view different 
products as perfect substitutes, the products are homogeneous from 
the consumer standpoint. In this case, the ring only has to establish 
and maintain one price. Another dimension is whether the product is 
simple or complex in nature. A complex product is one that is produced 
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under varying grades and types. The greater the number of grades and types, 
the more likely it is that the ring will have to define a formula for 
pricing. This not only makes price determination more complicated, but it 
also increases the cost of enforcement as there are so many different types 
of products to police. In effect, product homogeneity greatly simplifies 
the range of the agreement and lowers the cost of enforcement. 
The rate of technological change 
Another condition that is associated with the degree of product 
homogeneity over time is the rate of technological change. Where an 
industry is experiencing rapid change, the firms' products will be 
changing over time and the pace of technological change may vary 
among the firms. As the products change it will become necessary 
for the ring to establish price schedules for the various products. 
Once again, the increasing complexity of the agreement increases 
the cost of enforcement. While not considered by Hay and Kelley, 
some forms of technolgical change alter the production process 
and the costs of production, rather than or in addition to altering 
the product. The more rapid is such process technological change, 
the more likely it is that rivals, at any point in time, will be 
using different production technologies and thus have different 
average costs of production. Under these circumstances, agreeing 
on price (as argued above) may be mora difficult and there will 
be a greater incentive to cheat. Therefore, one would expect that 
collusive coordination would be easier in an industry where there 
is little or no product or process technological change. 
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The elasticity of demand 
The profitability of the price fixing ring depends upon its 
ability to increase price above the competitive level. In order for 
the participants to experience an increase in total revenue, there must 
be a relatively smaller decrease in quantity than increase in price. 
Where industry demand is more inelastic, the greater is the expected 
payoff from fixing price above the competitive level. Therefore, 
the likelihood of a conspiracy is greater where industry demand 
is inelastic. 
Barriers to entry and potential competitors 
By guaranteeing each participant a share of the market, the 
price fixing ring hopes to induce all firms to join and remain in the 
conspiracy. However, there may also be some potential competitors 
that may enter the market because of the industry's above-normal 
profits that result from the conspiracy. Where an industry's market 
tends to be lccc.1 in nature, the yoLcuLlal cumpecicors of the local 
firms may be established firms which produce the same product in bordering 
geographic markets. The possibility that these firms may expand their 
geographic inarket makes them potential entrants into nearby geographic 
areas. Potential competition may also come from firms who either 
supply the industry with resources or purchase the industry's output. 
The threat of vertical integration by either of these types of firms 
make them potential competitors. Finally, potential competition may 
arise with the establishment of a new firm by an individual or group 
of individuals or by a conglomerate. 
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If any of the above potential competitors enter the market and 
are able to operate at a price below that of the ring's there is 
likely to be a loss of market share and profits for each participant. 
This may cause some price-cutting among participants to regain their 
market shares, and thus ultimately threatens the ring's existence. 
Therefore, the ring's success will depend upon its ability to 
either exclude entrants from the market or include the entrants 
into the arrangement. The cost of enforcement will be lower where 
substantial barriers to entry exist. 
There are several possible sources of barriers to entry that may 
exist separately or in combination in an industry. First economies 
of scale in production and distribution may create barriers to entry. 
Where economies of scale continue over a substantial output range 
and thus require a firm to enter on a relatively large scale in order 
to achieve all economies, entry may be deterred. Industry demand 
may be insufficient to warrant entry of an additional large firm, 
but entry on a smaller scale would impose higher average costs of 
production on the new entrant than are enjoyed by the large established 
firms. Even if industry demand is sufficient to absorb a large new 
entrant, the entrant may have difficulty obtaining the necessary 
capital to build a plant the size dictated by economies nf srale. 
Secondly, there may be what is known as an absolute cost 
disadvantage, where the entrant's costs are higher than those of 
existing firms at every level of output. This may be due to 
established firms having superior production techniques, control of 
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superior inputs, or a better location, or to entrants having higher 
money capital costs or limited access to distributors or suppliers. 
Finally, in consumer goods industries the past use of product 
differentiation to establish consumer brand loyalty may be an 
important barrier. Where consumer brand loyalty is strong, the cost 
of introducing and promoting a new product in order to cause consumer 
switching may be prohibitive. In addition, entrants may be 
disadvantaged because established firms have superior product designs, 
advertising, and/or distribution outlets. Any or all of these 
barriers may impede the entry of new firms into an industry, and it 
is also possible that there may be other barriers that are quite 
effective in a specific industry. 
Sealed bid markets 
Some consumers, typically public agencies, often contract to 
purchase goods or services from business firms through the use of 
sealed bids. The customer's common mocive for requesting sealed 
bids is to receive the lowest possible price for the product or 
ser'.'ice being purchased. The use of sealed bids often encourages 
sellers to engage in discriminatory pricing behavior in order to 
obtain a customer. Under some circumstances, the use of sealed 
bids may make enforcement of collusion more difficult, while under 
other circumstances, sealed bids may lower the cost of enforcement 
and thus facilitate collusion. The costs of enforcement of collusion 
and the incentive for conspirators to cheat will be increased if 
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the prices each firm submits in its sealed bids are not disclosed to 
its rivals. Sealed bidding may also make it easier for a potential 
competitor to enter the market. 
On the other hand, certain customer practices that often 
accompany the use of sealed bids, especially when the customer is 
a public agency, decrease the cost of monitoring and enforcing collusion, 
thereby encouraging its use and success. When a firm submits a sealed 
bid on a contract, the firm is providing information to the purchaser 
on its current prices. After the bids have been received and 
analyzed, the cost-minimizing purchasing agency then awards the 
contract to the lowest bidder. It is common public agency practice 
to notify all bidders of the winning firm and winning bid. In some 
cases the entire distribution of bids is made available by the public 
agency. Under these circumstances, each bidder has access to information 
on the recent prices of competitors which may be useful in future 
biddings. However, when the public agency makes such price information 
availaDie to bidders, ttiis can lower the cost of enforcing a collusive 
arrangement since cheaters can be readily detected and action can be 
taken to discipline the cheaters. Here collusion is faciliated net 
by the use of sealed bids per se, but by the customer's practice of 
making the bids public information. 
While price fixing conspiracies have been detected in sealed 
bid markets, these markets also greatly enhance the success of tacit 
collusion when all bids are made public. Here, no agreement is necessary 
as each firm nas enough information regarding the pricing behavior 
of rivals to reach an optimal price independently. Charles Geiss and 
John M. Kuhlman, in a recent article on sealed bid markets, state: 
In this market each bidder is both a sender and receiver 
of messages. In the latter role, it is possible for each firm 
to monitor the behavior of all firms in the market and reconstruct 
their pricing strategies .... In the absence of collusion such 
a monitoring program will reduce the uncertainty inherent in 
the oligopolistic nature of sealed bids [11, p. 194]. 
They also show how this monitoring program can be used to estimate 
sealed bid market shares and to detect price changes. Therefore, 
the information commonly transmitted in a sealed bid market greatly 
facilitates the use of either overt or tacit collusion. 
Factors that Increase the Cost of Non-Collusive Conduct 
In certain markets there are some conditions that contribute to a 
high degree of market instability due to cut-throat competition. Such 
instability may impose a cost in the form of reduced profits or 
smaller market shares for some firms. Here some form of effective 
coordination among the firms may lower this cost. Hay and Kelley [131 
discussed two conditions that increase the cost of noncollusive conduct 
and thus give the firms in the industry an incentive to collude. 
Lumpiness and infrequency of orders 
In some industries, such as the electrical equipment industry, 
buyers' orders tend to be of varying size and frequency. Some orders 
tend to be relatively large and may comprise a significant portion of a 
firm's total sales; and therefore the firm will strive to maintain this 
order, especially if the orders are infrequent. If the firm wishes 
to retain its customers or attract new ones, it may be necessary to 
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offer price reductions that tend to upset the stability of the 
industry. If all firms follow this pattern, such price reductions 
may drive the price toward the competitive level. The result would be 
a competitive profit in the absence of collusion; but if an effective 
agreement can be arranged and enforced, then collusion can offer higher 
profits. 
High fixed costs 
Some industries tend to have high fixed costs due to the nature 
of production, and these industries are especially prone to price 
cutting during a cyclical decline in demand. When demand is decreasing, 
firms are forced to operate at less than full capacity where the fixed 
costs per unit are higher. Under this situation, firms will be tempted 
to cheat on the agreement by expanding output. A collusive agreement 
could diminish this instability if the ring can establish an effective 
means of detecting cheaters and an effective type of punishment that 
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Number of buyers 
Although not considered by Hay and Kelley, the number of buyers 
is also important and is relevant to both categories of collusive 
characteristics. Peter Asch and Joseph Seneca, in a study on the 
characteristics of collusive firms, state that a collusive agreement 
will more likely be maintained where the buyers' market is atomistic 
[1, p. 224]. Where buyers are small and unccncentrated, there is 
little advantage in a participant offering secret price discounts 
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since the effect upon total revenue will be minimal. However, where 
the buyers' market is more concentrated, secret price discounts may 
significantly increase the firm's sales if the buyer's purchases are 
sizeable. This is closely related to the lumpiness and infrequency 
of orders discussed above; since if orders are infrequent and 
large and the number of buyers is small, one may expect secret price 
cutting to be more common. The potential instability of each firm's 
market shares in this situation may make it worthwhile to negotiate 
a collusive agreement. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the necessity of some type of 
coordination in an oligopolistic industry. The specific type of 
coordination discussed above was overt collusion or price fixing, 
since future chapters will be concerned with the establishment of 
price fixing through the use of economic analysis. As an aid to 
this analysis, the structural characteristics normally associated 
with and facilitating price fixing were discussed so that a comparison 
of the structural characteristics of the fluid milk market could be 
made in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER III. THE METHDOLOGY OF MARKET ANALYSIS 
As stated in the first chapter, the objective of this study is to 
use economic analysis to determine the market conduct of firms in an 
industry from observable economic information. Market conduct includes 
the pricing behavior, product strategy, research activity, advertising, 
and legal tactics of firms in an industry. When market conduct cannot 
be directly observed, the available economic information regarding an 
industry can be utilized to determine some aspects of market conduct. 
This study is primarily concerned with drawing inferences about the 
pricing behavior of firms in the dairy industry in the Des Moines area, 
and the purpose of this chapter is to draw upon economic literature 
to build a framework for making inferences about market conduct. 
In those instances where market conduct is unobservable, it may 
be inferred from related observable aspects. Market conduct is at 
least partially determined by the basic conditions of the market and 
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firms also influences the performance of those firms. The basic 
conditions of a market refer to the demand and supply situation in that 
market, and these conditions have an important influence upon the structure, 
conduct, and performance of an industry. The conditions relevant to the 
state of market demand include the elasticity of demand, the rate of 
growth of demand, the availability of good substitutes, the cyclical 
and seasonal nature of demand, the promotional method, and the purchase 
method. Such conditions as the market for raw materials, the nature 
of production technology, the durability of the product, the degree of 
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unionization in an industry, the ratio of value to weight of the 
product, business attitudes, and the legal environment surrounding 
production and marketing are relevant to market supply. These 
conditions are often observable or measurable and this information 
can provide insight into the structure, conduct, and performance of 
an industry. 
Market conditions have a direct effect upon the structure of an 
industry. Market structure commonly refers to the number and size 
distribution of buyers and sellers, the degree of product differentiation, 
the conditions of entry into an industry, the firms' cost structures, 
and the degree of vertical integration and/or diversification. The 
evolution of an industry's structure can often be explained by changes 
in the basic market conditions. For example, the process of technological 
change may necessitate a plant of such magnitude that the market can 
efficiently support only a small number of large firms. 
Market structure has traditionally received a great deal of 
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First, many of the structural conditions of a market are observable 
as well as measurable, and this allows some aralysis of the competitive 
nature of an industry. Also, it has traditionally been argued that 
structural conditions directly influence the conduct and performance 
of firms in an industry. Therefore, accurate information relating to 
industry structure is an important part of making inferences concerning 
market conduct. 
The performance of fims in an industry' is usually judged 
according to the degree to which they facilitate the achievement of 
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the following economic goals: productive and allocative efficiency, 
progress in production capabilities, full employment, and equity. 
Although some of the goals may be conflicting at times, the greatest 
possible satisfaction of all four goals is required for optimal 
industrial performance. To some extent, one may be able to summarize 
the extent of achievement of these goals, but the lack of economic 
data necessary to measure this is often common. For example, to 
determine allocative efficiency an estimate of a firm's marginal cost 
is necessary unless the firm's production function is homogeneous of 
degree one; and in general, marginal cost is often difficult to estimate. 
In some cases, acceptable proxies may be found to measure performance 
while in other cases information on market structure when combined 
with economic theory may allow some inferences to be drawn regarding 
performance. 
Since market conduct influences performance, measures of 
performance may also be used as a basis upon which inferences may 
be drawn regarding market conduct. Therefore, the collection of good 
information and data relevant to market conditions, structure, and 
performance is necessary when one wishes to describe those types of 
market conduct which are not directly observable. However, it is 
often quite difficult to collect adequate and meaningful information 
for such analysis. Even if adequate information and data are available, 
there is often difficulty in drawing conclusions concerning conduct. 
This is because some of the market or structural conditions may be 
necessary for a certain type of conduct, but they are not sufficient 
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to insure that only that type of conduct is being practiced. In 
addition, the performance of an industry may be consistent with 
various types of conduct. However, empirical studies of industries 
where certain types of conduct have been identified may allow the 
observer to narrow the range of possible structure-conduct-performance 
relationships. 
Before reviewing the literature relevant to making inferences 
on market conduct, the next section will present some of the measures 
used to quantify the competitive nature of an industry. Knowing 
the competir ive nature of an industry can be combined with accepted 
economic theory to narrow the range of hypotheses concerning market 
conduct. 
The Concepts of Monopoly Power and Market Stability 
Measures of market structure and performance help explain the 
competitive nature of a market. This section will present some measures 
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monopoly power, where monopoly power is defined as the ability to 
influence price. The concept of market stability will also be presented 
as a means of measuring the competitive nature of market. Where 
reliable estimates of these measures can be made, valuable information 
will be gained concerning the market environment in question. 
There are many measures of monopoly power; some reflect actual 
monopoly power while others only reflect potential monopoly power. 
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While all of the measures are reflective of the industrial structure 
of the market, some of the measures are also performance-oriented. 
The Lerner index and net profit margins are performance-oriented 
measures that measure actual monopoly power, while concentration 
ratios and the Herfindahl index are structure-oriented measures that 
measure potential monopoly power [26, pp. 50-52]. 
The Lerner index is defined as: 
Price - Marginal Cost 
Price 
This measure is performance-oriented since it measures the 
relative divergence of price from marginal cost, and allocative 
efficiency is present where price equals marginal cost [18]. Where 
a market is perfectly competitive, L will be equal to zero, while 
the measure increases to a maximum value of one, as monopoly 
power increases. Hence, the measure not only reflects the 
market type but also the satisfaction of allocative efficiency. 
One serious difficulty with the measure is that marginal cost 
figures are generally unavailable. Another difficulty is that 
the measure may underestimate the degree of monopoly power if 
firms do not maximize profits because of the tendency for 
costs to rise in some monopolistic markets. 
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Another performance-oriented measure is Bain's measure of 
the net profit rate [3, p. 273]. This measure is simply profits 
divided by the replacement value of assets. Where firms earn a 
positive net profit rate over the long run, this is an indication of 
actual monopoly power. Generally, the data is available to use this 
measure, but there are some difficulties that remain in using the 
data since accounting procedures may give figures that do not represent 
the true net profit picture. To draw definitive conclusions from this 
measure, the net profit rate must be calculated over an extended period 
of time in which long run equilibrium is approximated. This is because 
perfectly competitive firms also can earn a positive rate of profit 
in the short run; consequently, measures for a short span of time 
may make it difficult to distinguish perfect competition from monopoly. 
In addition, the profit rate in monopolistic markets may be understated 
where firms do not maximize profits. 
Concentration ratios are structure-oriented measures and reflect 
only potential monopoly power. A market concentration ratio is 
typically defined as the percentage of the total size of an industry 
controlled by the largest few firms, where the market shares of firms 
are ranked in order of size. The size of the industry can be measured 
in terms of total sales, output, employment, value-audeJ, assets, ut 
value of shipments. In general, the ratios are computed for the 
four, eight, twenty, and fifty largest firms in the industry. 
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Since the ratios do not reveal individual firm market shares, the 
ratio is only a rough guide to the size distribution of firms in an 
industry. At most, the ratios can be used as a guide to the location 
of an industry in the continuum between perfect competition and monopoly. 
Although concentration ratios do provide some insight into the 
structure of an industry, there are numerous problems with the ratios. 
First, it is often difficult to define industry boundaries in order 
to identify the firms to include in the calculation of the ratio. 
Also, the measure largely ignores the competitive fringe in an 
industry and ignores the extent of buyer concentration. The 
magnitude of the ratios are also sensitive to the index of industry 
size, and the ratios do not give an accurate reflection of the size 
dispersion of firms. In addition, there are problems with interpreting 
changes in the ratios over time since the ratios ignore shifts in 
market shares over time where the changes in individual firm shares 
cancel. Finally, the concentration ratios that are available assume 
national markets and tor many products such geographic boundaries 
are simply too wide. Although there are numerous problems with market 
concentration ratios the data necessary for calculation is generally 
available. 
A summary measure without some of the problems of the market 
concentration ratio is the Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index is 
defined as: 
where S_^ is the market share of the i^^ firm [1'^]. H will vary in 
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value between zero and one. A value approaching zero indicates a 
perfectly competitive market and a value of one is indicative of a 
monopoly. The closer H is to one, the greater is the degree of 
monopoly power. Not only does H Increase as the number of firms 
decrease, but also K increases with increasing inequality in firm 
market shares in the industry. Therefore, the measure reflects both 
the number and the size distribution of firms. The only drawback 
to the measure is that it requires data on individual firm market 
shares and such data is unavailable in most markets due to disclosure 
laws. 
Another concept that does not measure monopoly power but measures 
the degree of competition in a market is market stability. Market 
stability is defined here as little or no change in individual firm 
market shares in an industry over time. Michael Gort measured the degree 
of market stability in 205 industries by calculating the correlation 
coefficient between the 1947 and the 1954 market shares of the fifteen 
largest firms in each industry [12]. where une correjation coeificieiiL 
is equal to one, there has been either no change in individual market 
shares or a proportional change in all firms' market shares. As the 
coefficient decreases toward zero for an industry, the degree of market 
stability decreases. The greater is the degree of market stability, 
the less likely it is that the industry is involved in open price 
competition. 
Gort offered two explanations for the occurrence of market stability. 
First, market shares may remain stable over time if there are no market 
forces that would cause shifts in sales volume. Market forces chat could 
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induce changes in market shares include a rapid rate of growth in 
market demand or a rapid pace of technological change. Second, 
stability in the size distribution of firms may permit collusive 
agreements or tacit collusion combined with a "live and let live" 
philosophy. The presence of barriers to entry in a concentrated 
industry allows such behavior, with the result being market share 
stability. Under either condition there is an absence of vigorous 
price competition; hence, many economists regard a high degree of 
market stability as an indication of little competition in the industry. 
Some of the measures presented above will be used in the forth­
coming empirical analysis where data permits estimation. These measures 
will be helpful in the description of the structure and the competitive 
nature of the industry which have an important influence upon the 
market conduct of firms in the industry. 
The Study of Market Conduct 
The prosecution of price fixing conspiracies has traditionally 
relied upon insider testimony and/or "hot" (incriminating) documents 
to establish the existence of conspiratorial conduct. However, it 
is likely that such prosecutions have reduced the likelihood of finding 
such sources of information about other conspiracies. The scarcity of 
information about questionable methods of market conduct has caused 
federal and state antitrust authorities to turn to economists for 
analysis of market conduct. Since the electrical equipment conspiracy 
case some economists have been developing a method of systematically 
analyzing the market conduct of collusive arrangements. Of particular 
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interest to some economists has been markets where products or 
services are purchased through the use of sealed bids. Since the 
focus of this study is on the possibility of collusive conduct 
in a sealed bid market, this section will review the methods of 
detecting collusive conduct in sealed bid markets. 
The study of market conduct in sealed bid markets has been 
developed following two different approaches. Thomas Rothrock [23], 
in a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Missouri-Columbia, 
labeled these two approaches the pattern-recognition approach and 
the theoretical approach. Only the pattern recognition approach will 
be discussed a length below, since the theoretical approach would 
have little applicability to an actual antitrust investigation at 
the current time. 
There are several possible reasons why the theoretical approach 
is less desirable at this time. This approach has focused upon the 
construction of competitive bidding models which employ statistical 
techniques developed in operations research. Some of the models 
have focused upon the effect of market information and communication 
upon firm bidding behavior in oligopolistic markets and the development 
or these models is still at an early stage. The models not only allow 
analysis of real world participants but also allow simulated market 
experiments to be conducted. However, the current development of the 
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models has the participants operating in a highly simplified setting 
which does not capture the complexity of actual markets; hence, 
the value of the results of such experiments is limited. As the 
models are further developed, they may offer greater insight into 
collusive bidding 







The pattern ^  
ine pattern information collected 
in industires where certain types ot conduct have been known to exist. 
From this information one can search for patterns and characteristics 
tnat are common to many of the situations. This allows the establishment 
of a set of patterns and characteristics that can be used in the 
^'^^^ysis of other markets where the market conduct of participants is 
in question. Records of antitrust investigations and prosecutions have 
been quite helpful in developing this approach. 
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models has the participants operating in a highly simplified setting 
which does not capture the complexity of actual markets; hence, 
the value of the results of such experiments is limited. As the 
models are further developed, they may offer greater insight into 
collusive bidding patterns. 
However, there is another reason why these models may not be 
useful in antitrust prosecutions of bid rigging. At the present time, 
the courts have generally not been receptive to advanced statistical 
analysis of market behavior due to the courts' lack of knowledge 
of statistical techniques. Since statistical analysis is being 
introduced as a partial substitute for evidence of an agreement, it 
is necessary that the courts comprehend the techniques in order to 
recognize their value. Recently, the courts have become somewhat 
receptive to the simpler statistical techniques utilized in an 
analysis following the pattern recognition approach that is discussed 
below. 
The pattern recognition approach 
The pattern recognition approach relies upon information collected 
in industires where certain types of conduct have been known to exist. 
From this information one can search for patterns and characteristics 
that are common to many of the situations. This allows the establishment 
of a set of patterns and characteristics that can be used in the 
analysis of other markets where the market conduct of participants is 
in question. Records of antitrust investigations and prosecutions have 
been quite helpful in developing this approach. 
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Specifically, the method used in this approach is to identify 
certain structural and performance characteristics that have 
been identified with conspiratorial conduct. In the second chapter 
the nature of collusive behavior and the structural and performance 
characteristics facilitating collusive behavior were presented. 
These characteristics provide a profile of an industry that is prone 
to collusive conduct. A comparison of an industry's structural and 
performance characteristics to this profile allows the economist to 
detect the possibility of collusive conduct. While this approach 
can only suggest the possibility of conspiracy in any industry 
(including those where products are sold through sealed bids), the 
approach does provide an efficient means of selecting industries 
where further investigation is warranted. To draw definitive conclusions 
on the nature of market conduct, it is necessary to do an in-depth 
study of the pricing or market sharing behavior of firms in the industry. 
While the pattern recognition approach is applicable to any 
market, there has specifically been some investigation of the market 
conduct of firms selling products in sealed bid markets. John M. Kuhlman, 
in a study of price fixing rings, profiled the conspiracy-prone industry 
as follows: 
simple, will have an inelastic demand, and will generally be 
sold on a "solo" basis. The industry will be relatively stable 
as far as technology is concerned. Product innovation and 
sales promotion will be largely absent. The product is more 
likely than not to be sold on a sealed-bid basis and it 
must be possible to limit or prevent new entrants from 
entering the industry [16, p. 74]. 
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Hence, sealed bid markets where products or services are sold singly, 
may provide a favorable environment for collusive conduct. As stated 
in Chapter 2, this can be explained by the common policy of purchasing 
agencies publicly announcing the winning bid and often the entire 
bid distribution. The availability of such information makes the 
enforcement of a collusive agreement relatively inexpensive, since 
cheaters can be readily identified. 
Kuhlman also offered some other comments and ideas on sealed 
bid markets that may be relevant to this study. First, since public 
agencies normally distribute information on the bids to all bidders 
once the contract is awarded, a common practice is for some firms 
to submit high bids in order to receive information on the bids 
submitted by their competitors. This can be helpful to a firm wishing 
to determine the pricing strategies of competitors. Second, public 
purchasing agencies are probably less responsive to price changes 
than are private profit maximizing buyers [16, p. 77]. This indicates 
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hence, firms will be able to earn higher profits by charging higher 
prices to such customers. Finally, Kuhlman suggests that a policy of 
systematically collecting bid data would enhance the detection of 
collusive behavior. Collecting data from several different agencies 
and locations would allow the development of a comparison benchmark. 
The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice currently 
collects data on identical bids in some markets, and this could be 
expanded in scope to identify some of the more sophisticated collusive 
arrangements. 
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The introduction of the computer can greatly facilitate the 
collection of bid data to develop comparison benchmarks and detect collu­
sive bidding patterns other than identical bids. Kuhlman believes that 
enough is now known about the structural conditions and the behavior 
patterns of collusive agreements to enable the economist to argue that 
certain pricing behavior can only be explained by collusive conduct. 
Chapter 2 presented the structural and performance conditions 
facilitating collusion, and now attention will be turned to a 
discussion of the behavior patterns indicative of collusion in sealed 
bid markets. 
There are many behavior patterns that have been identified with 
collusion in sealed bid markets. One that was briefly mentioned 
above is identical bidding. In this case all of the participants 
submit identical bids and one common result is that the purchasing 
agency evenly divides the contract among the bidders. This is not 
only a relatively simple means of collusive pricing, but also ensures 
that all participants receive an equal share of the market. A variant 
of this occurs where the purchasing agency itself divides the market 
prior to calling for bids and the participants receive a share of 
the market by submitting a winning bid in its portion of the market 
that is identical to the wiriniug bics of uLher participants in their 
respective portions of the market. The losing bids that are submitted 
are in some cases identical for all participants. This particular 
pattern was actually detected from the bidding practices of Cincinnati, 
Ohio bakeries several years ago. 
36 
Another common pattern in bidding practices is the geographical 
division of the market by the conspiracy. One of the functions of 
the conspiracy is to allocate market shares, and this is sometimes 
accomplished through the allocation of market shares based upon 
geographical boundaries. Such geographic allocation may be detected 
if geographic boundaries shift as the volume of sales shifts over 
time, such that market shares remain stable. However, one must be 
aware of the possibility that the size of market shares may be 
renegotiated by the participants in order to maintain the agreement. 
Finally, another observed pattern was detected in the electrical 
equipment case. Here, winning bids were systematically rotated in 
such a way that one of the participants would submit the winning 
bid over a period of time and then the winning bid was rotated to 
another participant. The length of the period as well as the number 
of periods was controlled such that each participant received its 
negotiated market share. 
The behavior patterns discussed above are not an exhaustive list 
since there are probably as many collusive bidding patterns as one 
can imagine. However, the intention of the preceding discussion 
was to alert the reader to some possible bidding patterns. In all 
cases the pattern was devised to enable the price fixing ring to 
establish a price, to allocate market shares, and to enforce the 
agreement. All collusive bidding patterns must allow the conspiracy 
to perform these functions. Hence, any investigation of pricing 
behavior should include consideration of whether the bidding pattern is 
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consistent with the fulj. liment of these functions by the price 
fixing ring. 
Collection of bidding data by antitrust authorities allows 
analysis of bidding patterns that may be similar to those above or unique 
to a specific industry. Some economists have designed computer programs 
to aid in the detection of certain bidding patterns that have been 
associated with collusive conduct. Joseph Gallo, in an article on 
the detection of collusive conduct, designed three computer programs 
to process bidding data [9]. Each program analyzes the bidding data 
according to a specific behavioral pattern that allows the conspiracy 
to perform its functions. 
The first program is labeled the Phase of the Moon Program which 
relates all bids to the winning bid for a purchasing agency. This 
program actually captures the essence of the bidding pattern of the 
electrical equipment industry. Gallo described the approach of this 
program as follows : 
If firms are in agreement according to a Phase of the 
Moon pattern, they must agree upon a common price base usually 
referred to as the book price. Once the book price price has 
been determined, each firm will know the position it holds for 
a stipulated time period and for a particular type of product. 
The firm's position is determined by a price differential 
between the lowest price and the succeeding higher prices [9, p.596]. 
In essencei this program sftarchps for systematic bid rotation by 
participants. Gallo also pointed out that this program could be 
used to determine if firms are allocating market shares on the basis 
of products. 
The second program is known as the Market Shares and Expenditures 
Program, and this program simply measures the stability of participants' 
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market shares over time. Essentially, this allows one to determine 
if market shares are allocated on a quota basis. 
Finally, the Distance and Bid Program compares the bid price 
at a delivery point and the distance between the delivery point and 
the nearest plant. The purpose is to detect any arbitrary geographical 
allocation of market shares by firms in an industry. 
Each of the programs is aimed at the detection of bidding patterns 
that are similar to patterns known to be consistent with collusive 
conduct. The programs alone do not allow concrete conclusions 
concerning collusive conduct, but they do identify industries where 
collusive conduct is probable. This is essentially the aim of the 
pattern recognition approach. Once bidding patterns have been identified, 
the economist can then analyze these patterns in terms of economic 
theory and draw some conclusions about the market conduct of firms in 
an industry. 
Computerized analysis of sealed bidding patterns was also the 
subject of a recent article by Thomas Rothrock, James T. McClave, 
and Janet P. Ailstock [24]. This study focused upon an investigation 
of the bidding patterns of bakeries in the Florida school board market. 
Three different computer programs were employed to detect any potential 
ncnccmpctitivc bidding patterns that '-'ould warrant further economic 
analysis. Since these programs can be generalized to any market, a 
brief description of each program will follow. 
The first program, known as SYMAD, produces a map of the area 
of interest. The relevant geographic markets in the area can be 
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displayed as well as the vendors operating within each market. In 
addition, Lhe median winning bid in each market can also be printed 
and a shading option allows the markets to be shaded according to 
the magnitude of the median price. Such a mapping program can be 
utilized to determine if there is any evidence of geographic market 
allocation. Also, one can determine if there are any markets with 
prices that are unusually high relative to the other markets. 
A second program, SPLOTS, displays the variation of bid prices 
in each of the geographic markets. The degree of variability in 
each market is illustrated with the use of a rectangle, with the 
length being determined by the difference between the first and third 
quartiles. In addition, the median bid price, mean bid price, and 
extreme bid prices are also displayed. The authors believe that the 
median and interquartile range are more meaningful than the mean 
and standard deviation in sealed bidding analysis because of the 
likelihood that the bid distribution may be skewed and have extreme 
observacions [24, p. 25]. The size of a market's interquartile range 
relative to those of other markets can be meaningful; if there is 
little or nc variability in bid prices, then this may indicate little 
open price competition among the firms or perhaps an explicit pricing 
agreement. Such an occurrence would warrant additional investigation. 
This program also identifies extreme-valued winning bids that 
could also indicate possible noncompetitive behavior. Winning bids 
that are judged to deviate toe far above or below the median would 
indicate geographic market division which would warrant further 
analysis. 
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The third program sets up a buyer-vendor matrix for each of 
the geographic areas. With the information contained in these 
matrices» one can investigate market stability, geographic market 
allocation, and the relative frequency with which each vendor wins 
contracts. This program as well as the two preceding programs 
essentially utilizes the pattern recognition approach to identify 
questionable bidding patterns. Once these patterns are identified, 
then the investigator must determine if there is an economic justification 
for the patterns. 
The Approach of this Study's Analysis 
As stated in Chapter 1, this study is concerned with an empirical 
investigation of the sealed bidding patterns of dairies submitting 
bids to Polk County area schools. Another interesting part of the 
analysis is to determine if there is any relationship between industry 
structure and pricing behavior. This section will describe the methodology 
of this study. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, market conduct is partially 
determined by basic marker conditions and industry structure. Therefore, 
the analysis will begin with a presentation of the available information 
on the basic market conditions of the dairy processing industry. The 
merger activity of firms in this industry prior to 1960 attracted the 
attention and action of the Federal Trade Commission; hence, there 
is extensive information concerning many of the basic market conditions. 
Although this information is not specific to the Des Moines area 
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dairy processing industry, it is quite likely that the Des Moines 
area market is similar to that in other areas. As stated earlier, 
a familiarity with the basic conditions of a market can be helpful 
in the description of the structure, conduct, and performance of 
an industry. 
The discussion of the basic market conditions is incorporated 
into a discussion of the structural conditions of the national dairy 
industry. Since the market for packaged fluid milk products tends 
to be local in nature, it is possible that structural conditions 
may vary with location. However, knowledge of the evolution of 
the national dairy industry structure can be helpful as a guideline 
in the research and description of the structural conditions in a 
local market. 
The importance of the relationship between industry structure 
and conduct necessitates an examination of the structural aspects 
of the Des Moines area dairy processing industry. To understand 
the evolution of current structural conditions, some history of the 
industry will be presented. Of special interest will be the number 
of dairy processors and the relative size of these firms over time. 
Where information permits, other aspects of the industry's structure 
win he discussed. Knowledge of the structure of the dairy processing 
industry is important to an understanding of the competitive nature 
of the industry. At this point, economic theory can be drawn upon 
to establish a set of expectations regarding the conduct and performance 
of firms in the dairy industry. 
42 
Market conduct includes many aspects of firm behavior, but this 
study is only concerned with the bidding behavior of dairy processors 
in the Des Moines area. In order to describe the nature of this 
behavior, this study will follow the pattern recognition approach 
and determine if the observed bidding patterns are consistent with 
independent behavior on the part of the firms or whether the observed 
behavior could only be explained by collusive conduct. 
Specifically, the structural and performance criteria presented 
in Chapter 2 will be compared to the characteristics of the Des Moines 
area market to determine how closely the Des Moines area dairy processing 
industry matches the profile of the conspiracy prone industry. The bid 
data must then be analyzed to determine if there are any questionable 
bidding patterns warranting further investigation. To aid this part 
of the analysis, two computer programs were written to process the 
bid data. To serve as a comparative benchmark, bid data was collected 
from the Ames Community School district and school districts located 
in Linn County, Iowa. The Linn County districts were chosen since 
this area includes Cec^ar Rapids where more dairies submit bids on 
dairy contracts. 
The first program. Program A, was designed to analyze the bid 
data generated by each dairy over time. This allows analysis of the 
firm's bidding strategy in school districts where bids were submitted. 
Three tables were generated for each of the dairies, if the dairy 
had submitted at least two bids in a given year. The first table 
simply lists the firm's bids for school districts located in Polk County 
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and/or Linn County. This allows analysis of the firm's bids with 
regard to the school districts' distance from the nearest plant. Such 
comparison may explain bids that deviate too farm from the median. The 
second table lists, for each dairy, the price differential between a 
half pint of white milk and the other dairy products for which bids 
were requested. The aggregate of these values will enable an analysis 
of whether there is a common industry price differential among the 
dairy products in question. Finally, the third table lists, by dairy, 
the ratio of the price of a dairy product to the price of a half pint 
of white homogenized milk. These tables will help determine if there 
is a standard formula used for computing prices of different sized 
containers. All of the tables help determine if there are any 
consistent bidding patterns among the dairy firms. Appendix A contains 
a printout of the program language, but the tables have been condensed 
into the tables contained in Appendix B. 
The second program. Program B, is also a means of discerning 
bidding patterns, but this program compiles the data by school district. 
For each district the program generates two tables. The first table 
simply lists all of the bids submitted on a specific date where the 
districts were able to provide complete data. This table allows detection 
consistent behavior across school districts over time may indicate 
an agreed upon losing bid. This table will also allow the observer 
to search for any patterns in winning and/or losing bids that would not 
be economically justified without further study. The second 
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table computes the price differential between the winning and losing 
bids on a contract date for each school district. For each district 
this will help detect similar losing bids, and for the aggregate of the 
districts, these tables can identify similarities in these differentials 
across school districts. Appendix A contains a printout of the program 
language, but again the tables have been condensed into the tables contained 
in Appendix B. 
Another part of the analysis will be a comparison of changes in 
bid prices over time with changes in the cost of raw milk. The price 
of raw milk paid by processors is available from the Federal Milk 
Order Administration. The objective will be to determine if there 
are similar price responses among dairies whenever the cost of raw 
milk changes. 
The empirical analysis of this study will largely depend upon 
the identification of similar bidding patterns. If similar patterns 
are identified, then further investigation is necessary to determine 
if there is an economic justification for the pattem(s). The theory 
of the firm can be utilized to identify conduct that is consistent 
with a given industry structure. The problem is to determine whether 
the bidding behavior of the firm(s) is consistent with independent 
profit-maximizing behavior or any other assumed behavior pattern 
with the exception of collusion. If there is a substantial number of 
these bidding patterns that cannot be rationalized as normal, independent 
competitive business practices, the conclusion can be narrowed to only 
that of collusive conduct when the basic market conditions and structural 
conditions are consistent with such conduct. This analysis is greatly 
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enhanced whenever a comparative benchmark is found that exhibits 
competitive bidding behavior among firms of a similar market environment, 
and this may allow some observations regarding the relationship between 
industry structure, industry pricing behavior, and industry performance. 
Conclusion 
In summary, this study will rely upon the pattern recognition 
approach to make inferences concerning the pricing behavior of Des Moines 
area dairy processing firms. The competitive nature of the industry 
will be presented through a discussion of the market conditions for 
fluid milk products and of the market structure in the Des Moines area. 
This will define the environment from which the bids are generated, 
and the bids will be analyzed to determine if any consistent bidding 
patterns exist. If any patterns do exist, then these patterns will 
be compared to any existing in the benchmark. Finally, an attempt 
will be made to rationalize any patterns as normal, independent business 
nature of the bidding behavior. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE NATIONAL DAIRY INDUSTRY 
The fluid milk processing industry is an established industry 
in the United States. This industry was the subject of a comprehensive 
Federal Trade Commission study (hereafter called FTC dairy report) in 
1973 [22,p. 29] and the information contained in the report will be 
cited often in this study. In 1967 the dairy industry was the seventh 
largest manufacturing industry in the United States and had total 
shipments of $7.8 billion; and according to the Census of Manufacturers 
the total value of shipments increased to almost $9.4 billion by 1972. 
The relative size of this industry indicates that the purchase of 
packaged fluid milk products is an important family expenditure. 
The FTC dairy report indicated that consumers spend more on milk 
products than on any food item other than meat. 
Over time milk production and processing has become subject 
to different types of government regulation. Milk is a perishable 
item and requires quick, sanitary, and retrxgerated transport. Prior 
to the turn of the century many disease epidemics were linked to 
the bacterial count in milk; consequently, the government imposed 
sanitary regulations upon the transport and the processing of milk 
products. Although the federal government has the authority to 
establish the sanitary requirements of interstate shipments of milk, 
the federal government has seldom exercised this authority. Instead, 
most states delegate authority to cities and counties to establish 
and to enforce sanitary requirements. These regulations, including 
47 
compulsory pasteurization, have made packaged fluid milk products 
relatively safe. 
In addition to sanitnry regulation, the dairy industry is also 
influenced by price regulation. During the depressed economic 
conditions of the 1930's, dairy farmers successfully pushed for 
some type of regulation of the prices paid by processors to dairy 
farmers or to their cooperatives. The resulting legislation allowed 
dairy farmers throughout the United States to elect whether to come 
under the price regulation of Federal milk orders or state milk orders 
or to remain unregulated. Currently, there are forty-seven Federal 
orders. Within each order, the market administrators of these 
orders establish the minimum prices paid for fluid grade milk 
utilized for fluid uses and for regulated fluid grade milk used in 
manufactured dairy products. Alden C. Manchester, a USDA agricultural 
economist, reports that currently eight-one percent of the raw milk 
is fluid grade; however, only forty-four percent of the marketed 
raw milk is processed for fluid products, while the remainder is used 
in manufactured dairy products [19, p. 13]. He also reports that over 
eighty percent of the raw milk eligible for fluid use is price regulated 
by Federal orders. 
The milk that is processed for fluid use is known as Class I 
milk, while the milk used in manufactured products falls into 
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Class II and Class III.^ The minimum prices of all three classes 
are established in relation to the support price of manufacturing 
grade milk in Minnesota and Wisconsin, which together constitute 
the surplus milk production area of the United States. In general, 
the prices established for Class II and Class III are similar or 
equal to the support price because there tends to be a national 
market for manufactured milk products [19, p. 13]. The establishment of 
Class I prices is also related to the support price; Class I prices 
are set above the support price by specified differentials. These 
differentials usually increase according to the distance from the 
surplus production area, partially reflecting the transportation 
costs by moving fluid grade milk into shortage areas. 
The pricing structure of the Federal orders allows the price 
of milk paid to farmers to vary according to its use in processing; 
this known as classified pricing. Any milk not used in fluid milk 
processing by dairy processors is used in manufactured products, 
and cherefore Liie ucuues>&ux. will pay different prices depending upcn 
the use of the milk. The receipts for all milk sold in a market 
order are peeled, and the dair^' farmers or cooperatives supplying 
milk in the order receive an average or "blend" price [19, p. 14]. 
In addition, it should be noted that the Federal orders establish only 
minimum prices for the three classes of milk. Dairy cooperatives often 
^Class I milk is processed into whole milk, low-fat milk, skim milk, 
flavored milk, and buttermilk. Class II milk is processed into cream, 
sour cream, yogurt, ice cream mix, and cottage cheese. Class III milk 
is generally processed into animal feed. 
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charge a premium for the milk sold to processors; and although it 
is likely that processors within one Federal order will have similar 
costs of raw milk, there may be differences due to the varying abilities 
of processors to bargain over these premiums. However, there is 
no available data to suggest how much these premiums vary among 
producers within a milk order. 
Before turning to a discussion of the structural aspects 
of the dairy processing industry, some attention should be given 
to the demand for packaged fluid milk products and to the channels 
of distribution in the dairy industry. Earlier, it was reported 
that the value of shipments in the industry had increased from 
7.8 billion dollars in 1967 to 9.4 billion dollars in 1972. An 
increase over time in the value of shipments does not differentiate 
between an increase attributable to an increase in quantity sold 
versus an increase in prices. By looking at changes over time in 
the physical volume of fluid milk sales, one can determine whether 
the dairy industry is growing, stable or declining. 
The FTC dairy report stated that the total consumption of fluid 
milk products increased rapidly up to the 1950's, but since 
1960 total consumption has only sightly increased. The per capita 
consumption of these products also increased up to 1955 but decreased 
from 1955 to 1962. Between 1963 and 1965 per capita consumption 
slightly increased but has fallen since 1965. The total consumption 
and per capital consumption of fluid milk is given in Table 4.1, the 
source of which is the FTC dairy report [22, p. 33]. These figures 
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Table 4.1. Physical volume of fluid milk sales. United States, 






1950 40.9 304 
1955 48.2 320 
1960 53.0 309 
1961 53.0 303 
1962 54.0 302 
1963 55.3 304 
1964 56.4 304 
1965 57.6 306 
1966 58.2 305 
1967 57.6 298 
1968 58.4 299 
1969 58-7 297 
1970 58.5 292 
1971^ 58.9 290 
^Includes fluid whole milk, low-fat milk products and cream on 
a product weight basis. 




indicate that the current demand for packaged fluid milk products is 
stable, and the figures on the industry's value of shipments reflect 
inflated prices. 
There have been several reasons given for the stability of 
demand in the recent past. First, there has been an emergence of 
good substitutes for dairy products. Bottled soft drinks, frozen 
concentrated juices, and packaged soft drinks have become more 
popular due to extensive advertising. Second, the birth rate in 
the United States has been decreasing; this means that there has 
been a decrease in the proportion of children in the population. 
Milk has been an important source of vitamins for children, and 
as the porportion of children in the population diminishes so does 
family expenditures on packaged fluid milk products. Third, people 
who have become more conscious of their diet and health have avoided 
milk because of its butterfat content. Such shifts in consumer 
tastes and family size halted the long-run trend of increasing 
demand for milk in the 1950's [22, p. 33]. 
There has also been a shift over time in the distribution of 
packaged fluid milk products. In the 1930's the most important type 
of distribution was retail home delivery. The Federal Trade Commiss 
reported that lii 1930 about seventy percent of 9ll retail sales 
was made on home delivery routes, while the remaining sales were 
wholesale delivery to grocery stores, restaurants, and distributors. 
In 1972 only sixteen percent of fluid milk sales was made on home 
delivery routes, and it appears that this trend will continue. 
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Retail home delivery is a labor intensive method of distribution 
which has become more costly as wage rates have risen. The costs 
of such delivery are typically reflected In higher prices; hence, 
consumers have switched to purchases in grocery stores, dairy stores, 
and other retail outlets where prices are generally lower. Limited 
in-store service at supermarkets, cheaper refrigeration equipment, 
and economies of scale in distribution to large volume accounts have 
contributed to substantial cost savings in distributing to wholesale 
accounts in retail establishments. This trend toward the food 
store channel of distribution has forced dairy processors to 
make some adjustments. Such a development has been an important 
factor in the disappearance of many smaller dairies which were unable 
to supply or to compete for large volume supermarket accounts. 
In many cases the necessary capital investment in cost-saving equip­
ment was simply too great, especially for the farmer-processor. 
Structural Change in the Dairy Processing industry 
In the early part of this century the market for processed 
fluid milk was local in nature due to the lack of adequate refrigeration 
equipment to transport milk and to the poorer quality of highways. 
At that time the popularity of retail home delivery allowed many small 
dairy processors to operate effectively. However, as improved 
refrigeration, better highways, and more efficient processing equip­
ment evolved, the market for fluid milk became broader in geographic 
area and the size of the efficient dairy processor became larger in 
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order to achieve the economies of scale in processing. Thus, many 
smaller processors which were unable to achieve these economies began 
to operate at a competitive disadvantage. 
In the 1920's dairy processing firms began merging, as was the case 
in many other industries at that time. This merger activity established 
a trend that has continued up to the present. Willard Mueller, 
Larry Hamm, and Hugh Cook, in a study of federal merger policy in the 
dairy industry, report that during the period 1920 to 1950 almost 
1,800 dairy firms were purchased by the nation's eight largest 
dairy processors [20, p. 7}. In a 1948 study, J. Fred Weston concluded 
that the three largest dairy processors had accomplished much 
of their growth through horizontal or market extension acquisitions [29, 
p. 141]. The percentages of the growth of these three firms due to 
acquisitions were: Kraftco, 64 percent, Borden, 75 percent; and 
Beatrice Foods, 63 percent. This frenzied merger activity continued 
following the passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950. Mueller, 
Hamm, and Cook reported that: 
During 1950-55 total merger activity continued high and the 
top eight dairy processing corporations averaged at least 70 
dairy acquisitions annually. Foremost Dairies, Inc., was the 
leader, acquiring companies with combined sales of about 
$342 billion. These mergers propelled Foremost's sales from 
$8 million in 1950 to $388 million in 1955. Beatrice Foods 
Company was the second most active acquirer, making 175 
acquisitions with combined sales of $147 million; this exceeded 
the growth of its total sales between 1950 and 1961. During 
1951-55 National Dairy Products Corporation (Kraftco) acquired 
39 companies with combined sales of $95 million, and the 
Borden Company made 110 dairy acquisitions with combined sales 
of $102 million [20, p. 81. 
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Such extensive merger activity caused a radical change in the structure 
of the dairy industry. 
Prior to 1955, horizontal and market extension mergers within the 
dairy industry substantially decreased the number of firms, 
and in many cases the eight largest dairies acquired either major 
competitors or healthy potential competitors. Acquisitions of 
this nature have a tendency to reduce competition as the market 
concentration in local areas increases. This expected effect 
upon competition prompted the Federal Trade Commission to take 
action in 1956. 
The Commission issued a complaint against Foremost on January 16, 1956; 
complaints against Beatrice, Borden, and National Dairy (Kraftco) were 
also issued on October 17, 1956. These complaints alleged that some 
of the dairy acquisitions by these four firms were in violation of the 
amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act.^ The Commission made a final 
decision in the Foremost case in 1962 and in the Beatrice case in 1965. 
National Dairy and Borden entered into consent agreements in 
1963 and 1965, respectively. These combined actions required that the 
four processors divest themselves of plants having total annual sales of 
$200 million. However, such divestiture represented only a small 
^The amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act states, "That no corporation 
engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or 
any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the 
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in 
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, 
the effect of such acquisition oay be substantially to lessen competition, 
or tend to create a monopoly." 
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proportion of the acquired firms, since many of the acquired firms 
had ceased operations upon purchase. In addition, the Commission 
placed a ten year ban on future acquisitions by these firms without 
prior Commission approval. 
In the Beatrice decision the Commission outlined its merger 
policy for the dairy processing industry. In general, the policy 
was designed to encourage the growth of the very small dairy processors 
and to enable them to attain competitive viability. Recognizing 
that many of the smaller concerns would need to achieve further 
economies of scale in processing, the Commission indicated that 
mergers undertaken by smaller firms (namely firms with sales of 
less than $10 million) would not be challenged. However, mergers 
between medium size firms (namely those with annual sales of $40 
million to $60 million) would be discouraged, with the exception that 
a medium-sized dairy could make a small market extension acquisition 
or very small horizontal acquisition, provided that the acquisition 
was not part of extensive merger activity [20, p. 17]. The partial 
divestiture of firms purchased by the four largest dairies, the 
ten-year ban on acquisitions by the big four, and the merger guide­
lines stated above were intended to slow the massive restructuring 
of the dairy processing industry that had occurred prior to 1956. 
The effect of the Commission's actions were mixed. Between 1962 
and 1975 Mueller, Hamm, and Cook [20] report that the top eight dairy 
processors, on the average, acquired only four dairies each year, 
and most of these acquisitions were of very small processors. 
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However, the Commission's actions did not stop Beatrice, Borden, 
National Dairy, or Foremost from engaging in conglomerate mergers. 
The Mueller, et al. study reports the following: 
During 1961-74 the top four companies acquired at 
least 278 companies for which they paid at least $1,344 
million. With the exception of Kraftco, acquisitions con­
tributed more to the growth of the largest dairy firms in 
the 1960's than during the 1950's [20, p. 94]. 
Therefore, it appears that the Commission simply forced these four 
processors to rechannel their merger activity into other product 
lines; but the virtual cessation of dairy acquisitions by these 
dairies probably prevented the purchase of many viable medium-size 
processors by the largest dairies. 
During the period 1961-75 the Mueller, et al. [20] study also 
indicated that the relative merger rate of medium-size processors 
increased and contributed to the impressive growth rates of many of 
these firms. A number of firms became medium size with annual dairy 
sales of $20 million to $100 million. By 1972 there icas a total of 
sixty-five medium size firms. In addition, the medium size processors 
(like the largest processors) diversified into other product lines. 
The merger activity of processors with dairy sales less than 
$25 million also increased after 1956. Many of these firms used 
these acquisitions to grow and to become more competitive with the 
larger companies. However, there remains a number of smaller firms 
which have not been able to achieve the necessary economies of scale 
in processing. Some of these firms have survived because they have 
succeeded in maintaining an outlet for their products, but it is likely 
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that many of these firms will continue to disappear as smaller, 
inefficient plants are usually closed upon acquisition. 
Another common occurrence of the merger activity in the dairy 
industry has been the acquisition of dairy processing firms by 
cooperatives. The FTC dairy report stated that many of these 
acquisitions were made in an effort to find additional outlets 
for Grade A milk, and in some cases the acquired processors have been 
medium size firms [22,p. 6]. This type of forward vertical integration 
by dairy cooperatives may have some effect upon competition, since 
the cooperatives will process milk as well as sell milk to processing 
firms. This could lead to a price squeeze in cases where the cooperative 
has some monopoly power; it could also raise barriers to entry and 
cause thinner markets. In fact, the FTC dairy report indicates that 
a single cooperative often supplies ninety percent of the fluid milk 
to processors in a majority of large city markets; in such markets 
there may be a real threat of anti-competitive behavior. 
Recall food rhminc hpv<=> rnnr-ri Kiiro/-i rn r j-ia chstigir.g Structure 
of the dairy industry. As early as 1920 food chains began integrating 
backward into dairy processing, and in 1971 there were forty-three 
food chains operating fluid milk processing plants. Since World War II 
there have been low levels of consumer preference for the various 
brands of milk, and the introduction of food chain private labels 
has been quite successful. This has forced many non-integrated dairies 
to adjust to a new market environment. As noted earlier, there has 
been a shift from retail home delivery to wholesale delivery to 
grocery stores, and this has made the independent processors dependent 
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upon food chain buyers as an outlet. Therefore, many processors 
have been processing private label milk for food chains at a competitive 
price in order to forestall any further vertical integration by 
food chains that diminishes the size of the market. The occurrence 
of and the threat of food chain integration into dairy processing 
was probably a force in the disappearance of many smaller processors 
who were unable to attract or to supply such large volume accounts. 
The Federal Trade Commission reports that the major reason for 
food chimin integration is the high distribution costs of the independent 
dairies. These distribution costs are dependent upon the services provided 
by the route driver. Even though limited service delivery is less 
costly, the wholesale dairy companies have been unable to control these 
costs. This is due to the lack of increases in labor productivity 
in distribution and to increasing wages and fringe benefits. In addition, 
the dairy cannot control how long a truck and driver spend waiting in 
line to unload the product. A food chain integrated into dairy 
processing can enjoy lower distribucion wltli larger volu=c dock 
deliveries to supermarket warehouses or stores where in-store employees 
can be motivated to move the product promptly without costly waiting. 
Hence, food chain control over delivery and employees allow some cost 
savings. Also, the ownership of a plant may eliminate the problems 
of dealing with several smaller processors, none of which have sufficient 
capacity to supply the entire chain. 
Further, the Commission reports that it is quite unlikely that 
food chains have passed on these cost-savings to consumers. Most of 
the chains involved in dairy processing are relatively large and 
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therefore refrain from price cutting; in addition, the financial 
risk of investing in such facilities would also induce the chains 
to maintain the price level [22, p. 5]. However, it is quite likely 
that the threat of vertical integration by additional chains has 
induced some independent processors to hold down the wholesale price 
of milk. 
In general, the structure of the dairy industry has undergone 
substantial change since the turn of this century. The number of 
processors and the number of plants have diminished sharply, while 
food chains have entered the industry to partially supply their 
stores and to take advantage of cost-savings. Hence, the market 
for packaged fluid milk products has evolved into one with fewer 
firms who are now confronted with fewer and larger wholesale buyers. 
The effect of these structural changes on the levels of concentration 
and competition in the industry is considered below. 
Concentration in the Dairy Processing Industry 
As stated earlier, the market for fluid milk products is local 
in nature, although the market has become broader with the development 
of better refrigeration equipment and the construction of interstate 
highways. The majority of packaged fluid milk products is shipped 
within a fifty mile radius of the processing plant, but some plants 
ship milk up to 100 to 250 miles from the plant. Therefore, concentration 
in the industry should be viewed in local market areas rather than on 
a national basis. 
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In most local markets the market for packaged fluid milk products 
can be characterized as oligopolistic. Also, within a local area 
there tends to be only a few milk cooperatives supplying raw milk, 
and all dairy processors purchase machinery and containers from 
oligopolistic manufacturers. Therefore, the few dairy processors 
in a local market face similar costs of raw milk, equipment, and containers. 
As discussed in the second chapter, the existence of similar costs 
should enhance the possibility of effective coordination or collusion 
in the local dairy processing industry. In addition, the small number 
of firms in local markets, the lack of brand loyalty to milk products and 
of recent product change, and the inelastic market demand for dairy 
products all facilitate the possibility of effective coordination. 
As improved transportation lowered the transportation cost 
barrier between local markets, the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 
1965 started to include potential competitors in the computation of 
local market concentration ratios. Since the market boundaries are 
continuously changing, local market concentration ratios are generally 
considered to be poor. Even though the ratios must be viewed with 
caution, the average local concentration is high. Table 4.2, taken 
from the FTC dairy report, lists several local four firm concentration 
ratios in Federal Milk Market Areas from 1950 to 1969 [22, p. 461. In 
1965 one can see that the four largest processors in the milk order 
produced seventy-two percent of the total production in the order. In 
the last column is the four firm concentration rate of production 
within a 250 mile radius of a central city. In 1969 this four firm 
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Table 4.2. Average 4-finn local market concentration for packaged 
fluid milk 1950-1969 [22, p. 46]. 
4 largest proces­ 4 largest suppliers' 4 largest local 
sors' share of share of total fluid market processors' 
total production milk sales into the share of production 
from all plants market regardless in regions defined 
located in the of where it was by a 250-mile radius 
Year market^ processed^ around a central city^ 
1969 N.A.^ N.A. 42.2 
1965 72 66 41.7 
1962 67 63 
1959 64 61 
1956 62 60 
1953 60 60 
1950 56 N.A. 
^Includes volume of products moving out of the market area, but 
not the volume of products coming into the area from processors outside 
the area. Averages shown in this column are for 72 Federal Order Areas 
computed from Table 42, page 34, "The Structure of Fluid Milk Markets," 
1968. 
"The 1965 average is for 73 markets computed from the data source 
listed above. Data for 1953 through 1962 are averages of 66 Federal 
Order Areas computed from Table 48, page 58, "Nature of Competition 
in Fluid Milk Markets," Agricultural Economics Report No. 67, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, 1965 
'^See text, page 48. 
"^Not available,. 
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concentration ratio was 42.2 percent. However, this ratio may 
understate the extent of concentration at any one point in time 
since it includes potential competitors that are not currently 
selling in the central city. Nonetheless, concentration in local 
markets had been increasing up to 1966. Although reliable concentration 
ratios are unavailable, the Federal Trade Commission believes that 
concentration in local markets tends to be high and that since 1966 
concentration in local markets has been more stable than in the past. 
There is even reason to expect that concentration may have slightly 
decreased given the collapse of barriers between city markets. 
Although the market for milk products is local in nature, it 
may be useful to indicate the national size distribution of dairy 
processors. However, one should be aware of the fact that there 
are no national dairies in the sense that one processor operates in 
all areas of the United States. Instead, the largest dairy processors 
tend to operate in an extensive region(s) of the United States; 
therefore, the national four-firm concentration ratio in the dairy 
processing industry' will not be as large as in many other manufacturing 
industries. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are from the FTC dairy report. In Table 4.. 3 
concentration rates are computed on the basis of value of shipments 
Too ^ /1 1 U ^ /-s .->• J f /-» « « V ^ A  ^  ^  ^^ T.T Y ' ^ J - U. KIVA VVA & ^ T. M 
relatively stable between 1958 and 1957, while the eight firm, 
twenty firm, and fifty firm ratios all increased over the same period. 
In Table 4.4 concentration ratios are computed on the basis of physical 
volume [22, p. 55]. Here, the four firm ratio diminished three 
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Table 4.3. National value of shipments concentration for packaged 
fluid milk (20262); selected years [22, p. 54 
Percent of value of shipments 
Year accounted for by the 
3 largest^ 4 largest 8 largest 20 largest 50 largest 
dairies dairies dairies dairies dairies 
1967 22 25 35 45 55 
1963 21 25 32 42 50 
1958 22 26 32 40 47 
^Shares for three largest computed from data submitted to Federal 
Trade Commission. The three largest were Borden, National Dairy, and 
Foremost until 1963. Beatrice was number three in 1963 
percentage points between 1957 and 1970, given the stability of the 
same ratio in Table 4.3. Although no twenty-firm concentration ratios 
based on physical volume are available prior to 1970, the results 
in Table 4.3 indicate that the share of the ninth to the fiftieth 
largest firms has probably increased while the share of the four 
largest firms has probably decreased. This probably reflects the 
growth of the medium size dairies following the Federal Trade Commission's 
action against the merger activity of the four largest firms. 
To aid future analysis, it may also be interesting to indicate 
the productive capabilities of the largest dairy processors in 1973. 
At that time Borden and Kraftco each processed nearly three and a 
quarter billion pounds of milk in their plants. Beatrice and Foremost 
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Table 4.4. National physical volume concentration for packaged fluid 
milk (20262), selected years [22, p. 55]. 
Percent of gallons of non-farm consumption 
Year of fluid milk products processed by: 
3 largest^ 4 largest 8 largest 20 largest 
dairies dairies dairies dairies 
1970 16 19 27 41 
1957 19 22 27 N.A. 
1954 18 20 25 N.A. 
1950 16 17 20 N.A. 
1934^ 16 17^ 18® N.A. 
^Shares for three largest computed from data submitted to Federal 
Trade Commission. The three largest were: Borden, National Dairy and 
Beatrice in 1934. Foremost replaced Beatrice as the third largest in 
1958. However, in 1971, Beatrice was again in third place. 
^Not available. 
^Federal Trade Commission, "Agricultural Income Inquiry, Part 1 — 




Logether processed the same amount as Borden. The fifth through ninth 
largest processors each produced close to a billion pounds annually [22, 
p. 58]. The remainder of the firms in the industry processed substantially 
less than a billion pounds annually. 
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the national 
concentration of the dairy processing industries differs from the high 
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national levels of concentration observed in other large manufacturing 
industries. This is due to the local nature of the market for dairy products 
where concentration tends to be high. Mergers within the industry un­
doubtedly contributed to these high local levels of concentration, but the 
relevant question is whether such merger activity was necessary for the 
remaining firms to be efficient in terms of both processing and distribution. 
In some manufacturing industries technological considerations dictate 
the operation of a large sized plant in order to achieve all economies of 
scale in production. The smallest plant capable of achieving all economies 
of scale in production is referred to as the minimum efficient plant; 
where the output level of a minimum efficient plant is large relative to 
industry demand, the industry's level of concentration will be high. 
There have been several studies concerning the minimum efficient plant in 
dairy processing. 
One method of determining the minimum efficient plant is to observe 
the size of plants by new entrants into the market. In the dairy industry 
tlic new ciiuLiaiiLs have been the food cnains. However, these plants were 
engineered to specifically manufacture the needs of each of the chains and 
the use of such data might give a misleading estimate of the minimum 
efficient plant. Therefore, economists have tended to measure this through 
the use of engineering estimates and the survivorship technique. 
Although plants that process A,000 to 40,000 quarts of milk a 
dairy continue to operate, between 1950 and 1971 the number of these 
size plants diminished from 1,868 to 855 [22, p. 76]. Many of these 
plants have survived due to an ability to retain a small portion of 
the market, to produce a large volume of one type of milk, or to enjoy 
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an isolated market due to transportation barriers. But, in 
general, these plants are not large enough to effectively compete 
with larger plants. 
The Federal Trade Commission, in applying the survivorship 
technique, reports that between 1950 and 1971 the number of plants 
producing 40,000 quarts or more a day increased substantially. 
In this period there was a 164 percent increase in the number of 
40,000 quarts plants [22, p.79]. The survival and increase in number of 
plants that process at least 40,000 quarts of milk a day indicates 
that this size of plant may be the minimum efficient plant in dairy 
processing. 
There have also been engineering estimates of the minimum 
efficient plant that use simulation techniques to determine the 
output necessary to achieve the lowest per-unit cost. A study 
completed in 1970 by the Vermont Agricultural Station estimated 
the economies of scale of plants with outputs of 100,000, 400,000, 
and 800,000 quarts per day [5]. The study found the minimum efficient 
plant to be 800,000 quarts per day, but plants with lower daily 
output would have only a slight cost disadvantage. In the conclusion 
the report states, in reference to the study's cost simulation, 
Total daily operating costs were $3,388 for the 100,000-quart 
plant, $10,578 for the 400,000-quart plant, and $18,887 for the 
800,000-quart plant. Daily cost per quart of output was 3.4 cents, 
2.6 cents, and 2.4 cents for the three plants. This represents a 
saving of 8 mills per quart moving from 100,000 to 400,000 quarts, 
but only 2 mills from 400,000 to 800,000 quarts [5, p. 12], 
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Although the Vermont study indicates a minimum efficient plant 
much larger than the survivorship method, the Federal Trade Commission 
in its dairy report states the advantage of such a large plant is 
substantially reduced when future market conditions are not perfectly 
predictable as the Vermont study assumed. 
In addition to the Vermont study, there have been many other 
engineering estimates. A summary of these estimates indicates that the 
minimum efficient plant would be in the 40,000 to 50,000 quart range, 
which is close to that indicated in the FTC's survivorship study [22, p.85]. 
Also, there was an indication that plants which specialized in one 
product achieved all economies in processing at a lower output. 
The Federal Trade Commission reported that in 1971 there were 
616 plants whose daily output was close to 40,000 quarts per day 
and that these plants process at least seventy percent of all 
packaged fluid milk products. If this size plant is indeed the 
minimum efficient plant, the Commission concluded in an analysis 
of twenty standard metropolitan statistical areas that this daily 
output was not large enough to cause the existing high levels of 
local market concentration. 
In addition to economies of scale in processing, there are also 
Marketing in 1966 found the costs of distribution to be 18.6 
percent of the wholesale value of milk while processing costs were 
only 18.3 percent [21, p. 37]. The costs of distribution are generally 
harder to control because these costs depend upon three factors: 
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the channel of distribution, the service provided at each stop, 
and the volume of the account. In general, the costs of distribution 
will be lowest for a large wholesale account where there is dock 
pick-up at the plant, and the most costly method of delivery is retail 
home delivery. Since home delivery tends to be labor-intensive and 
labor costs have been rising, this costly form of delivery has been 
diminishing over time. 
There appears to be some economies in wholesale delivery accounts 
which are related to the number of stops as well as the volume of 
each stop. The Federal Trade Commission states that: 
A small dairy can serve most local customers as efficiently 
as a larger dairy. However, the larger customer with larger 
stores and many locations appears to require a larger dairy 
to fulfill the volume and service requirements . . . they 
frequently demand deliveries over wide geographic areas with 
service to all of their divisional retail outlets. This fact 
alone precludes service of these large accounts by small dairies. 
Smaller dairies and even some middle tier dairies experience great 
difficulty in obtaining the private label accounts of the fifty 
or so largest national food chains [22, p. 93]. 
Therefore, it appears that there is some advantage to size in supplying 
larger accounts, but there is no indication how large the firm must be 
to overcome these difficulties and achieve all economies of distribution. 
In addition to the food chain accounts, there are many other 
wholesale accounts where hifness mav nnt npreggarv. gnd ^mailer 
dairies could probably efficiently distribute to these accounts. 
However, because of the variation in the methods of distribution, it 
is difficult to be exact about the size of plant necessary to achieve 
cost-savings in distribution. In fact, the Federal Trade Commission 
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concluded that it believed any economies of scale in distribution 
were not so extensive as to cause the high levels of local market 
coiicStiurâ. cxori. # 
Although no consideration was given to economies of scale in 
procurement or advertising, the FTC dairy report concluded that 
the economies of scale in both processing and distribution were 
not sufficient to cause high levels of local market concentration 
in dairy processing. Hence, the industry's merger activity may 
have been necessary to eliminate many of the smaller, inefficient 
firms, but the necessity of such acquisitions cannot be fully 
attributed to technological considerations. In most regional markets 
it is estimated that the area can support at least a half dozen 
plants and in the more densely populated areas a greater number of 
plants can survive. 
Conclusion 
The dairy processing industry is a well-established industry, 
but the industry has experienced some important structural changes. 
There are now fewer firms and plants, and local market concentration 
tends to be high. However, studies on the economies of scale in 
processing indicate that technological considerations in production 
are not the reason for such high levels of concentration. The 
extensive merger movement in the industry can explain much of the high 
levels of concentration. 
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In addition, changes in the channels of distribution and 
in the number of buyers have also been important. Retail home 
delivery is diminishing in importance, while wholesale accounts 
in retail outlets, especially supermarkets, have become quite 
important. The entry of food chains into processing and the threat 
of additional integration have also forced market adjustments as 
well. Many smaller processors are unable to fulfill entire wholesale 
accounts at a competitive price, and this has contributed to the 
disappearance of some of these firms. In addition, the threat of 
integration adds a competitive influence to the market. However, 
in most local markets where seller concentration is high, one 
would expect some type of tacit or overt collusion to exist. 
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CHAPTER V. THE DES MOINES AREA DAIRY PROCESSING INDUSTRY 
In the preceding chapter the market for fluid milk products was 
described as being local in nature, and in most local markets the 
dairy processing industry can be characterized as being oligopolistic. 
The Des Moines area market can be described in much the same way. 
Currently, there are three processors operating in the Des Moines 
Metropolitan Area; and two of these firms. Dairy A and Dairy B are 
relatively large single plant processors while the third. Dairy C, is quite 
small. Within a fifty :nilc radius of Des Moines there are four additional 
processors, three of which (Dairies D, E, and F) are quite small, 
while the fourth (Dairy G) is somewhat larger but not as large as 
Dairies A and B. Within a 150 mile radius of Des Moines there are 
at least another dozen processors of fluid milk. However, in addition 
to the three processors located in Des Moines, only a dairy in 
Rochester, Minnesota (Dairy H) and a retail store chain in Omaha, 
Nebraska (Dairy I) currently market fluid milk products in the 
Des Moines Metropolitan Area. 
There can be little doubt that the Des Moines packaged fluid 
milk market is oligopolistic, and it can be described as a duopoly 
since A and 5 have a substantial majority of the market. Firms A 
and B have been the dominant firms in the Des Moines area for many 
years; however, it is hard to determine the exact length of time 
due to the lack of information or production data. 
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In 1970 there were nine processors selling dairy products in 
the Des Moines area.^ In addition to the three current area 
processors (Dairies À, B, and C) and Dairies D and I, milk products 
were also being sold by four other dairies (J, K, L, and H). Dairies 
J, K, and L operated plants in the Des Moines area. Both Dairies K and 
L were quite small with each producing less than 6,000 quarts per day 
in 1970. Dairy L ceased operations in May, 1971 and Dairy K ceased 
operations in March, 1972. In each case the size of operation was 
simply too small to achieve economies of scale and to remain competitive 
2 
with the larger dairies in the area. 
The operation of Dairy J was much larger than that of Dairies L, 
K or C but smaller than either Dairy A or Dairy B. In 1970, and until 
June 30, 1971, Dairy J was reportedly processing between 50,000 and 
130,000 quarts per day, and therefore Dairy J's output was large enough 
to achieve most economies of scale in processing. However, Dairy J 
clO?9d r9Tlt OTÎ JutlP -> 1971 riin v * c: 
refusal to continue operation after an unfavorable settlement with 
the local union of Teamsters. At this time. Dairy J had diversified into 
^This information was obtained in an interview with Mr. Charles 
Griffith of the City of Des Moines Health Department — Milk Sanitation 
and in an interview with Mr. Fred Stout of the Iowa Department of 
Agriculture — Dairy Trade Practices. 
2 This comment is based upon the interview with Mr. Fred Stout. 
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product lines which its officials considered more profitable, and the 
dairy processor closed the Des Moines plant to utilize the available 
money capital in more profitable operations. When Dairy J closed the 
Des Moines plant, this represented the exit of the only significant 
competitor that Dairies A and B faced in the Des Moines area. 
Dairy M was another competitor in the Des Moines area until 1971. 
This dairy operated a plant in Corydon, Iowa until being purchased 
recently by a cooperative, Mississippi Valley Milk Producers Association. 
Although the dairy did market milk products in the Des Moines area, 
in 1970 the firm's market share was even smaller than that of Dairy L. 
In 1970 Dairy D sold milk products in the Des Moines area until it 
temporarily ceased operations in September, 1971; however. Dairy D 
was similar to Dairy M in that it only had a very small share of the 
market. 
Dairy I is the only food chain that distributes milk in the 
Des Moines area, and the chain's milk products are processed in a plant 
located in Omaha, Nebraska. Since 1970 this food chain has annually 
distributed packaged fluid milk products that would comprise approximately 
two percent of the milk marketed in the Des Moines area. 
Dairy H, which operates a relatively large plant in Rochester, 
Minnesota, began distribution of dairy products in the Des Moines area 
in 1973. Since 1973 Dairy H's share of the Des Moines market has been 
substantially less than one percent. 
Dairy C continues to operate its milk processing plant three days 
a week. Since 1970 Dairy C's share of the Des Moines market has also 
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been quite small, about one percent of the total market. This dairy 
has survived in the Des Moines area because the firm supplies four 
of its own ice cream stores and therefore has a captive account. 
In May, 1970 Dairy A was purchased by the milk cooperative whose 
headquarters are located in Carlinville, Illinois. The Dairy A Division 
of this cooperative is the second largest dairy processor within a fifty-
mile radius of Des Moines, and the dairy has a capacity well in excess 
of 40,000 quarts per day. Since 1970 estimates of the dairy's production 
indicate that the dairy output has nearly doubled and is well in excesr 
of 40,000 quarts per day. This would indicate that Dairy A's output is 
large enough to achieve most economies of scale in processing. 
Dairy A processes such milk products as sour cream, cottage cheese, 
buttermilk, skim milk, fluid milk, low fat milk, chocolate milk, and 
yogurt. According to an official of Dairy A, the dairy distributes 
approximately twenty-five percent of its fluid milk products in the 
Des Moines area and distributes the remainder to other areas within 
Iowa or bordering states. Dairy A not only distributes its own brand 
name milk products, but it also packages private label milk products 
for many of the food chains located in the Des Moines area. 
Although Dairy A is part of a large milk cooperative, the dairy 
processing plant located in Des Moines is not supplied ra;^ milk by the 
parent cooperative. The raw milk supplied to the Des Moines plant 
comes mainly from cooperatives located in Federal Milk Order 79 which 
contains the Des Moines area. 
The largest dairy processor in the Des Moines area is Dairy B. 
This dairy was incorporated in 1938 and became the dominant firm 
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in the area by reinvesting profits back into the operation. In 1975 
the dairy had total sales of $29,100,000 according to Dun and Bradstreet. 
Since 1970 the daily output of the dairy has expanded and the plant 
reportedly processes more than 200,000 quarts per day which indicates 
that substantial economies of scale in processing have been achieved. 
An unidentified dairy employee indicated that the plant was capable 
of processing one million pounds or approximately 465,000 quarts of 
milk in at least an eighteen hour day. 
Dairy B also processes such packaged fluid products as sour cream, 
chocolate milk, buttermilk, fluid milk, cottage cheese, cream, and 
yogurt. The firm reportedly distributes from twenty-five to thirty-three 
percent of its output in the Des Moines area and ships the remainder 
into areas within Iowa and bordering states. In contrast to Dairy A, 
Dairy B primarily processes its own brand products and only processes 
milk under one private label. According to Fred Stout of the Iowa 
Department of Agriculture, this is due to the many years of developing 
the Dairy B brand name through extensive advertising. 
Although data limitations do not allow the estimation of market 
shares for Dairy A and Dairy B in the Des Moines area, there is little 
doubt that these two firms control a substantial share of this market. 
Fred Stout of the Iowa Department of Agrirnl tnre estitnated that Dairy A 
and Dairy B control more than ninety-five percent of the Des Moines area 
market for packaged fluid-milk products, and Charles Griffith also felt 
that these two dairies controlled a comparable share of the market. 
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The high level of concentration in this market indicates that 
the market is a tight knit oligopoly. Under such circumstances 
there tends to be very little open price competition if some type of 
effective industry coordination is found- In Polk County there are 
essentially two dairy processors supplying the market. Dairy B primarily 
distributes its own brand of milk products while Dairy A distributes not 
only its own brand but is also relatively more involved in processing 
private labels than is Dairy B. This may suggest that each dairy has 
found its own part of the market in order to avoid price competition. 
Dairy A and Dairy B are unionized by the Teamsters, and it is likely 
that each firm pays similar prices for equipment and containers since 
each of these products is only produced by three or four national firms. 
In addition, the price of raw milk would be similar since the price of 
Class I and Class II is regulated under Federal Order 79. Therefore, 
the firms are likely to have all these costs in common. However, there 
may be some costs that differ between the two companies. Differences in 
capacity utilization and internal efficiency could contribute to 
differences in the cost of processing. Also, there may be differences 
in the cost of promotion and distribution. Since Dairy B is primarily 
concerned with promoting its own brand, it is possible that this firm 
incurs higher costs of prcmcticn than does Dairy A. Finally, Lhe two 
companies may have different target profits or profit margins. However, 
despite these possible differences, it appears likely that the 
cost similarities they share are sufficient to enable the two firms 
to have an incentive to engage in and maintain tacit or overt collusion. 
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Although data is not available to determine the growth rates of the 
individual dairies over time, an unidentified dairy industry official 
indicated that Dairy A has experienced, on the average, a higher relative 
rate of growth in physical volume since 1971 than has Dairy B. Hence, 
Dairy A's recent growth would indicate that it has become a larger rival 
of Dairy B. If data were available to compute firm market shares, it 
would be interesting to determine the effect of Dairy A's growth upon 
the degree of market stability in the Des Moines area. 
An important question may be why Dairy A experienced such high rates 
of growth in physical volume in the period 1970 to 1972. There are several 
hypothetical answers. First, the former Dairy A was purchased by the 
by the cooperative in 1970 and since the cooperative is a large regional 
cooperative and processor, the Des Moines plant may have enjoyed greater 
financial support after the acquisition that enabled the dairy to broaden 
its market or to become more efficient. Second, the exit of Dairy J from 
the market in 1971 may have allowed Dairy A to pick up a greater number of 
accounts and increase its market share. Third, the demand for packaged 
fluid milk products iray have increased and Dairy A may have taken advantage 
of the opportunity. The per—capita consumption figures available from 
Federal Order 79 suggests that demand may have increased between 1970 
and 1972. Finally, Dairy A may have grown more due to the dairy's 
willingness to process private label milk products for food chains. Such 
private label products have become increasingly more acceptable to con­
sumers. Any of these explanations is plausible and it is perhaps likely 
that all help explain Dairy A's recent growth. 
In the preceding chapter it was noted that many food chains have 
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been backward integrating into dairy processing; however. Dairy I is the 
only chain in Des Moines which processes its own private label. However, 
ChlH chain's procoHKlnR plant is ](^cated in Omaha. Several reasons may 
explain why the other Des Moines food chains have not followed this trend. 
Many of the food chains operating in Des Moines are regional chains and 
the total demand of each such chain may not be sufficient to operate a 
processing plan of minimum efficient size. In addition, these regional 
chains may not have the money capital necessary for such an investment. 
Another possibility is that Dairy A and, to some extent. Dairy B may be 
processing the private label products at a price that forestalls entry 
by these chains. Although any of these reasons are possible, the 
absence of food chain processing plants in the Des Moines area is in 
sharp contrast to other metropolitan areas throughout the United States. 
There are several other interesting characteristics of the Des Moines 
area market. One is the absence of a national dairy in the market; one 
national dairy operates a plant in Ottumwa but has declined to market 
of a dairy processing plant owned and supplied by a milk cooperative. 
This eliminates any possibility of a price squeeze in this market. 
However, recently the Mississippi Valley Milk Producers Association has 
purchased plants in Waterloo, Corydon, Cedar Rapids, and Rock Island, 
Illinois, Although such vertical acquisitions may have potentially 
anti-competitive effects in Iowa, there is also a possibility that this 
company may become a viable potential competitor of Dairy A and Dairy B 
in the Des Moines area in the future. 
79 
Although there are some sizeable potential competitors within 
a 200-mile radius, these plants have not penetrated the Des Moines 
area. This may be due to the cost of transportation; but, as 
transportation barriers are eliminated, it may be possible for them 
to enter the Des Moines area. This may be especially true for processors 
located in northern Iowa and southern Minnesota where the cost of 
raw milk is lower. Although the differential is only between sixteen 
cents and thirty-four cents per hundredweight, this may be enough 
to compensate for the increased cost of transportation. However, 
as stated earlier, most processors tend to ship milk products within 
only a fifty mile radius. 
In addition to the potential competition of existing processors, 
there is also the possibility of newly established entrants in the 
Des Moines area. This will depend upon the height of the barriers 
to entry. Here, one can only guess on the presence of some barriers 
to entry. First, it would probably be necessary for a new firm to 
bulla tne minimum etticient plant to avoid being cost disadvantaged 
since Dairy A and Dairy B have achieved most processing economies. 
Also, there may be a difficulty in acquiring wholesale accounts, 
especially with food chains whose total account and number of stops 
may require a larger operation. It is unlikely that promotional 
expenses, such as advertising, would be an effective barrier since 
consumer brand loyalty tends to be quite low for dairy products. 
Finally, it may be possible that Dairy A and Dairy B are setting 
prices to forestall or block entry by a new firm; but there is no 
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evidence to support this conjecture. However, the experience in dairy 
processing nationwide is that the only newly established entrants 
have been food chains which have captive outlets, but this has not been 
true of the Des Moines area market to this date. Therefore, the 
only true potential competition would be from established firms located 
in different areas. 
In general, seller concentration in the market for fluid milk 
products in the Des Moines area is highly concentrated, but is this 
level of concentration necessary to achieve most economies in processing? 
The preceding chapter indicated that a 40,000 quart plant could achieve 
most of these cost savings, and such a plant working five days a 
week would process 10,400,000 quarts or 22,360,000 pounds of milk 
per year. Annual statistics of the Federal Milk Market Administration 
indicate that Polk County consumes around 90,000,000 pounds of fluid 
milk products annually, and this would indicate that the Polk County 
area alone could support four processors operating at the minimum 
efficient size. This leads one co a conclusion chac i.iie i:oin;eaLi<aLj.ui.i 
in Polk County is excessive. 
Conclusion 
The dairy processing industry in the Des Moines area parallels 
that of most other local areas. The number of firms are few and 
market concentration is excessively high. The two dominant firms. 
Dairy A and Dairy B, have a combined market share well in excess 
of ninety percent; but. Dairy A has been experiencing a more rapid 
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rate of growth than has Dairy B. However, the lack of market share 
or detailed production information makes it impossible to analyze 
the relative stability of market shares for the two firms. 
In two ways, the Des Moines area market differs from the typical 
local metropolitan market in the dairy processing industry. First, 
there is only one food chain selling its own processed milk products, 
and Dairy A is the major processor of private label milk for the 
Des Moines area food chains. There is also an absence of vertical 
integrated milk cooperative-processors in the Des Moines area. 
However, the recent acquisitions of the Mississippi Valley Milk 
Producers Association may enable this cooperative to enter the 
Des Moines area market in the near future. 
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CHAPTER VT. AN ANALYSIS OF PRICING BEHAVIOR 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter the Des Moines area dairy processing industry 
was described as a duopoly, and the primary concern of this chapter will 
be the pricing behavior of the firms in this industry involved in the 
sale of fluid milk products to school districts. In addition, this 
analysis should allow some conclusions regarding the relationship 
of industry structure and performance in a sealed tender market. This 
chapter will begin with a comparison of the Des Moines area industry 
with the profile of a conspiracy prone industry outlined and discussed 
in Chapter 2. Before reviewing the actual bidding patterns, some of 
the information gathered in the course of this study will be presented; 
this may provide some explanation of the observed patterns. The actual 
bids submitted to school districts in Polk County and in Linn County 
as well as the Ames Community School District will be reviewed for the 
school years 1972-73 to 1977-78 where data was available. The objective 
will be to utilize the output from the computer programs described in 
Chapter 3 as well as additional statistical analysis to determine if 
there is any evidence of noncompetitive bidding practices among the dairy 
firms in any of the districts included in this study. 
Similarity of the Market Under Investigation 
to the Conspiracy-prone Industry 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the conspiracy prone industry typically 
can be characterized as a highly concentrated industry where the number 
of firms is small, the firms sell a simple, homogeneous product, the 
rate of technological change is slow, the cost structures of the firms 
are similar; there exist some barriers to entry and few potential 
competitors, the demand for the product is inelastic, and the product 
is sold in sealed bid markets. In addition to the above characteristics, 
collusive behavior is also more likely to occur where the industry's 
orders are infrequent and lumpy, the industry tends to have high fixed 
costs, and the number of buyers is small. Given this set of character­
istics, consideration should now be given at to how well the Des Moines 
area dairy processing industry matches this profile. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, there is little doubt that this industry 
in the Des Moines area is highly concentrated, with two firms reportedly 
controlling at least ninety-five percent of the Des Moines area market. 
In addition, dairy products tend to be simple, relatively homogeneous 
products. Although there are a number of products which differ in flavor, 
butterfat content, and size of containers, it is likely that larger dairies 
process similar lines of these products. The dairy processing industry 
has experienced some recent process technological change, but it is 
doubtful that the pace of change would be rapid enough to make collusive 
agreements difficult to maintain. Fred Stout of the Iowa Department of 
Agriculture indicated that much of the recent technological change had 
been in the equipment thsr fills and seals the various container sizes 
marketed by a dairy.^ 
"""This information was obtained in a personal interview with 
Mr. Fred Stout of the Iowa Department of Agriculture. 
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The information presented in Chapter 5 also indicated that the 
two larger dairy processors in the Des Moines area were likely to have 
similar cost structures. The two firms probably pay similar prices 
for raw milk, equipment, hourly workers, and containers; together, 
these expenses are likely to represent a sizeable proportion of 
the firms' total costs of production. In addition, the previous 
chapter indicated that there was reason to speculate that there were 
some barriers to entry into the Des Moines market since the regional 
food chains have not backward integrated into dairy processing. However, 
there is no evidence of what type of barriers exist or how important 
these barriers are in discouraging the entry of potential competitors. 
Finally, the demand for fluid milk products tends to be inelastic, 
especially in the school board market. The school districts are not 
likely to be sensitive to price changes for several reasons. The 
high nutritional value of milk generally makes milk products an 
important source of vitamins in the diet of children, and school districts 
are concerned with serving nutritional, balanced meals which include milk. 
Hence, the importance of milk products in the school lunch program would 
lead one to conclude that the demand for milk by school districts 
would not be very sensitive to price changes. In addition, the federal 
governiuent Subsidizes the districts ' purchase of milk, such chat children 
only pay a fraction of the total cost of the milk. Therefore, it is 
likely that the demand for milk products by school districts is 
relatively inelastic. 
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From the preceding discussion one can conclude that the Des Moines 
area dairy processing industry does fit the profile of a conspiracy-prone 
industry. Although the processors in the Des Moines area have many 
customers and probably do not have excessive fixed costs, these factors 
do not appear to be sufficient to alter the above conclusion. However, 
it should be remembered that many industries might fit the conspiracy-
prone profile and yet not be involved in collusive conduct. Also, the 
conclusion that the Des Moines dairy processing industry matches the 
profile indicates only that further investigation of pricing behavior 
is necessary to formulate a conclusion regarding the probability of 
collusive conduct. 
The Linn County area school districts were chosen as a comparative, 
competitive benchmark against which to measure the behavior in the 
Des Moines dairy market. While it would be true that many of the 
characteristics of a conspiracy-prone industry would apply to the 
Linn County area's dairy industry, there are a few differences that would 
tend to make it more competitive. First, there are more firms either 
processing packaged fluid milk products or distributing such products. 
Cedar Rapids has three firms chat process milk, but only one has been 
active in the school district market included in this study's sample. 
In addition, there is a dairy processing firm located in Iowa City 
that has been active irregularly in the school board market. There 
are also several dairy distributors, located in several small towns 
surrounding Cedar Rapids that have supplied many of the school districts, 
finally, a dairy located in Waterloo and a dairy located in Des Moines 
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have also submitted bids to the Linn County area schools. In sum, 
there are more firms attempting to win the contracts of the Linn County 
school districts than there are in the Des Moines area. Although many 
of these firms submit bids irregularly, the irregular nature of their 
bidding is probably a pro-competitive influence in the market. Also, 
this probably indicates that there is some potential competition and 
that the barriers to entry must not be excessively high. Thus, given 
the nature of the Linn County area market, it was chosen as a standard 
for comparison. 
The Ames Community School District is included in this study 
because this district has also been supplied by the Des Moines area 
processors. However, there is a third competitor in the Ames market, 
and this many enable one to see how the Des Moines area processors 
respond when there is one additional firm in the market. This third 
competitor is a distributor of the same dairy products distributed 
by a very active firm in the Linn County school district market, and 
this enables even further comparisons of pricing behavior in the 
different markets. 
Bidding Arrangements 
In the process of collecting the dairy bids, additional information 
about the bidding process was also gathered since such information may 
explain many anomalies in the data. Such information as special contract 
arrangements, the basis for determination of the award, and the delivery 
arrangements are all important considerations. This section will review 
some of the more important facts about the two areas' bidding arrangements. 
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In the Polk County area there are nine school districts: Ankeny, 
Bondurant-Farrar, Des Moines Independent, Johnston, North Polk, 
Saydel, Southeast Polk, Urbandale, and West Des Moines. The schools 
located in the North Polk, Bondurant-Farrar, and Southeast Polk 
districts are the farthest from the dairy processors located in 
Des Moines, and none of the schools are located any more than 
thirty miles from the Des Moines area processors. One important part 
of the forthcoming analysis will be the relationship between the bid 
and the distance traveled during delivery. 
One would normally expect that the bid price would increase as 
transportation costs increase, ceteris paribus. However, it was learned 
that the school districts in the Polk County area do not share a common 
delivery arrangement. The larger school districts require daily deliveries 
to meet their daily consumption, while the smaller districts may only 
require delivery every other day. Hence the number of weekly deliveries 
is also an important consideration in the relationship between bid 
price and transportation costs. Table 6.1 summarizes the number of 
weekly deliveries of each school district. 
Until the 1974-75 schoolyear the contract specifications were such 
that the dairy agreed to supply fluid milk products at the quoted bid 
price for the entire contract period; hence, the quuted bid was 
known as a firm bid. During the contract period of the 1973-74 
schoolyear the cost of raw milk in a half pint of processed milk 
increased from $.03832 in August, 1973 to $.05133 in May, 1974 which is 
an increase of $.013 per half pint. Such an increase in costs made the 
88 
Table 6.1. Delivery arrangements of Polk County area school districts 
District Number of Deliveries Per Week 
Ankeny 5 
Bondurant-Farrar 2-3 
Des Moines 5 
Johnston 3 
North Polk 3 
Saydel 3 
Southeast Polk 5 
Urbandale 5 
West Des Moines 5 
school district market for milk products unprofitable; hence, in the 
following schoolyear the contract arrangements were changed for all 
school districts in the Polk County area except Des Moines. The new 
contracta contained what is kaowu an escalacor clause, wnicn allows 
the supply price to vary with changes in the federally regulated price 
of raw milk. When the regulated price for the upcoming month falls 
below the price of the month in which the bid was calculated, the 
supply price decreases correspondingly. The supply price increases 
proportionately when the price of the upcoming month rises above the 
base month's price. Generally, this clause works as follows: for each 
change of $.18605 per hundredweight in the regulated price of raw milk 
there will be a change of $.001 per half pint in the supply price to the 
districts. The introduction of the escalator clause simply allows the 
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dairy to maintain the same margin between the supply price and the cost 
of raw milk throughout the contract period. 
The escalator clause was rejected by the Des Moines Independent 
School District, but the district did compromise on the length of 
the contract period. Beginning with the first semester of the 
1974-75 schoolyear, the Des Moines district began requesting bids 
two times per schoolyear. During the summer months the district 
accepts bids to supply dairy products from September through December, 
and near the close of the fall semester the district accepts bids for 
the period January to June. This arrangement also gave the supplying 
dairies an opportunity to react twice a year to favorable or unfavorable 
cost changes. 
The school districts were also asked how the contract was awarded. 
In general, all of the districts awarded the contract to the dairy 
submitting the lowest bids on the variety of products requested by 
the districts. However, there were cases where a district would accept 
a liiguei. bid because rhe dairy submitting the lowest bid did not meet 
other specifications such as the type of container or the butterfat 
content. These occurrences will be emphasized later in this chapter 
where appropriate. 
In addition, it is necessary to discuss the special contract 
provisions of the Des Moines Independent School District. Since the 
early 1970's this district has split the supply area into four 
quadrants, known as Northeast, Southeast, Northwest, and Southwest. 
The district accepts bids on any or all of the quadrants; and awards 
a contract for each quadrant to the overall lowest bidder. 
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This division of the district was accomplished with the consultation 
of the Des Moines area dairy processors to insure efficient delivery 
to the small schools as well as the large schools in the district. 
The division of the district attempts to make the quantity sold in any 
quadrant approximately equal to that of the other quadrants. 
Finally, it is generally true that the supplying dairy will 
furnish coolers and straws to the school districts. However, there 
are exceptions to this rule. The Des Moines district owns some coolers 
in their schools, and the dairies have generally specified during the bidding 
period the price adjustment (typically, a discount of $.001 per half pint) 
for milk delivered to schools with coolers. In addition, some districts 
do not require straws in the contract specifications and this will be 
pointed out later in this chapter where appropriate. 
In Linn County there are eleven school districts, but only eight 
districts were able to supply information on their dairy bids. These 
eight districts were Albumett, Cedar Rapids, Center Point, College, 
Linn-Mar, Lisboa, MouuL Vernon, and North Linn. in addition, the Central 
City Community School District was able to identify the supplier in 
each year. All of the Linn County school districts are located within 
a thirty mile radius of Cedar Rapids. Unlike the Polk County area, 
these school districts have occasionally been supplied by dairies 
located outside the Cedar Rapids area. 
In the Linn County area, as in the Des Moines area, the districts 
are on different delivery schedules. Some require daily delivery 
while others only require delivery every other day. Table 6.2 contains the 
delivery arrangement of each Linn County district included in this study. 
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Table 6.2. Delivery arrangement of the Linn County area school districts 
Number of 
District Deliveries per Week 
Alburnett 3 
Cedar Rapids 5 




Y-T^ /-VT^ 2-3  
North Linn 2-3 
The dairies supplying milk to these districts also initiated an 
escalator clause in the contracts to reduce their profit risk, and the 
clause operates the same as previously described for the Polk County area. 
However, some Linn County districts accepted a contract with this clause 
during the course of the 1973-74 schoolyear; this is one year before 
the clause's known introduction in the Polk County area. 
Just as the school districts in the Polk County area, the Linn 
County districts also reported that the contract was awarded to the over-
1 TA A VA V.VA V A A ^ N r\r\ O ^ ^T-v"ie VI 11 A T.TV» "Î R* V» 
will be discussed further where appropriate. In most districts the 
provision of coolers was also a contract specification, but not one of 
the districts indicated that the provision of straws was a contract 
specification. These provisions will also be discussed further where 
appropriate. 
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The Ames Community School District, like those in Polk County, 
accepted contracts with escalator clauses in 1974. In addition, the 
Ames District receives daily delivery of dairy products from the dairies. 
However, the provision of straws and coolers is more complicated in 
Ames than in Polk County. Recently, the Ames District purchased some 
coolers; therefore, the district now requests bids with and without 
coolers. In the early years of this study's analysis, coolers were required 
and not until 1977 did the district begin requesting bids without coolers. 
The provision of straws has also varied, with some schools in the district 
requiring straws while others did not. Therefore, it will be impossible 
to determine a pricing factor for straws in this district. 
Analysis of Bid Patterns 
In this section the bidding patterns of the dairies operating in 
the Polk County area, the Ames Community School District, and the Linn 
County area will be reviewed. The analysis will begin with a review of 
the school district market shares of the dairies oDeraLlng in Lhe two 
areas and of the degree of market stability in the two areas. Second, 
the results of some statistical analysis of the two areas' winning bids 
over time will be presented. The primary interest of the statistical 
testing will be the determination of the extent of similarity of the 
two areas' bid distributions. Third, the analysis will continue with 
a review of the bids submitted to the school districts during the 
period between 1972-73 and 1977-73. Finally, there will be an analysis 
of the relationship between the change in bid price from schoolyear to 
schcclyear and the change in the cost of raw milk during this period. 
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The analysis presented in this section should allow some conclusions 
regarding the type of pricing behavior observed in the two areas, 
as well as in the Ames Community School District. 
Market shares and market stability 
During the six year period of this analysis, the Polk County 
area school districts have received bids on fluid-milk products (which 
excludes ice cream) from five dairy processors. During the fall 
semester of 1972 the Des Moines Independent School District received 
bids from Dairy V located in Omaha, Nebraska, and this dairy did win 
the Northeast quadrant. However, Dairy V supplied products to this 
quadrant only during the fall semester. This quadrant was reassigned 
to Dairy A at the beginning of the second semester because Dairy V 
was having delivery problems. 
Dairy D and Dairy T have also submitted bids periodically to 
the districts in the Polk County area. Dairy T, located in Waterloo, 
was ULLSUCC^SSf J-TL êacn CâSc, uuL. uo.JLi.y u uxu. Will Lilc coilLrciCLti u L 
the Urbandale and West Des Moines districts during the 1976-77 
schoolyear. Dairy D has experienced soine difficulties in supplying 
milk to the school districts in the area because the firm markets its 
fluid milk products only in plastic pouches which the school districts 
have been reluctant to accept as a substitute for half pints. This 
dairy has also experienced difficulties with the required delivery 
arrangements and has had a shortage of coolers to place in the schools. 
With the exception of the above cases, the school districts in 
this area have been supplied by the two large Des Moines area dairy 
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processors, Dairy A and Dairy B. During this time, Dairy B has 
successfully won the dairy contracts in Boundurant-Farrar, Des Moines 
Northeast (with the exception of the fall semester of 1972), Des Moines 
Southeast, North Polk, and Southeast Polk. This dairy has also been 
the successful bidder in the Saydel district during the period, with 
the exception of the 1974-75 schoolyear. In this schoolyear the contract 
was awarded to Dairy A upon the basis of the dairy's half pint orange 
drink bid. An official for this district indicated the two dairies 
were quite surprised and upset about the award of the contract to Dairy A. 
On the other hand. Dairy A has been the successful bidder for the 
contracts awarded in Ankeny, Des Moines Northwest, Des Moines Southwest, 
and Johnston during the entire period covered by this study. This dairy 
has also supplied dairy products to the Urbandale and West Des Moines 
districts during the entire period except for the 1976-77 schoolyear as 
discussed previously. With the exception of the Des Moines Northeast 
contract in 1972, the Saydel contract in 1974, and the Urbandale and 
west JDes Moines contracts in 1976, Dairy A has generally won six of twelve 
contracts and Dairy B has generally won six of twelve contracts in each 
ysEr « 
Table 6.3a summarizes the bidding activity for contracts awarded in 
the summer months before each schoolyear in the period. The colurcns 
summarize, by dairy, the number contracts for which bids were submitted 
and the number of contracts won. Since some districts did not maintain 
detailed records for each year, it is possible that some dairies submitted 
more bids than shown; however, the districts were certain that no other 
dairies submitted bids during the period. As shown in Table 6.3 Dairy A 
Table 6.3a. Summary of summer bidding activity for the Polk County area market 
Dairy B Paltry D Dairy T Dairy A Dairy V 
Number Number Number Number Number 
sub- Number sub- Number sub- Number sub- Number sub- Number 
Summer of mitted won mil;ted won mitted won mitted won mitted won 
1972 12 50000 10 6 11 
1973 11 6 0 0 0 0 9 6 0 0 
1974 12 5 0 0 0 0 11 7 0 0 
1975 11 600 2 0 12 6 00 
1976 12 6 2 2 2 0 12 A 0 0 
1977 12 6 6 0 4 0 12 6 0 0 






























































and Dairy B each won fifty percent of the contracts awarded in the 
schoolyears of 1973-74, 1975-76, and 1977-78. In addition. Dairy B 
eventually was awarded the Des Moines Northeast contract during the 
1972-73 schoolyear. 
Table 6.3b sunznarizes the bidding activity for contracts awarded 
for the second semester in the Des Moines Independent School District. 
During the four years that such contracts have been awarded. Dairy A 
and Dairy B were each awarded two of the four contracts. In addition, 
each dairy consistently won the same quadrants in each contract period. 
The information contained in Tables 6.3a and 6.3b suggests that 
there is a tendency for Dairy A and Dairy B to evenly divide between 
themselves the Polk County school district market. If the 1972 
Des Moines Northeast contract, the 1974 Saydel contract, or the 1976 
Urbandale and West Des Moines contracts would have been awarded to 
the lowest bidder on dairy products from Dairy A or Dairy B, then 
each dairy would have won six of twelve contracts in each year. 
Iri additioa LU Lhe apparent market division ot the area, there 
is also the tendency for each dairy to supply the same districts or 
quadrants year after year. Such an occurrence strongly suggests that 
there may be a geographic allocation of the school district market 
in Polk County, but further analysis of the bidding patterns of the 
two dairies is necessary. 
Since not all of the Polk County districts purchase the same 
quantity of milk, it is also necessary to review the quantity of milk 
purchased by each district. The Iowa Department of Public Instruction 
was able to furnish quantity data on the total number of half pints 
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purchased by each district for the schoolyears under analysis. 
Since quantity data was not available on the other dairy products 
purchased by the districts, the forthcoming analysis will be restricted 
to half pints of homogenized whole milk, chocolate whole milk, homogenized 
two percent milk, chocolate two percent milk, and skim milk. However, 
the Iowa Department of Public Instruction was not able to provide a 
product breakdown of the quantity of half pints purchased. In addition, 
only an aggregate figure was available for the Des Moines district; 
hence, it will be assumed that each quadrant receives a quarter of 
the aggregate quantity. This assumption is appropriate; Janice Dudley 
of the Des Moines Independent School District indicated in an 
interview that the district tried to divide the district into quadrants 
such that the quantity purchased in each quadrant would be approximately 
equal to that of the other quadrants. 
The availability of the quantity of half pints purchased by each 
district allows for the estimation of firm market shares. This will 
also allow the estimation of the Herfindahl index and the statistical 
estimation necessary to judge market stability in the Polk County 
school board market. 
Table 6.4 contains the schoolyear quantity of half pints purchased 
by each school district, and Table 6.5 contains the schoolyear market 
shares of successful bidders and the schoolyear Herfindahl index for 
the Polk County school district market. In Table 6.5 one can see that 
Dairy B had a market share of approximately forty five percent for 
four of the six schoolyears while Dairy A had a market share of at 
least fifty-four percent in five of six schoolyears. Further, the 
Table 6.4. Qviantlt;y of lialf pints purchased by Polk County School Districts 
Quantity of Half Pints for Schoolyear of 
District 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78^ 
Ankeny 471 ,364  <52 ,682  487,843 536,302 598,660 519,388 
Bondurant-Farrar 118,824 ]17,671 132,484 137,546 146,368 131 ,965  
Des Moines 5 ,877 ,171  5,538,947 5,902,298 6,025,406 5,961,067 5 ,145 ,512  
Johnston 190,620 179,477 177,521 165 ,927  174 ,412  157 ,345  
North Polk 155 ,473  129,338 154 ,534  164,708 167,200 139,800 
Saydc.l 345,369 329 ,342  375,936 386,589 398,175 320,325 
Southeast Polk 509,978 435 ,191  486 ,993  494,123 504,862 446,615 
Urbandale 393,594 309,821 357,897 337,559 298,405 295,237 
West Des Moines 914,185 759,749 815,245 932,856 948,976 847,157 
Polk County Total 8 ,976 ,578  8,252,218 8,890,751 9,181,016 9,198,125 7,999,344 
\'he quantities for 1977-78 only reflect consumption through the month of April. 
Table 6.5. Summary of firm market shares, the Herfindahl Index, and the correlation 
coefficient among firm market shares for consecutive schoolyears in Polk County 
Market share of: 1972-7 3 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 
Dairy B .3714 .4582 .419 .457 .456 .451 
Dairy D .00 .00 0 0 .136 0 
Dairy A . 547 .5418 .581 .543 .408 .549 
Dairy V .0818 .00 0 0 0 0 
a 
Herfindahl Index .4435 .5034 .513 .5036 . 393 .505 
Correlation coefi'icient .972 1, ,00 1.00 .959 .953 
'^The Herfindahl Index is defined as 
n 
H = Z 
1=1 
where is the i*"^ firm's market share, 
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Herfindahl index was approximately .5 in four of the six shoolyears 
indicating that there is a moderate degree of monopoly power in force 
in the Polk County school district market. In addition, given that 
there were only two winning participants in these four years, such 
a value for the Herfindahl index indicates that the market had been 
approximately evenly divided by the participants. 
Finally, Table 6.5 also includes the correlation coefficient of 
the firms' market shares for each pair by consecutive schoolyears in 
the period 1972-73 to 1977-78. As discussed in Chapter 3, the closer 
the correlation coefficient is to one, the greater is the degree of 
stability in firm market shares. In each pair of consecutive schoolyears 
during the period of 1972-73 to 1977-78, one can see that the correlation 
coefficient was in excess of ,95. In addition, the correlation coefficient 
of firm market shares was equal to one between the schoolyears of 1973-74 
and 1974-75 and the schoolyears of 1974-75 and 1975-76; this indicates 
that there was little competition for the school districts' contracts 
during this period. Also, the correlation coefficient for the remaining 
pairs of schoolyears indicates that there was an absence of competition 
in these years. Hence, during the period of 1972-73 to 1977-78 one 
can conclude that there was a high degree of market stability in the 
Pclk County school district market. 
The districts located in Linn County were not able to furnish 
as complete data as were the districts in Polk County. As few as five 
dairies or dairy distributors have submitted bids to the Linn County 
districts for an upcoming schoolyear and in some years as many as seven 
firms have submitted bids. Although not all of the firms bid in every 
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district, the firms that do bid occasionally represent potential 
competitors to those dairies that bid consistently. The most consistent 
bidders in some of the Linn County school districts during varying 
lengths of time are Dairies Z, N, P, S, T, and A. 
Table 6.6 summarizes the bidding activity of firms in the Linn 
County school district market. In 1972 only five districts were able 
to supply data and a total of seven firms submitted bids to the 
districts in this sample. Dairy Z, a distributor of dairy products 
processed in Rochester, Minnesota, won contracts for the Alburnett 
and Cedar Rapids districts. Dairy 0. a dairy cooperative located in 
Linn County, won the Center Point contract while Dairy Q won the 
Mount Vernon contract. Although the Central City Community School 
District could not supply bid information, the district indicated 
that Dairy S received the contract. Finally, Dairy A of the Des Moines 
area won the North Linn contract. 
For the 1973-74 schoolyear six districts were able to furnish data. 
Dairy Z won the contracts awarded in Alburnett and Center Point, 
while Dairy P won the contracts in Cedar Rapids and Linn Mar. Once 
again. Dairy Q supplied the Mount Vernon district and Dairy A supplied 
the North Linn district. The Central City Community School District 
iiidiCiîLêd Cliât Daiïy S won Llie cunLieicc for this schuulyear. 
Eight districts supplied data for the 1974-75 schoolyear, and 
this revealed that five firms submitted bids for this contract period. 
Dairy Z won the contracts in Cedar Rapids, Center Point, College, 
Alburnett, and Linn Mar, while Dairy P won the contracts in Lisbon and 
Mount Vernon. Dairy S supplied the North Linn and Central City districts. 
Table 6,6. Summary of bidding activity in Linn County area market 
Dairy T Dairy S Dairy V Dairy W Dairy X Dai ry N 
Number Number Number Number Number Number 
sub­ Number sub­ Number sub- Number sub- Number sub- Number sub­ Numbe 
Year mitted won mitted won mitted won mitted won mitted won mitted won 
1972 1 0 4 1 
1973 1 1 1 0 
1974 2 2 6 0 
1975 1 0 2 2 
1976 2 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 




mit ted won 




















1972 1 0 1 1 1 0 3 2 1 1 1 1 
1973 3 2 1 1 4 2 1 0 1 1 
1974 6 2 2 0 5 5 
1975 5 3 2 0 5 4 
1976 7 4 2 0 5 3 
1977 7 1 2 0 5 4 
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For the 1975-76 schoolyear five firms submitted bids to the 
nine districts in the sample. Dairy P was the only bidder in the 
Lisbon and Mount Vernon districts, and the firm also received the 
Linn-Mar contract. Dairy Z won the contracts in Albumett, Cedar Rapids, 
Center Point, and College. Once again. Dairy S won the contracts in 
Central City and North Linn. 
The number of firms submitting bids for the 1976-77 contracts 
increased to eight. Dairy Z won only three contracts this year, namely, 
the contracts awarded in Albumett, Center Point, and Cedar Rapids. 
Dairy P supplied the College, Linn-Mar, Lisbon, and Mount Vernon 
districts; and once again. Dairy S won the contracts in Central City 
and North Linn. 
Finally, for the 1977-78 schoolyear eight districts were able to 
furnish data, and seven firms submitted bids for these contracts. 
Dairy Z received the contracts in Albumett, Center Point, College, 
and Linn-Mar. However, the Linn-Mar was later awarded to Dairy P 
because Dairy Z failed to properly clean the district's coolers. 
Dairy P initially won only the Cedar Rapids contract. Dairy T won 
the contracts in Lisbon and Mount Vernon, while Dairy S again supplied 
the Central City and the North Linn districts. 
Although there are not many consistent bidders for the contracts 
of the Linn County school districts, there are more firms that occasionally 
bid for these contracts than is true in the Polk County area. Interviews 
with several of the districts indicated that the districts did not 
send bid invitations to all of the firms bidding in this area because 
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they were not aware of these firms' willingness to submit bids. 
In addition, the contents of Table 6.6 indicate that the number of 
contracts won by the participants does change, and the same firm 
does not necessarily supply the same district schoolyear after schoolyear. 
In Linn County there simply doesn't appear to be the high degree of 
market stability that is common in the Polk County area. 
However, it is also necessary to look at the market shares of the 
winning participants in Linn County. As was the case for the Polk 
County school district market, the Linn County markets are based upon 
the quantity of half pints sold to each school district. The quantity 
of half pints purchased by each district in the Linn County sample 
is contained in Table 6.7. In each of schoolyears one can see that the 
quantity of half pints purchased by the Cedar Rapids district was a 
significant share of the total quantity of half pints purchased by the 
districts in the Linn County sample. Throughout the period of 1972-73 
to 1977-78 the quantity of half pints purchased by Cedar Rapids represented 
at least sixty-two percent of total quantity of half pints purchased by 
the districts in the Linn County sample. Given that the Cedar Rapids 
district did not allow a group of dairies to jointly supply the district, 
the dairy that won the Cedar Rapids contract had a significant share 
of the Linn County market. 
Table 6.3 contains the firm market shares in Linn County for 
the period 1974-75 to 1977-78. Market shares were not computed 
for the schoolyears 1972-73 and 1973-74 because the sample was not 
as large as the sample for the remaining years. As one can see in 
Tabic 6.7. Quantity of half pints purchased by Linn County School Districts 
Quantity of half pints for schoolyear of 
District 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 
Alburnett 147,292 136,417 141,452 135,675 159,562 140,017 
Cedar Rapids 3,568,087 3,309,077 3,434,480 3,368,192 3,691,579 3,425,814 
Center Point 143,757 146,962 144,851 137,179 155,761 129,487 
Central City 151,846 134,568 132,476 129 ,318  136,776 124,078 
College 527,212 550,697 543,737 560,313 613,785 514,186 
Linn Mar 399,972 406,558 402,831 476,786 574,050 491,076 
Lisbon LIS,181 96 ,339  98,644 99 ,657  127,566 117,423 
Mount Vernon 178 ,555  161 ,453  188,193 191,614 222,943 188,530 
North Linn 214,883 202 ,313  198,844 231,965 248,770 193,746 
Linn County 
Total 5,446,785 4,144, 584 5,285,508 5,330,699 5,930,792 5,324,357 
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Table 6.8. Summary of market shares, the Herfindahl Index, and the 
correlation coefficient among firm market shares for 
consecutive schoolyears in Linn County 
Market share of: 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 
Dairy Z . 883  .7881 .6756 . 2394  
Dairy P .0542 .1441 .2594 . 6434  
Dairy S .0626 .0677 .065 .0596 
Dairy T .00 .00 .00 .0574 
Herfindahl Index .7865 .646 .5279 .478 
Correlation coefficient .994 .976 .328 
Table 6.8, Dairy Z had a sizeable market share in 1974-75, 1975-76, and 
1976-77 when the dairy supplied the Cedar Rapids district, and the firm's 
market share was significantly smaller in 1977-78 when Dairy P won the 
Cedar Rapids contract. The size of the Linn County sample also 
contributes to the magnitude of the Herfindahl index in Linn County as 
shewn in Table 6.8. Although tue Herfindahl index decreases from 
1974-75 to 1977-78, the value of the index is greater than .5 from 
1974-75 to 1976-77 which would indicate a moderate degree of monopoly 
power in the Linn County market. Unfortunately, the measure is sensitive 
to size of the Cedar Rapids contract relative to the Linn County sample 
total, and therefore, the index may not be an appropriate measure of 
monopoly power under these circumstances. 
The correlation coefficients of market shares for pairs of 
consecutive schoolyears from 1974-75 to 1977-78 are also contained 
in Table 6.8. As one can see there appears to be a high degree of 
108 
inarket stability frcm 1974-75 to 1976-77, with the correlation coefficient 
in excess of .97 between 1974-75 and 1975-76 and between 1975-76 and 
1976-77. However, the correlation coefficient is only .328 between 
1976-77 and 1977-78, reflecting the shift of the Cedar Rapids contract 
from Dairy Z to Dairy P. Although there was some shifting of contracts 
from one schoolyear to the next schoolyear, it would appear that the 
correlation coefficient is also biased by the size of the Cedar Rapids 
contract. From 1974-75 to 1976-77 the market share of Dairy P increased 
from .0542 to .2594 while Dairy Z's market share decreased from .883 
to .6756; however, the correlation coeffcients between the market shares 
of 1974-75 and 1975-76 and between the market shares of 1975-76 and 1976-
77 indicate a high degree of market stability. Only when the Cedar Rapids 
contract is won by Dairy P in 1977 does the correlation coefficient 
indicate a lower degree of market stability. Given the sensitivity 
of the Herfindahl index and correlation coefficient to the relative 
size of the Cedar Rapids contract, these measures are biased indicators 
of r.cr.cpcly power and uuiikeL scabiiicy, respectively, in the Linn County 
market. 
In the Ames Community School District there have been three firms 
actively seeking the district's dairy contract. In addition to Dairy A 
and Dairy 3 both of the Des Moines area, there is a dairy distributor. 
Dairy Y. Dairy Y distributes fluid milk products that are processed 
in Rochester, Minnesota. These are the same products distributed 
by Dairy Z in the Linn County area. During the period covered by 
this study, the Ames district has been willing to allocate its schools 
among the three firms. 
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In 1972 only Dairy A and Dairy B submitted bids in Ames and 
they were jointly awarded the contract. Dairy B and Dairy Y submitted 
bids in 1973 and they were jointly awarded the contract. All three 
dairies submitted bids for the remaining four schoolyears in this 
study. However, the three firms jointly supplied the district only 
during the 1974-75, 1976-77, and 1977-78 schoolyears. During the 1975-
76 schoolyear Dairy Y supplied all of the district's schools except 
that Dairy A supplied the high school because of its relatively low 
ice cream mix bid. In the Ames district the high school purchases 
the district's needs for ice cream mix and then distributes the 
product to the other schools in the district. However, in all of 
the schoolyears there was some degree of contract sharing by two or 
three of the firms submitting bids. 
Since neither the Iowa Department of Public Instruction nor the 
Ames district provided a quantity breakdown by schools, the computation 
of market shares is not possible. However, such figures would not 
be too meaningful since the other districts in Story County are not 
included in this study. 
Winning bid distribution analysis 
The preceding discussion indicated that there appears to be a 
geographic allocation of the school district dairy market in Polk County 
while this result is not apparent in Linn County. The analysis will now 
continue with a presentation of some summary statistics calculated for 
the two areas. Only the winning bids were utilized in the computation 
of these descriptive statistics, and these measures would allow some 
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additional insight into the competitive nature of the bidding practices 
in the two areas. 
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dairy products sold in half pints although some districts in both 
areas do request bids on other dairy products. For each of the products 
sold in half pint containers certain descriptive statistics were computed 
to provide some insight into the distribution of winning bids in the 
two areas. The following measures were determined for each of the half 
point products: high, seventy-fifth percentile, median, mean, twenty-
fifth percentile, low, and interquartile range [17]. Table 6.9 
contains these measures for the Polk County districts, while Table 
6.10 contains these same measures for the Linn County district. 
Perhaps the best way to review these statistics for the two areas 
is to compare the distributions for each product schoolyear by schoolyear. 
Unfortunately, only one district in Linn County during the period purchased 
^ OR<.-K.4U MU.^£V ULICXU A ^CITIPCX ^ JLOV.'II I.WI. CIIXO P 1. CIL. L. 
meaningless. In 1972 five districts in Linn County and seven districts 
in Polk County furnished at least winning bids for the products purchased. 
A comparison for half pints of whole homogenized milk for the two areas 
indicates that the high, the seventy-fifth percentile, the median, the 
mean, the twenty-fifth percentile, and the low for the Polk County 
area exceeds those for the Linn County area. However, the interquartile 
range, which should reflect the degree of competition, is approximately 
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Table 6.9. Distribution of winning bids for half pint dairy products in 
Polk County 
Whole homogenized milk 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
n 10 11 3 3 5 5 
High .0675 .0735 .085 .086 .0915 .0959 
75 percentile .06635 .073 .08485 .083375 .0915 .092 
Median .0659 .0725 .0848 .0825 .0915 .092 
Mean .06603 .07217 .0846 .08366 .0915 .09236 
25 percentile .06525 .0709 .084 .0825 .0915 .090425 
Low .0635 .0697 .084 .0825 .0915 .0899 
Interquartile range .0011 .0021 .00085 .000875 .00 .001575 














Homogenized two percent milk 
n 11 11 12 12 
High .085 .0835 .09 .0885 
75 percentile .08 .0825 .088 .087 
Median .0798 .0825 .0875 .087 
Mean .0802 .08127 .08763 .08693 
25 percentile .0795 .080125 .0865 .0869 
Low .079 .0775 .0865 .0849 
Interquartile range .0005 .002375 .0015 .0001 
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Table 6.9. (Cont.) 
Chocolate two percent milk 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
n 6 9 10 11 
High .085 .091 .0975 .096 
75 percentile .085 .09 .096 .0945 
Median .0849 .09 .095 .0945 
Mean .0848 .0888 .09515 .09444 
25 percentile .0845 .086 .094 .094175 
Low 
.0845 .086 .094 .0924 
Interquartile range .0005 .004 .002 .000325 
Skim milk 
n 5 6 7 7 8 i 3 
High .06 .0662 .075 .0775 .0825 .082 
75 percentile .06 .065 .075 .077125 .082 .082 
Median .06 .065 .0748 .077 .08175 .082 
Mean .0585 .06515 .0748 .0757 .081875 .08175 
25 percentile .05438 .06485 .0745 .0725 .0815 .082 
Low .0525 .0647 .0745 .0725 .0815 .08 
Interquartile range .005625 .00015 .0005 .004625 .0005 .00 
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Table 6.10. Distribution of winning bids for half pint dairy products 
in Linn County 
Whole homogenized milk 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
n 5 5 8 7 6 5 
High .065 .0695 .0825 .084 .093 .092 
75 percentile .063375 .06785 .0814 .0791 .09045 .089125 
Median .063 .0665 .0805 .077 .0877 .088 
Mean .0633 .06665 .07904 .0786 .0873 .08802 
25 percentile .0625 .06435 .0759 .0759 .0812 .0848 
Low .0625 .0637 .07 .0759 .08 .0843 
Interquartile range .000875 .0035 .0055 .0032 .000925 .004325 
Whole chocolate milk 
5 
High .0675 .0717 .0875 .089 .098 .097 
75 percentile .06725 .07 .08615 .086 .09663 .0964 
Median .067 .0695 .0857 .08295 .0925 .093 
Mean .06716 .06965 .0855 .08488 .09328 .0932 
25 percentile .067 .0679 .08375 .0827 .087925 .0904 
Low .067 .0679 .0825 .0825 .0869 .0901 
Interquartile range .00025 .0021 .0024 .0033 .0087 .006 
Homogenized two percent milk 
n 4 4 6 8 
High . 0 / / 5 .08 .088 . 067 
75 percentile .0724 .0739 .0865 .086 
Median .07195 .07272 .08395 .06 
Mean .073225 .0738 .08313 .0821 
.0715 . 0699 A -7 -7 A . U / Y ^ .0772 
Low .0715 .0699 .0774 .0763 
Interquartile range .0009 .004 .00905 .0082 
Chocolate two percent milk 
n 2 4 6 6 
High .0775 .084 .093 .093 
75 percentile .0793 .09225 .092 
Median .0767 .07865 .08825 .08795 
Mean .0767 .0789 .08743 .0862 
25 percentile .0743 .0797 .0773 
Low .0759 .0743 .0797 .0773 
Interquartile range . 005 .01120 .01385 
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the same for both areas. Three districts in each area purchased 
half pints of chocolate whole milk; and although there is little 
variance in bid prices in Linn County, the low for the Polk County 
area exceeds the highest bid in Linn County. Hence, it would 
appear that in 1972 the school districts in Polk County paid higher 
prices for half pints of whole white milk and whole chocolate milk 
than those paid by Linn County school districts. 
For the 1973-74 schoolyear six districts in Linn County and eight 
districts in Polk County reported their respective bid prices. Upon 
the basis of these two samples one can see that the low for the Polk 
County area exceeds the high winning bid in Linn County for half pints 
of both whole white milk and whole chocolate milk. The median for 
whole white milk differs by $.006 and for whole chocolate milk by 
$.008. In addition, the interquartile range for both products in 
Linn County exceeds that of Polk County. Again in 1973, one could 
conclude that based upon the sample values, Polk County districts 
generally paid higher prices for their dairy products; and in 
addition, it would appear that bid prices did vary more in Linn County 
than in Polk County. 
^The interquartile range is the difference between the seventy-
fifth percentile and the twenty-fifth percentile and measures the 
dispersion of observations in the absence of extreme observations. 
As the interquartile range increases, the greater is the dispersion 
of observations. In a competitive sealed tender market where each 
firm operates independently, one would expect the dispersion of 
observations to be larger than if market coordination by the firms 
was present. 
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Beginning with the 1974-75 schoolyear most of the districts 
in Polk County substituted milk with two percent butterfat content 
for whole milk (milk with a butterfat content of at least 3.25 percent). 
The shift came more gradually in the Linn County area. In 1974 
three districts in Polk County were known to purchase whole white milk 
while eight districts in the Linn County sample did. Once again, 
each measure in the Polk County distribution of half pints of whole 
homogenized milk exceeds that of Linn County. No comparison can be 
made for chocolate whole milk since only one district in Polk County 
reportedly purchased this product. For half pints of homogenized 
two percent each of the percentiles of the Polk County distribution 
exceeds those for Linn County and both areas have a very small 
interquartile range. Only two districts in the Linn County sample 
purchased half pints of chocolate two percent milk, but the bids were 
lower than the Polk County low bid. Thus, in 1974 the Polk County 
districts once again generally paid higher prices for their half pint 
dairy products. 
For the 1975-75 schoolyear three Polk County districts and seven 
Linn County districts purchased half pints of whole white milk. 
The median bid in the Polk County sample exceeded that of the Linn 
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is much larger than that for Polk County. For half pints of homogenized 
two percent milk the median in Polk County exceeds that of Linn County 
by .0098, and the interquartile range for the Linn County sample 
exceeds that for Polk County. The same general tendency is true 
for half pints of chocolate two percent milk. 
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In 1976 the high bid for a half pint of whole white milk in 
Linn County exceeds that for Polk County, but the median for the 
Linn County sample is about $.004 less than the Polk County median. 
Also, note that there is no variation in winning bid for this product 
in Polk County. For half pints of homogenized two percent milk the 
median for the Polk County sample exceeds that for the Linn County 
sample, and the interquartile range for Linn County exceeds that of 
Polk County by six times. Once again, the same is true about the 
comparison of the two areas' distribution of winning bids for chocolate 
two percent milk. 
For the 1977-78 schoolyear the winning bid distributions for 
whole white, homogenized two percent, and chocolate two percent milk 
for the two areas differ much the same way as exhibited in previous 
years. In each schoolyear in this analysis it generally appears, 
with few exceptions, that each of the location measures of the Polk 
County distribution exceeds those of the Linn County sampling distribution 
for each of the half pint products. For each of the products in the 
1975-76, 1976-77, and 1977-78, the median of the Linn County sample 
is lower than that of the Polk County sample, and the interquartile 
range of the Linn County distribution exceeds that of Polk County. 
This suggests two interesting things: first- the Polk County districts 
generally paid higher prices for half pints of dairy products than did 
Linn County districts; and second, the larger Interquartile range in 
Linn County suggests that there is more price competition than is 
true in Des Moines. To substantiate these comments some statistical 
tests were performed upon the two samples. 
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In selecting appropriate statistical tests consideration was 
given to the possibility that the bids included in the two areas' 
empirical distributions would not be independent observations. 
This would be true in the presence of either tacit or overt collusion, 
and the high level of concentration in the Polk County area would 
suggest that at least tacit collusion is likely in this area. Hence, 
nonparametric statistical tests were chosen since these are some 
tests that do not assume independence among sample observations. 
The Smirnov test was chosen to test for a significant difference 
in the two areas' empirical distributions of winning bids in each 
schoolyear and the Tukey test was chosen to test for a signficant 
difference in the two areas' measure of central tendency in each 
schoolyear. 
A Summary of the results of the Smirnov test is contained 
in Table 6.11. The test statistic for the Smirnov test is the 
greatest vertical difference between the two empirical cumulative 
ûistriDution runctions, SUP i.S^ - S^ (%_)]. S. (Y ) represents 
the cumulative distribution funcCion for the Linn County sample and 
$1 (X^) represents the cumulative distribution function for the Polk 
County sample. The null hypothesis was that the Polk County empirical 
cumulative distribution function was greater than or equal to the 
Linn County empirical cumulative distribution function. The alternative 
hypothesis was that the Linn County empirical cumulative distribution 
function was greater than that for Polk County. The level of confidence 
for rejecting the null hypothesis was .95, and the critical level reflects 
a probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis of .05. 
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Table 6.11. Summary of the results of the Smirnov test 
lihole homogenized milk 
Year SUP [$2 (Y.) - SI (XJ] Critical Level Conclusion 
1972 9/10 13/20 reject H 
1973 1 3/5 reject H 
1974 1 5/7 reject H 
1975 5/7 2/3 reject H 
1976 2/3 2/3 cannot reject H 
1977 4/5 3/5 reject H 0 
Whole chocolate milk 
Year SUP [S, (Yi) -
'i (X,)]  Critical Level Conclusion 
1972 1 2/3 reject H 
1973 1 5/7 reject 
Homogenized two percent mi Ik 
Year SUP [S^ (Y.) -
^1 
(X.)]  Critical Level Conclusion 
1974 1 7/10 reject H 
1975 9/11 7/10 reject H 
1976 2/3 7/12 reject H 
1977 9 ' 12 / / T-pTPrr H 
o 
Chocolate two percent r.: Llk 
Year SUP [S_ (Yi) -
^1 
( X . ) ]  Critical Level Conclusion 
1974 1 5/6 reject H 
1975 1 2/3 TCi-i pr 1-
1976 1 17/30 reject H 
1977 10/11 69/120 reject H" 0 
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In each of the tests on the two areas' distributions of chocolate 
whole milk, homogenized two percent milk and chocolate two percent 
milk, the null hypothesis could be rejected. For whole white milk 
the null hypothesis could be rejected for all schoolyears except 
1976-77. The results of the Smirnov test, with the exception of 
whole white milk in 1976-77, substantiate the conclusion that Polk 
County districts generally paid higher prices for the various half 
pint products. Given the high level of concentration in the Des Moines 
dairy processing industry, this simply reflects that the Des Moines 
area dairy firms do indeed exert some monopoly power. 
The results of the Tukey test are contained in Table 6.12. 
This statistic tests for significant differences in the two sampling 
distributions' expected values. The test statistic varies with a two-
tailed or one-tailed test. The null hypothesis was that the expected 
value of the Polk County sample was less than or equal to that of 
the Linn County sample. For this one-tailed test the test statistic, T, 
is the sum of the number of Polk County bids exceeding the highest 
Linn County bid and the number of Linn County bids smaller than the 
lowest Polk County bid. At an ct = .05 the critical level is seven. 
Once again, the null hypothesis can be rejected in all schoolyears 
for half pints of chocolate w hole milk, hou-oger.i^ied two percent milk, 
and chocolate two percent milk. The null hypothesis can also be 
rejected for half pints of whole white milk in the schoolyears 1972-73, 
1973-74, and 1974-75. These results offer further support of the 
conclusion that Polk County districts generally paid higher prices. 
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'I'able 6.12. Summary cjf the results of the Tukey test 
Whole homogenized milk 
Year T Critical Level Conclusion 
1972 11 7 reiect H 
1973 17 7 reject H 
1974 11 7 reject H 
1975 6 7 cannot reject 
1976 0 7 cannot reject H 
1977 5 7 cannot reject 
Whole chocolate milk 
Year T Critical Level Conclusion 
1972 9 7 reject H 
1973 11 7 -,o reject 
Homogenized two percent milk 
Year T Critical Level Conclusion 
1974 15 7 reject H 
1975 12 7 reject H 
1976 7 7 • reject 
1977 / 7 reject 
o 
Chocolate two percent milk 
Year T Critical Level Conclusion 
1974 8 7 reject 
ly/:) 13 7 reject H"" 
1976 16 7 reject H° 
1977 15 7 reject 
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The statistical analysis of this section suggests that the Des Moines 
area firms do exert monopoly power in the sale of half pint fluid 
milk products to school districts. However, this does not suggest 
that overt collusive behavior has been proven, for the same result 
would occur with tacit collusion. Given the appearance of market 
sharing and the exertion of monopoly power in the Des Moines area, 
attention will turn to the actual bidding patterns in Polk County, 
Linn County, and Ames. 
Analysis of bids submitted 
The bids that were submitted to the school districts will now 
be reviewed to determine if there are any patterns that would be 
indicative of collusive behavior. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
the analysis will be restricted to the bids submitted on half pints 
of fluid milk products, except in those instances where the bids 
submitted on other products were an important determinant in the 
award of the contract. In many districts bids were accepted only on 
half pint products while other products used in cooking were ordered 
as needed. This made the samples of these other products too small 
to determine any patterns. 
The analysis will proceed schoolyear by schoolyear, and the bids 
will be reviewed in conjunction with the price differential between 
various pairs of half pint products and the price differential between 
the winning bid and each losing bid. These differentials may be helpful 
in detecting some bidding patterns. Since the tables containing the 
bids were so numerous, the tables are contained in Appendix 5 and are 
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numbered for easy reference. These tables contain the bids by area 
and the conditions important to each contract. These conditions 
include whether the quoted price was a firm bid or a bid with an 
escalator clause, and whether the provision of a cooler or straws was 
included in the quoted price. Finally, the underlined bid represents 
the winning bid. 
In Appendix B Tables B.l a-c and B.2 a-c contain the 1972 bids and 
associated differentials for Polk County and Linn County, respectively. 
Table B.17a summarizes the bids submitted to the Ames Community School 
District for the entire period, while Table B.17b contains the associated 
price differentials for the period. 
In Polk County there are some rather interesting patterns in 1972. 
Dairy B submitted the same bid for whole homogenized milk in all 
quadrants of the Des Moines district, while Dairy A's bid was $.0005 
lower than Dairy B's in its winning quadrants and $.0005 higher than 
Dairy B's in the other quadrants. Although Dairy A may experience 
slightly higuci." Li.ansuoj. LdLioii coscs in delivering to the Northeast 
and Southeast quadrants given the dairy's location, it would appear that 
the firm preferred to service other districts farther from its plant 
rather than the schools closest to its plant. Also, both Dairies A 
and B submitted the same bid for skim in all quadrants. Finally, Dairy V, 
which won the Northeast quadrant, submitted lower bids on all products 
even though the products were transported from Omaha, Nebraska. 
In the Polk County districts other than the four quadrants in 
Des Moines where Dairy A was awarded the contract, the firm's bid on 
whole white milk ranged from $.0002 to $.0005 lower than Dairy B's bid. 
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The provision of straws in Johnston, Southeast Polk, Urbandale, and 
West Des Moines appears to have been an important factor in the determina­
tion of the quoted price. Dairy B's bid on each of the products purchased 
was $.0015 higher than the firm's bid on each of the products purchased 
by Ankeny and Des Moines, while Dairy A's bid on each product ranged 
from $.0012 to $.0023 higher than quoted in Ankeny and Des Moines. 
Except for the North Polk contract, if one adjusts for the inclusion of 
straws. Dairy B's bid for whole homogenized milk without straws was 
$.066 in all districts while Dairy A's bid for the same product without 
straws ranged from $.0655 to $.0665. Hence, there appears to be no 
relationship between bid price and distance to delivery point. The 
North Polk Community School District, which is one of the farthest 
districts from either dairy's plant, received lower bids than other 
districts located closer to the plants of Dairy A and Dairy B. One 
might attribute this to changes in the cost of raw milk in a half pint 
of processed milk between the times the bids were made, but the figure 
only varied by $.00011 during the summer of 1972. 
Tables 3.lb and B.lc contain the price differentials mentioned earlier. 
Because few districts purchased whole chocolate milk or skim milk. 
Table B lb doesn't reveal any patterns. However, it appears common for 
Dairy B to maintain a $.005 differential between its whole chocolate 
bid and whole white bid. Table B.lc also doesn't reveal any other 
patterns except for the ability of each firm to quote a price within 
$.0002 to $.0005 of the other's bid. 
Both Dairy A and Dairy B submitted bids in Ames, and in Table B.17a 
one can see that each firm's bids were identical to those submitted by 
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each in the Johnston district. Although Dairy A's bid on each half 
pint product was lower than Dairy B's, both dairies jointly supplied the 
Ames district. 
Table B.2a contains the 1972 bids for the five Linn County districts 
that supplied bid data. There are also some interesting similarities 
in this area. In the Mount Vernon district three firms submitted 
identical bids for whole white homogenized milk. However, Dairy N 
submitted the same bid of $.0635 to three districts for whole white 
homogenized milk, and it was common for this firm to include price 
list for all products in its bid envelope. Given this practice it 
would be quite easy for competitors to match or shade the prices 
quoted by Dairy N. In addition. Dairy 0 and Dairy Z submitted identical 
bids for whole white milk and whole chocolate milk in the Center Point 
district. Indeed, there doesn't appear to be much variance in the winning 
bids in this area. 
For Dairy N there doesn't appear to be any consideration given 
to the distance traveled to the delivery point. However, Dairy Z's 
bids do appear to vary with the distance traveled since the closest 
district of the three, Cedar Rapids, received the lowest bids and the 
farthest district, Alburnett, received the highest bids. For the 
other firms it is impossible; to determine if iihere w£is einy relationship 
between price and transportation costs. However, Dairy A of the 
Des Moines area was awarded the North Linn contract with a bid of $.0625 
for whole white milk. This bid was lower than any of the dairy's bids 
in Polk County even though the product would have been transported at 
least 110 miles. 
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The 1973 Polk County area bids are contained in Table B.3a in 
Appendix B. In the Des Moines district one can see that Dairy A 
and Dairy B submitted identical bids on both whole chocolate milk and 
skim milk. For whole white milk Dairy A's losing bid in the Northeast 
and Southeast quadrants was identical to Dairy B's losing bid for this 
product in the Northwest and Southwest quadrants. Neither dairy 
appeared willing to supply the entire district, and this may be due 
to a lack of sufficient number of refrigerated trucks necessary to 
supply such a large district. 
Once again, the provision of straws does help explain some of the 
variance in each firm's bids. Johnston and West Des Moines both 
required straws and in these districts Dairy B's bid for whole white 
milk was $.0015 above its losing bids in the two Des Moines quadrants 
and in Urbandale, where straws were not required. Neither North Polk 
nor Southeast Polk required straws and in these districts. Dairy B's 
winning bid for whole white milk was identical to its winning bid 
on this product in the Des Moines Northeast and Southeast quadrants. 
The same practice was true for Dairy A. This firm's bid on whole 
white milk in Ankeny and Johnston, where straws were required, was 
$.0005 higher than the firm's winning bid in Des Moines. Also, there 
is a $.0015 differential between the firm's bids submitted on all products 
to the Urbandale and West Des Moines districts. In fact, both dairies 
charged the West Des Moines district $.0015 more for each product for 
the provision of straws than for the same products purchased by 
Urbandale without straws. 
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Another interesting point is that in this year the Saydel, 
Urbandale, and West Des Moines districts jointly advertised for bids. 
Dairy B, which has normally supplied Saydel, submitted its lowest bid 
on whole white milk to Saydel; this bid appears to be very close to 
Dairy A's lowest winning bid submitted to Urbandale. Dairy B's winning 
bid in Saydel was $.0025 less than its winning bid in Southeast Polk, 
and both bids were submitted in June and neither contract included 
straws. 
Finally, there doesn't appear to be any relationship between bid 
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white milk to Urbandale and West Des Moines than it did to Des Moines, 
while Dairy B submitted bids on whole white milk in North Polk and 
Southeast Polk identical to its winning bid in Des Moines. 
Table B.3b contains the price differentials maintained among various 
pairs of products. Both dairies maintained the same price differential 
between whole chocolate milk and whole white milk in their respective 
losing Des Moines quadrants. The same is true for the skim-whole white 
differential. In the other districts both dairies maintained identical 
price differentials for the various pairs of products. Table B.3c contains 
the differential between the winning bid and the losing bid. It is 
interesting that Dairy B's bid on each product was $.0053 higher than 
Dairy A's bid on each product in both Urbandale and West Des Moines. 
Of course, this was due to the common price differential maintained 
among the products. 
The 1973 Ames bids are contained in Table B.17a. Dairy B and Dairy Y 
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submitted identical bids on whole white milk and whole chocolate milk; 
and therefore, the district was supplied by both dairies. As was common 
in Polk County, both dairies maintained a $.005 price differential between 
whole white milk and whole chocolate milk. Also, the Ames district was 
supplied both products by Dairy B at a lower price than was true for 
Des Moines, and this indicates that Dairy B was not concerned about the 
transportation costs to this district. The bid on whole white milk sub­
mitted by Dairy B was identical to that submitted to Saydel. 
Table B.4a contains the 1973 Linn County bids. In this year there 
was more variation in bids submitted on both whole white milk and 
whole chocolate milk. There were no occurrences of identical bidding 
as was true in 1972, and there are no discernible patterns in the bids. 
In addition, there is no apparent relationship between bid price 
and the distance traveled. Dairy Z submitted higher bids to Cedar Rapids 
than it did to Alburnett and Center Point which are farther from 
Dairy Z's distribution plant, while Dairy P submitted substantially 
higher bids i.o Lluu I-Iar ciian to Cedar Rapids, even though the two 
districts are quite close to each other. Finally, once again Dairy A 
supplied the North Linn district with whole white milk that was $.007 
less than its winning bid on the same product in the Des Moines district. 
Tables B.4b and B»4c contain the associated price differentials. 
In B.4b one can see that it was not true that the dairies tended to 
maintain a common differential between whole white milk and whole 
chocolate milk in Linn County. In addition, there wasn't any consistent 
differential between the winning bid and losing bids of the districts 
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included in the Linn County sample. 
In 1974 the districts in Polk County began purchasing milk with 
a butterfat content of two percent, but some of the districts continued 
to purchase whole milk. Table B.5a contains the 1974 bids, and again 
there are some interesting patterns. The pattern exhibited in the 
Des Moines district in 1972 for whole white milk reappearred in the 
district in 1974, except that it was applied to all half pints purchased 
by the district. Dairy B quoted the same price for homogenized two 
percent, chocolate two percent, and skim in all quadrants while 
Dairy A's bids on these products were $.0005 below those of Dairy B 
in the Northwest and Southeast quadrants. In the Northeast and Southeast 
quadrants Dairy A's bids were $.0005 above those of Dairy B's. Another 
pattern exists in the Ankeny, Johnston, and West Des Moines districts. 
Dairy B submitted a price of $.08 on homogenized two percent milk 
in all three of the districts while Dairy A submitted a price of $.0798 
in all three districts. However, in the Urbandale district Dairy A 
submitted $.08 for homogenized two percent milk while Dairy B submitted 
$.081. This occurrence is puzzling given that the Urbandale and West 
Des Moines districts once again jointly solicited bids. Dairy A 
submitted Dairy B's losing bid on homogenized two percent in Ankeny, 
Johnston, and West Des Mm'nes to Urbandale vhile Dairy B increased its 
bid on the same product to $.081. 
This same occurrence is true in a comparison of the two dairies' 
bids on chocolate two percent milk in Urbandale and West Des Moines. 
However, on skim milk both dairies submitted the same bids that they sub­
mitted to West Des Moines. It is hard to imagine that market information 
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would be good enough to allow each dairy to submit such bid and 
continue to win the same contracts year after year. Further, both 
dairies submitted identical bids on homogenized two percent milk to 
the Saydel district. Although Dairy B submitted a lower bid on 
whole chocolate milk, the contract was awarded to Dairy A since 
this firm had submitted a lower bid on half pints of orange drink. 
In 1974 there doesn't appear to be any price differentials due 
to the provision of straws. Johnston, which required straws, received 
the same bid on homogenized two percent milk as other districts that 
did not require straws. In addition, there appears co be no relationship 
between bid price and cost of transportation as neither dairy varies 
bid price with the distance traveled. 
Table B.5b shows that both dairies maintained identical differentials 
between pairs of products in all districts. Perhaps this is a common 
industry practice, but it would certainly facilitate collusive behavior. 
The winning and losing bids could be determined for one product and 
then the common differentials could be applied to determine the other 
product's prices. 
Table B.5c shows the common winning-losing differential to exist only 
in the Des Moines district. However, it also points out the common 
bidding patterns in Ankeny, Johnston, and West Des Moines. 
Once again. Table B.17a contains the bids submitted to Ames in 1974. 
Dairies A, B, and Y submitted identical bids on whole white milk and 
homogenized two percent milk. Dairies A and B also submitted identical 
bids on chocolate two percent milk, while Dairy B and Dairy Y submitted 
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identical bids on skim milk. Again, the bid submitted on homogenized 
two percent milk is identical to the bid submitted to Saydel by 
Dairy A and Dairy B. There simply doesn't appear to be any evidence 
of open price competition in the Ames district given the identical 
bids on the various products. Perhaps this is due to the willingness 
of the district to divide the market among the bidders, but the district 
might avoid this problem by abandoning this type of award. 
The 1974 Linn County bids are contained in Table B.6a and for this 
year the sample is larger and there were more firms bidding in some 
of the districts. Again, there appears to be soma variation in the 
bids submitted to the districts. However, Dairy N once again submitted 
nearly the same bid to all districts, except one, for each product. 
Dairy N again sent a price list to the districts and it is likely that 
the other interested firms could have obtained a copy of Dairy N's 
bids and thus ensure that their own bids would win or lose. 
There were no cases of identical bidding or common patterns for 
any of the products in Linn County in 1974. In Table B.6b it appears that 
Dairy P tended to maintain the same differentials among products as 
the Des Moines area firms did. Dairy Z also maintained similar 
differentials in many cases. This may indicate that the differentials 
malncained by these firms were a common Industry practice in 19 74. 
Finally, the winning-losing differentials contained in Table B.6c do 
not reveal any patterns among the firms bidding practices, and hence, 
one could conclude that the Linn County market appeared to be competitive 
in 1974. 
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Table B.7a summarizes the bids submitted to the Des Moines district 
in November, 1974. Again, Dairy B submitted the same bid for 
homogenized two percent milk for all quadrants and the same bid for 
chocolate two percent milk, for all quadrants. Dairy A again adjusted 
its bid on these products by $.0005 to continue supplying only the 
Northwest and Southwest quadrants. For half pints of skim the bid 
submitted by Dairy A for its winning quadrants is identical to Dairy B's 
winning bid on skim in the Northwest and Southwest quadrants. To 
continue manipulating their bids in this manner, the dairies would 
have to have extensive knowledge about each other's operation and 
pricing behavior. 
Table B.7b reveals another common reaction by the firms. Before 
this bidding period the dairies typically had maintained a $.005 
differential between homogenized two percent and chocolate two percent; 
however, at this time both dairies increased this differential to $.0075. 
This may be due to an increase in the price of an input used by each 
dairy, but it is interesting that each responded in an identical 
manner at the same time. In sum, this bidding period again shows 
there are some consistent patterns appearing in the bids. 
The bids from the summer bidding period of 1975 in Polk County 
are in Table B.8a. However, the interesi-ing pattern exhibited in the 
Des Moines district during both periods of 1974 does not reappear. 
Instead, Dairy B's winning bid on homogenized two percent for the 
Northeast and Southeast quadrants was identical to Dairy A's winning 
bid on the same product in the other two quadrants. Both dairies 
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submitted higher bids on this product for their respective losing 
quadrants. For chocolate two percent milk both dairies submitted 
the same bid for their respective losing quadrants. 
Further, Dairy B's winning bid in two of the Des Moines quadrants 
for homogenized two percent milk was the dairy's losing bid on this 
same product in Ankeny, Urbandale, and West Des Moines. Dairy A's 
bid on homogenized two percent milk was the same for all three districts. 
The same pattern was true for Dairy B's losing bid for chocolate 
two percent milk in Urbandale and West Des Moines and the firm's losing 
bid on skim milk in West Des Moines. 
Again, the two firms submitted identical bids for homogenized 
two percent milk in the Saydel district, but Dairy B's bid on chocolate 
two percent milk was lower than Dairy A's so that Dairy B regained 
the contract in 1975. 
Also, one will notice that Dairy D submitted lower bids on all 
products than Dairy A and Dairy B in two of the four Des Moines 
tjuadrauLs. The Tirin was noc awarded che concracc because ic lacked 
the necessary number of coolers required by the district. This may 
market at this time. 
As in the past there is no indication of any relationship between 
bid price and cost of transportation. North Polk, one of the farthest 
districts from the two daries' plants, received bids from both daries 
that were lower than they submitted to the Des Moines district. 
The price differentials maintained between pairs of dairy products 
did vary in this year, as can be seen in Table B.8b. However, it is true 
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that both dairies tended to have the same differential between skim 
milk and homogenized two percent milk and between whole white milk 
and homogenized two percent milk. On the other hand, the price 
differential between homogenized two percent milk and chocolate 
two percent milk did vary for both dairies. 
In general, there are still some interesting patterns in 
Polk County during the summer bidding period of 1975, but the patterns 
are not as simple as those exhibited in the previous years covered 
by this study. In Table B.17a one can review the bids submitted to 
Ames in 1975. Although there are a few cases of identical bidding, it 
does appear that there was more price competition in this year. 
Dairy Y was awarded the entire contract except for the high school 
because the dairy submitted the lowest bids on homogenized two percent 
milk and chocolate two percent milk. Dairy A supplied the high school 
since it had the lowest overall bid on ice cream mixes. It would 
appear that in this year that Dairies A, B, and Y lacked the necessary 
information to behave as they had in the past two years. 
The 1975 Linn County bids are contained in Table B.9a. Unfortunately, 
only Dairy Z and Dairy P submitted bids to more than two districts. 
Even though there are fewer active firms in this year, there are no 
cases of identical bidding in this area= Although the bids on whole 
chocolate milk and homogenized two percent milk submitted to the College 
district are very close, if one reviews the bids submitted on whole 
white milk and chocolate two percent milk then it will be apparent that 
the bids did vary somewhat. It is also interesting that Dairy Z 
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submitted bids on its various products to the Linn-Mar district that 
were significantly higher than the bids the dairy submitted to other 
districts. This would indicate that Dairy Z simply did not want 
the Linn-Mar contract in 1975. 
Also, it is interesting that four districts received bids from 
only one firm. The Lisbon district indicated that it simply wasn't 
aware of any other firms except for Dairy N and Dairy P However, 
Dairy N has periodically been reluctant to bid because of various 
problems. Perhaps these other districts simply lack sufficient 
market information to solicit bids from all the firms in the area. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that Dairy A submitted lower 
bids on the various products requested by two districts than the firm 
submitted in Polk County. This is also true in each of the previous 
years covered and would suggest that Dairy A did exert some monopoly 
power in the Polk County area in 1975. Also, Dairy Z and Dairy Y 
distribute products from the same plant, but one will notice that 
Dairy Y quoted substantially higher prices on whole white milk and 
homogenized two percent milk to the Ames district than Dairy Z submitted 
to its districts. If the contract arrangements with the Minnesota 
plant are the same for both distributors, it would appear that 
Dairy Y also exerted souie muiiupuly power in 1975. 
A review of Tables B.9b and B.9c will show there are no interesting 
patterns in the differentials maintained between various pairs of 
products or the differentials between the winning bid and the losing 
bids. Although there were fewer participants in the Linn County market, 
there are no patterns that would suggest collusive behavior. 
135 
However, the lack of participants in four districts may indicate 
that the firms were unwilling to compete, but to substantiate this 
conjecture one would have to know the firms that the districts 
sent bid requests to in 1975. 
During the winter bidding period of 1975 in the Des Moines district 
there are some interesting patterns once again, as shown in TableB.10a. 
For half pints of homogenized two percent milk Dairy A's winning bid 
for the Northwest and Southwest quadrants is $.001 less than its bid 
for the other two quadrants. Dairy B's winning bid for the same product 
for the Northeast and Southeast quadrants is $.001 less than its losing 
bid in the other two quadrants. Both dairies have identical losing 
bids for chocolate two percent milk and identical winning bids for 
skim milk. Such manipulation of bid prices would require a great 
deal of information. It is amazing that the two firms can alter their 
prices in this manner and still continue to win the contract for 
the same quadrants time after time. 
The bids for cne summer bidding period of 1976 in Polk County 
are contained in Table B.lla. In a review of the bids submitted to 
the Des Moines district one can see that Dairy T submitted bids for 
the Northeast quadrant. However, once again Dairy A and Dairy B 
won the contracts in Des Moines. The only similarity in bids in 
this district is that both dairies have identical losing bids on 
homogenized two percent. However, other similarities exist in bids 
submitted to other Polk County districts. Dairy B's losing bid on 
homogenized two percent in Johnston, Urbandale, and West Des Moines 
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is identical to Dairy A*s losing bid on this same product in Southeast 
Polk and North Polk. Dairy B's winning bid on homogenized two percent 
milk in Boundurant-Farrar, North Polk, and Southeast Polk is identical 
to Dairy D's winning bid on this product in Urbandale and West Des Moines. 
The same is true for whole white milk, chocolate two percent milk, 
and skim milk. Given the dates of the various contracts, it would 
appear that Dairy D simply submitted Dairy B's winning bids in Bondurant-
Farrar, North Polk, and Southeast Polk to Urbandale and West Des Moines. 
This explains the absence of any variation in the winning bid for whole 
white milk in the Polk County area in 1976. Finally, Dairy A and Dairy B 
submitted identical bids for homogenized two percent and chocolate 
two percent in Saydel, but Dairy B was awarded the contract for having 
a lower bid on half pints of orange drink. 
The provision of straws appears to be the difference in the bids 
submitted on homogenized two percent in Ankney and Johnston. Ankeny, 
which did not require straws, received a bid from both dairies that 
was $.001 lower than submitted to the Johnston district. Finally, 
there again does not appear to be any logical variation in bid prices 
due to the cost of transportation. 
A review of the price differentials between pairs of products in 
Tables.lib reveals that Dairy A and Dairy H tended to maintain very 
similar differentials. Also, in Table B.llc one can see that the 
winning-losing differentials do not reveal any additional similarities. 
In 1976 the entry of Dairy D into the Polk County area market 
disrupted the market stability of the previous years, and the review 
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of the change in bid price over time in the next section will reveal 
if Dairy D's entry resulted in more price competition the following 
year. However, there were still a number of unexplainable similarities 
in the bids of Dairy A and Dairy B. The similarity of losing bids, 
at least for homogenized two percent, could indicate an agreed upon 
losing bid, which is an important function of any price fixing ring. 
A review of the 1976 Ames bids will show that Dairies A, B, and 
Y returned to the practice of submitting identical bids. Identical bids 
were submitted for whole white milk, chocolate two percent milk, and 
homogenized two percent milk. As in 1974 the three dairies shared the 
Ames contract. Dairy A supplied the high school again because of 
its ice cream mix bids, while Dairy B was awarded a certain number of 
schools because the firm submitted the lowest bid on yogurt. The 
return of identical bidding in 1976 is certainly interesting, and 
another past pattern reappears also. The bids submitted on homogenized 
two percent and chocolate two percent are once again identical to 
those submitted to Saydel by Dairy A and Dairy B. 
A review of the Linn County bids in Table B.12a will provide a 
contrast to the recurring patterns in the Polk County area. Only one 
district received bids from just one firm, and Dairy T, which had 
submitted bids to one district in 1975, submitted bids tc three 
of the area's largest districts. Although there is one case of identical 
bids on homogenized two percent milk in the Cedar Rapids district, 
there are simply no additional patterns to observe. The bids on each 
product do vary more than observed in Polk County, and the shifting of 
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some contracts from one firm one year to another firm the next year 
would indicate a more competitive market. 
It is interesting to note once again that in the Linn-Mar 
district Dairy A submits bids that are lower than it submitted in 
Polk County. A comparison of Dairy Z's bids in Linn County and 
Dairy Y's bids in Ames will again show that Dairy Y quoted substantially 
higher prices for the same plant's products co the Ames district. 
A review of the bids from the winter bidding period of 1976 in 
Des Moines in Table B.13a will again show how Dairy A and Dairy B can 
adjust their prices and still maintain the same winning quadrants. 
For homogenized two percent milk there are identical winning bids in 
the four quadrants and nearly identical winning bids for skim milk. 
However, it is interesting that the two dairies' bids are lower than 
quoted in the summer and lower than the bids submitted by Dairy D and 
Dairy T in the Southeast quadrant. The next section will show how the 
firms responded to changes in the cost of raw milk and will indicate 
if there was a similar response by Dairy A and Dairy B to the entry 
of Dairy D into the Polk County market during the preceding summer. 
The 1977 Polk County bids in Table B.14a do reveal that Dairy A 
and Dairy B did respond to the entry to Dairy D in 1976, In order to 
regain the Urbandale and West- Des Moines contracts. Dairy A offered 
the districts with a choice of a contract with firm bids or a contract 
with an escalator clause. The firm offered the same choice of contracts 
to Ankeny, where Dairy D also submitted bids. For homogenized two percent, 
chocolate two percent, and skim the firm bid was $.002 above the bid with 
an escalator clause in both the Urbandale and West Des Moines districts. 
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The firm bid submitted to these districts on homogenized two percent 
and skim was the same bid submitted by Dairy A in the Des Moines 
Northwest and Southwest quadrants, where Dairy A typically wins its share 
of the Des Moines contract. Also, Dairy B submitted its winning bid 
on homogenized two percent, chocolate two percent, and skim for the 
Des Moines Northeast and Southeast quadrants to both Urbandale and 
West Des Moines. Hence, both dairies responded to the entry of Dairy D 
in a very similar fashion. 
In addition, Dairy A and Dairy B again submitted identical bids 
on homogenized two percent milk and chocolate two percent milk to the 
Saydel district. Dairy D did submit bids to this district, but once 
again Dairy B won the contract for the lowest bid on orange drink. 
In the Des Moines district one will notice that Dairy A and Dairy B 
have identical winning bids on each product and identical losing bids 
on chocolate two percent and skim. Finally, in the Bondurant-Farrar, 
North Polk, and Southeast Polk districts Dairy B submits the same bid 
CO all discriccs and Dairy À submics a bid $.003 higher chan B's 
in all three districts. The same is true for chocolate two percent 
milk in Bcndurant—Farrar and North Polk, whole white milk xn Bondurant-
Farrar and Southeast Polk, and skim milk in North Polk and Southeast 
Polk. 
In addition to these similarities. Table B.lAb again shows that there 
tended to be common differentials maintained between pairs of products 
by Dairy A and Dairy B. With the numerous similarities that appeared 
in 1977, it is difficult to imagine that the bids were generated by 
independent behavior. The bids submitted to the Ames district also 
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reflect this similar behavior on the part of Dairy A and Dairy B. 
Table B.17a reveals that Dairy A, Dairy B, and Dairy Y submitted 
identical bids on whole white milk, chocolate two percent milk, and 
homogenized two percent milk. The Ames district awarded the contract 
to all three firms as it did in 1976, and there simply appears to be a 
lack of competition for the Ames contract. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the district may be encouraging the continuation of such behavior 
given its willingness to split the district among the three firms, and 
the district could certainly take measures to force a change in this 
behavior. 
The 1977 Linn County bids are contained in Table B.15a. This year 
there are a few cases of identical bidding. Dairy P and Dairy T 
submitted identical bids on whole white milk and whole chocolate milk 
in the Lisbon and North Linn districts and identical bids on homogenized 
two percent and chocolate two percent in Lisbon. Given that Dairy P 
was purchased the following spring by the same parent firm that owns 
Dairy T, it is possible that there was some coordination of actions. 
However, if this was the case, Dairy P lost the Lisbon contract which 
it had won the past three years. It also lost the Mount Vernon contract 
to Dairy T; and again. Dairy P had won this contract the three previous 
years. With the exception of these cases, there are no other interesting 
patterns to note. Dairy Z regained the contracts in the College and 
Linn-Mar contracts, but lost the Cedar Rapids contract to Dairy P. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the Linn-Mar contract was reassigned 
to Dairy P later in the schoolyear. 
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One of the interesting points about the bids in Linn County is that 
one dairy does not necessarily have the lowest bid on all products. 
For example. Dairy Z in the College district has the lowest bid on 
homogenized two percent and chocolate two percent, but Dairy P has 
the lowest bid on whole white and whole chocolate. This has been true for 
certain districts in several of the other years, and at least this should 
indicate a lack of concerted behavior by the firms in this area. This is 
also shown by the lack of a common differential between pairs of dairy 
products in Table B.15b. However, this table does show that Dairy T and 
Dairy P had very similar differentials 
As has been true in previous years, neither area's bids indicate 
a relationship between bid price and the cost of transportation. Once 
again. Dairy A submitted lower bids to two districts in Linn County 
than it did in any of the Polk County districts. Perhaps the lack 
of the expected transporation cost-bid price relationship in either 
area indicate that the firms use marginal cost pricing. If a firm 
already has delivery stops to retail outlets in an area, it may estimate 
the cost of an additional stop to be quite small. 
Before summarizing this section, the winter, 1977 bids for the 
Des Moines district in Table 6.16a must be reviewed. Again, Dairy A 
and Dairy B have nearly identical winning bids for each product, 
although their respective losing bids do differ. Table B.I6b shows 
that the two dairies have very similar differentials between homogenized 
two percent and chocolate two percent and skim and homogenized two 
percent. Although the exact pattern may differ from bidding period to 
bidding period, the award of these contracts has not differed in the 
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Des Moines district since 1973. 
Conclusions from bid analysis 
The bids submitted to school districts located in Ames, Polk 
County, and Linn County have now been reviewed to determine if there 
were any patterns that would suggest that the firms in each of the 
areas had been engaging in collusive behavior. This review of the bids 
submitted in each of the areas will now be summarized so that some 
conjectures regarding the competitiveness of each area's market 
can be made. 
With the exception of a few cases of identical bidding in 1972 
and 1977, there were no discernible bidding patterns in the Linn County 
area. The small sample size for the bids submitted in 1972 and in 1973 
may have prohibited one from detecting any patterns in these years, but 
for the bids submitted in 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977 the sample 
included at least the winning bids submitted to eight school districts. 
This is only one less distrirr rnpn included in. the Pclk County cc.-plc 
in 1976 and 1977; and therefore, the sample should have been large 
enough to detect at least a few patterns, if there were any to observe. 
In Linn County it was often true that a few of the smaller 
school districts received bids from only one firm. Some of these 
districts indicated that the district had failed to solicit bids from 
a large number of firms. In some cases only one firm had been asked 
to submit bids, and this was due to a lack of information regarding 
the number of firms willing to submit bids. The lack of competition 
for these contracts is due only to the actions of the individual district. 
1 4 3  
The larger districts in Linn County have received bids from as many as 
five firms since 1974. Since 1974 the bid data indicate that at least 
two dairy distributors and at least three dairy processors have 
submitted bids in this area in each year. In 1976 and 1977 there were 
seven firms submitting bids to one or more of the eight districts 
included in the Linn County sample. 
Although these firms have only irregularly submitted bids or 
have submitted bids to only one district, the willingness of firms to 
bid was probably a healthy competitive factor. As the number of firms 
willing to submit bids changes, especially when it increases, it is 
difficult to establish and/or maintain a collusive agreement. The 
irregular nature of a firm's willingness to bid may reflect the absence 
of a request to bid or periodic difficulties within the firm, but it 
would be hard to maintain an agreement that would satisfy all 
participants when the number of participants changes. If the 
conspiracy attempted to ignore these potential competitors, the loss 
of market share of a firm or firms involved in the agreement would 
certainly hinder the stability of the agreement. Therefore, the lack 
of bidding patterns in Linn County may be explained in part by the 
changing number of firms that submit bids. In addition, there are two 
dairy processing firms in Cedar Rapids that have not been active in 
the school district market, but they do represent additional potential 
competitors in the area. 
Given the lack of any bidding patterns and the number of active 
firms, one would conclude that the school district market in Linn County 
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is competitive. This conclusion is further supported by the observed 
variance in the price differentials maintained between various pairs 
of products by the firms, but there were a few firms that did tend to 
maintain a given price differential. However, there did not appear to 
be any relationship between bid prices and the cost of transportation; 
but, as mentioned earlier, it may be possible that the firms practice 
marginal cost pricing in the delivery of dairy products to school 
districts. 
In contrast, there were numerous similarities in the pricing 
behavior of Dairy A and Dairy B in Polk County. The provision of 
straws in 1972 and 1973 was shown to be quite important in explaining 
the variance of bids in the area. When the pricing factor for the 
provision of straws was taken into account, the variance of the two 
firms' bids was very small. However, this factor appeared to be less 
important after 1973. The provision of straws by the dairies did cause 
the firms to incur higher costs in fulfilling the contract which would 
be reflected in hlgueL prices, but che point is tnat the tirras' prices 
did not vary by much once this factor was taken into consideration. 
Also, it was shoizn that the dairies could vary their bid prices in 
the Des Moines district so well that each dairy was awarded the contract 
for the same two quadrants time after time. In the bids submitted to 
this district, the winning bids submitted by Dairy B in the Northeast 
and Southeast quadrants were at times identical to Dairy A's winning 
bids in the Northwest and Southwest quadrants. At times the same 
was also observed in the two dairies' losing bids. In 1972 and 1974 
Dairy B would submit the same bid on a product for all quadrants. 
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while Dairy A would alter its bid by $.0005 above or below Dairy B's bid. 
However, it was never observed that both dairies would submit identical 
bids on all products for all quadrants. Perhaps a reason that this did not 
occur is that the Des Moines district refuses to accept identical bids 
on all products for all quadrants. Janice Dudley, an official of the 
Des Moines district, indicated that the district felt that such an 
occurrence was indicative of collusive behavior. Therefore, this was 
never observed, but other similarities, such as those enumerated above, 
were numerous. 
In the other districts in Polk County there were also similar pricing 
actions. It was not uncommon for the two dairies to follow a given pattern 
for the districts typically won by Dairy A or Dairy B. For example, it 
was common for Dairy B and Dairy A to submit bids in the Urbandale 
district that were identical to those submitted to West Des Moines. 
However, this may be explained by the fact that the two districts often 
jointly requested bids from the dairies, but this pattern was observed 
in the bids submitted to Southeast Polk and North Polk on several 
occasions. Finally, since 1974 the two dairies have submitted identical 
bids on one or more products to the Saydel district. 
In addition to the patterns observed in the bids, it was also 
very common for the two firms to follow the same price differentials 
between various pairs of products. At times when the differentials did 
vary, the two dairies often maintained very similar differentials. 
For example, in 1973 both dairies chose a lower and identical price 
differential between whole white milk and whole chocolate milk in 
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their respective losing quadrants of the Des Moines district than they 
chose for their respective winning quadrants. The only possible 
explanation other than collusion is that it is a coincidence, but 
there are other similar cases throughout the period. 
Finally, it was observed in the Ames district that these two 
dairies along with Dairy Y often submitted identical bids on one or 
more products. The continuing occurrence of identical bidding in the 
Ames and Saydel districts suggests that the dairies have enough information 
to enable them to come up with the same prices. However, it can be argued 
that any firm that has enough information to match a supposedly secret 
price also has enough information to beat that price and secure the 
contract. The interesting question is why doesn't a firm beat a 
competitor's price if it can match the price. 
Given the level of concentration in the Des Moines area dairy 
processing industry, it is certain that tacit collusion is the 
least that is probable. The firms do incur very similar costs which 
facilitates tacit collusion, and it is possible that the firms have 
a "live and let live" philosophy. The firms may simply avoid open 
price competition so chat each can have a share of the market. 
Supplying milk to school districts is certainly a good advertising 
medium given that the children will be buyers of dairy products in 
the future, and by avoiding price wars each can benefit from this 
early brand identification and the stable sales generated by having a 
contract. Hence, it is possible that the firms submit identical bids 
to avoid the instability and unprofitability of having price wars. 
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However, it is very difficult to believe that the firms could 
submit bids following the patterns often observed in the Des Moines 
district without some additional exchange of information. It is hard 
to find an explanation for identical losing bids except for coincidence 
or overt collusive behavior. However, before coming to a conclusion on 
the firms' pricing behavior, the analysis will continue with a comparison 
of how the firms react to changes in the cost of raw milk in a half 
pint of processed milk from one bidding period to another. 
Cost-bid price analysis 
Although the firms in the Des Moines area have similar costs, it 
will be important to see how each reacts to changes in input prices. 
One would expect that firms' reactions would possibly differ in several 
ways. The firms may differ in the timing of their realization of 
future cost changes and, therefore, have different reaction times. 
However, this may not be too important here given that all firms regulated 
under Federal Order 79 have access to changes in the cost of raw milk 
at the same time. Also, the firms may differ in how much price is 
adjusted for changes in costs. The firms may have differing target 
profit levels or differing views regarding the permanence of the 
cost change. Therefore, one would expect reactions to differ somewhat 
among firms. 
Thus, an additional indication of the pricing behavior of firms 
in an industry is found by observing how firms adjust their prices 
given a change in costs. Since the price of raw milk in Des Moines 
and Cedar Rapids is regulated by Federal Milk Order 79 and varies from 
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month-to-month, one important part of a dairy firm's total cost is 
supplied by public information. Although price information is not 
available on the dairy firms' other inputs, the volatility of the 
price of Class I milk should be reflected in the prices of packaged 
fluid milk products given that the cost of raw milk probably represents 
over fifty percent of a firm's average total cost. Hence, this section 
will review how firms have responded to changes in the cost per unit 
of raw milk from one bidding period to ai-'-'her. 
Tables 6.13 a-d contain the monthly cost of raw milk in a half pint 
of processed milk for the two areas. The cost per hundredweight of 
raw milk does differ in the two areas, with the firms regulated in 
the Cedar Rapids paying seven cents less per hundredweight than the 
firms regulated in the Des Moines area. This is due to a locational 
adjustment as briefly mentioned in Chapter 4. There are two per half 
pint cost figures for each area; this is due to a difference in the number 
of pounds of raw milk necessary to process a gallon of whole homogenized 
milk as opposed to a gallon of homogenized two percent milk,^ Table 6.13a 
represents the cost per half pint of raw milk processed into whole 
homogenized milk in the Des Moines area, while Table 6.13b contains 
comparable figures for homogenized two percent milk or skim one percent 
milk in the Des Moines area. Tables 6,13c and 6.13d contain comparable 
^There are 8.6 pounds of raw milk in a gallon of processed milk 
with a butterfat content of at least three percent and 8.62 pounds of 
raw milk in a gallon of processed milk with a butterfat content between 
1 percent and 2.9 percent. 
Table 6.13a. Cost of raw milk in half pint homogenized milk by year and month, 1972-78 in 
the Des Moine» area 
Month 
Year Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct, Nov. Dec. 
1972 .03402 .03402 .03424 .03424 
197:! .03612 .03660 .03671 .03682 
1974 .04859 .05020 .05106 .05128 
197!, .04386 .04408 .04434 .04434 
1976 .05504 .05633 .05536 .05187 
1977 .05192 .05187 .05155 .05139 



























































two percent milk or skim milk by year and 
Month 
Year Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
1972 .03410 .03410 .03432 .03432 .03470 .03426 , 03416 .03421 .03453 .03486 .03502 .03545 
1973 .03620 .03669 .03680 .03690 .03744 .03787 . 03804 .03841 .04105 .04191 .04477 .04789 
1974 .04870 .05032 .05118 .05140 .05145 .04919 . 04488 .04154 .04143 .04197 .04358 .04429 
1975 .04396 .04418 .04445 .04445 .04450 .04493 . 04536 .04585 .04714 .04903 .05210 .05388 
1976 .05517 .05646 .05549 .05199 .05388 .05301 . 05226 .05237 .05447 .05598 .05312 .05204 
1977 .05204 .05199 .05167 .05150 .05231 .05388 . 05398 .05388 .05414 .05409 .05463 .05463 
1978 .05490 .05533 .05555 .05651 
Tabliî 6.13c. Cost of raw milk In half pint homogenized milk by year and month, 1972-78 In the 
Cedar Rapids area 
Month 
Year Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
1972 .03365 .03365 .033(16 .03386 .03424 .03381 .03370 .03375 .03408 .03440 .03456 .03499 
1973 .03574 .03623 .03634 .03644 .03698 .03741 .03757 .03795 .04058 .04144 .04429 .04741 
1974 .04821 .04983 .05069 .05093 .05096 .04870 .04440 .04107 .04096 .04150 .04311 .04381 
1975 .04348 .04370 .04397 .04397 .04402 .04445 .04488 .04537 .04666 .04854 .05160 .05337 
1976 .05466 .05595 .05499 .05149 .05337 .05251 .05176 .05187 .05397 .05547 .05262 .05155 
1977 .05155 .05149 .0513 7 .05101 .05182 .05337 .05348 .05337 .05364 .05359 .05413 .05413 
1978 .05440 .05483 .05504 .05601 
Table 6.13d. Cost of raw milk in hall pint homogenized two percent milk or skim milk by year and 
























































































figures for the Cedar Rapids area. The difference in the cost per 
half pint between the two areas is approximately $.00038. 
Before reviewing the change in bid prices over time, the author 
wishes to offer a few words of caution. The Federal Orders announce 
the price per hundredweight of raw milk for the upcoming month on the 
fifth day of the current month. One would expect firms bidding for 
contracts to consider the expected costs of inputs during the contract 
period in the determination of quoted price. Of course, the risk 
of misjudging the cost of inputs in the future is reduced when the 
contract includes an escalator clause as is conmion in the sale of dairy 
products to school districts. However, when the bid data was reviewed 
it was common for the firms to state that the quoted bid was based 
upon the current month's cost of raw milk even if the bid was dated 
after the fifth of the month. Therefore, the forthcoming analysis 
assumes that the cost per half pint reflected in the bid price is the 
current month's cost rather than the upcoming month. In addition, some 
of the districts were quite vague about the exact date of the award since 
many districts furnished the data from official board minutes. Therefore, 
caution must be exercised in reviewing the results of the forthcoming 
analysis. Where there appears to be inconsistent behavior, the cost 
per half pint in the preceding and upcoming months will be included. 
Since data were collected only back to the 1972-73 schoolyear, the 
first comparison of the change in bid price and change in cost per 
half pint will be from the 1972 bidding period to the 1973 bidding 
period. Tables C.l a-c in Appendix C contain this information for half 
pints of whole homogenized milk (Table C.la), chocolate homogenized milk 
(Table C.lb), and skim milk (Table C.lc). The change in the cost per half 
pint reflects the change in the cost from the previous contract date 
to the current contract date. In the Polk County area the change in the 
cost per half pint of whole homogenized milk ranged from $.00317 for 
the Southeast Polk contract to $.00424 for the Ankeny contract. 
The change in winning bid prices ranged from $.0024 in Urbandale to 
$.077 in Ankeny, with it being common for the change in winning bid 
price to exceed the change in cost per half pint. Given the general 
inflationary period between the contract periods, this pricing 
behavior may only reflect increases in the cost of other inputs or 
expected increases in the cost of raw milk during the contract period. 
Perhaps the only peculiar change is in the Urbandale district, 
but this can be explained. The 1972 bid included straws in the 
contract while the 1973 bid did not. 
In the Linn County sample the change in the cost per half pint 
of whole homogenized milk ranged from $.00274 to $.0042. As in the 
Polk County area there doesn't appear to be any peculiar patterns in 
the pricing behavior exhibited. 
Table C.lb contains the comparisons for whole chocolate milk while 
Table C.lc contains the comparisons for skim milk. Again, a review 
of the changes in bid prices and changes in the cost per half pint 
does not reveal any inconsistent firm behavior for either product. 
In the 1974 bidding period most Polk County districts switched 
to the purchase of milk products with a butterfat content of 
two percent; and hence, for this area it is impossible to compare 
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price changes and cost changes except for those districts that 
purchased whole homogenized milk and skim milk. Tables C.2 a-c 
contain the comparisons of the 197 3 bidding period and the 1974 
bidding period. In referring back to Tables 6.13 a-d one can see that 
during the 1973-74 schoolyear the cost per half pint of raw milk 
did increase in excess of $.01 per half pint before starting a decline 
in June, 1974. Therefore, the change in the cost per half pint 
reflected in Tables C.2 a-c will generally not be appropriate. Given 
that many of the 1973 contracts reflected firm bids, it would be 
expected that firms would attempt to recover partially the previous 
year's losses or reduced profits in the upcoming contract period. 
Following the 1973-74 schoolyear most contracts included in this study 
contained escalator clauses. 
For whole homogenized milk one can see that the dairies did increase 
bid prices substantially more than the stated change in cost from bidding 
period to bidding period. Given the cost of raw milk during the 1973-74 
schoolyear, this behavior does not seem abnormal. The same general 
behavior is shown in Table C.2b for vctiole chocolate milk and C.2c for 
skim milk. 
Given that the Des Moines district accepted bids in November, 1974 
for the second. Table 3 C.3 a-c reviews how the bids changed from the 
summer bidding period to the winter bidding period. The change in 
the cost per half pint over this period was .00204, and both dairies did 
increase their respective bid prices by approximately .0025 for both 
homogenized two percent and skim. However, it is quite interesting 
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to note that both dairies chose to increase the price of chocolate 
two percent by .005. This may only reflect that both dairies experienced 
an increase in the price of input used in the processing of chocolate 
two percent milk, but it is interesting that both firms had identical 
reactions at the same time. 
The interval between the 1974 summer bidding period and that of 
1975 shows that the cost per half pint was relatively more stable than 
during the previous schoolyear. Tables C.4 a-e contain the information for 
this interval. In Table C.Aa one can see that the cost per half pint 
of whole homogenized milk did increase slightly, but that in some 
districts the firms did lower their bids from the previous period's 
level. However, for this product there isn't any consistent pattern 
among the firm's reactions. Perhaps the firms had overreacted to the 
situation of the previous year and were simply adjusting for this 
overreaction. The same can be seen in Table C.4b for chocolate milk in 
the Linn County area. 
Table C.4c contains trie calculations for skim milk. In the 
Des Moines district there is an interesting similarity. The cost per 
half pint increased .00178 from the previous bidding date in November; 
however, both dairies chose to increase the quoted bid only .0005 in 
the Northeast and Southeast quadrants. This same pattern can be 
seen for homogenized two percent in Table C.4d in the Northwest and South­
west quadrants. Another peculiarity is that Dairy B did not increase its 
winning bid for homogenized two percent in the Northeast and Southeast 
quadrants while Dairy A did not increase its winning bid for skim in the 
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Northwest and Southwest. It is a very interesting coincidence that each 
firm adopted such similar behavior in its respective winning quadrants 
across different products. 
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both chose to lower their quoted bid on homogenized two percent to 
Saydel by .0025 while the change in cost was -.00695. A review of 
the cost per half pint in adjacent months did not lend any explanation 
to this similarity. The Linn County area also has an interesting 
occurrence in the College district. All three dairies who had submitted 
bids on homogenized two percent in the previous year decreased their 
quoted bid although the cost per half pint had increased slightly. 
However, if one previous year's bids had been calculated upon the June 
cost per half pint, then the change in cost figure would have shown 
a decrease rather than a slight increase. Although the bids submitted 
to the College district are very close, the magnitude of the bids relative 
to those in other districts would make it difficult to believe that 
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shown in the College district for chocolate two percent milk in Table C.4e. 
The December, 1975 bidding period in the Des Moines district 
reflected in Tables C.5 a-c, doesn't indicate any inconsistent firm 
behavior. Although the dairies didn't increase their bids as much as 
the indicated increase in the cost per half pint, this may be explained 
if the dairies had based those prices upon the November cost of $.0521 
instead of the December cost of $.05388. However, the price responses 
of Dairies A and B are very similar for all products. 
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Tables C.6 a-e contain the comparisons of the change in bid price 
and the change in cost for the summer bidding period of 1976. During 
the previous schoolyear the cost per half pint had increased approximately 
$.008 and this is reflected in the bids for whole homogenized milk in 
Table C.6a, whole chocolate milk in Table C.6b, and skim milk in Table C.6c. 
However, the biannual bidding cycle of the Des Moines district shows 
that the cost per half pint decreased slightly from December to July, 
and this is reflected in the bids submitted on all products to this 
district. 
The dairies submitting bids on homogenized two percent milk in 
the Saydel district, as shown in Table C.6d, once again increased their 
bids by less than the stated change in cost. However, the cost per 
half pint was lower in April than in May, the stated bidding period. 
If the bids had been determined in April, then this may explain the 
similarity. 
Except for the Des Moines district, it appears that the dairies 
in both areas simply increased their bid prices in response to rising 
input prices. In general, there doesn't appear to be any inconsistent 
firm behavior in this bidding period. 
During the November, 1976 bidding period in the Des Moines 
district there are some interesting siiuilariLies as shovi-n in Tables 
C.7 a-c. Since the July bidding period the cost per half pint had risen 
slightly before beginning to decrease in November, but the stated change 
in cost shows a slight increase over the July figure. Dairies A and B, 
who have supplied the Des Moines district continuously since January, 
1973 both chose to decrease their bids from the previous level by a 
very similar figure, approximately $.004. Given that costs had risen 
over the interim, it is very difficult to find an economic explanation 
for this similar behavior, unless the two firms were reacting to the 
encry of Dairy D into the Polk County area in the previous summer as 
a viable competitor. However, the secrecy of a competitive sealed 
tender market would have not revealed the participants bidding for 
the contract until the award of the contract was announced. The 
similar pricing behavior of Dairies A and B on all products at this 
time is somewhat peculiar. 
Tables C.8 a-e contain similar information for the summer bidding 
period of 1977. During the previous contract period the cost of 
raw milk had fluctuated up and down, but for most districts the stated 
change in the cost of raw milk had increased only slightly. For 
whole homogenized milk one can see the favorable effect of additional 
competition in Polk County. In 1976 Dairy D had been awarded the 
Urbandale and the West Des Moines contracts, which in the previous 
fon-r QrVior-.iyeors hzd bssn supplied by Dairy A. In 1977 Dal^y A, 
as mentioned earlier, offered both districts a choice of a contract 
with firm bids or a contract with an escalator caluse in order to 
regain the contract. In fact, most bidders in the two districts 
lowered their prices on all half pint dairy products. 
If one reviews the change in bid prices in Polk County with the 
change in cost for all products, it may be possible that the entry of 
Dairy D as a competitor in 1976 may have contributed a favorable 
competitive influence throughout the entire county. With the sxceptio 
of the Des Moines district, most districts received lower bids from 
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at least one dairy in 1977 than they did in 1976 even though the cost 
of raw milk had increased slightly. 
Price cutting was also common in Linn County in 1977. In 1976 
Dairy T of Waterloo had entered the Linn County school district market 
and the entry of the firm may have also had a favorable influence 
upon competition in this area. 
Once again. Dairies A and B display very similar pricing behavior 
in the bids submitted to the Saydel and the Des Moines districts. In 
Saydel both dairies increased their bids on homogenized two percent 
and chocolate two percent by the same amount in order to maintain 
identical bids. Similar behavior is also shown in Des Moines where 
for homogenized two percent, chocolate two percent, and skim milk 
Dairy B's winning bids in the Northeast and the Southeast quadrants 
is identical to or very close to Dairy A's winning bids in the 
Northwest and Southwest quadrants. Such similar reaction to cost 
changes is very hard to explain without further knowledge of the firms' 
other Input prices. 
Finally, the winter bidding period of 1977 in the Des Moines district 
shows, in Tables C.9 a-c, thac the cost per half pint had only slightly 
increased from July, the previous bidding period. Once gain. Dairies A 
and B both decided to follow a similar price response. For the most part 
both dairies didn't change their bids from those quoted in July, which 
is not inconsistent with the slight increase in cost. However, it is 
interesting to observe how closely these two dairies respond to cost 
changes continually over time. 
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A review of how firms react to changes in the cost of raw milk 
indicates that for the most part the firms in the Linn County area did 
not have identical responses. However, there were cases where the firms 
would cut their prices from the previous year's levels, even though the 
stated change in the cost per half pint had increased. This is interesting 
because earlier analysis had shown the bid prices in Linn County to be 
relatively lower than the bid prices in Polk County, and yet there were 
instances of price cutting. Although there could have been a decrease in 
the price of other inputs, the general inflationary trend of this period 
would suggest that this is not likely. Instead, this price cutting could 
have been due to the competition for the larger contracts in Linn County. 
Given the number of firms bidding for the contracts in the Cedar Rapids, 
College, and Linn-Mar districts, this seems the most likely explanation 
for the periodic price cutting. 
On the other hand, there were some interesting similarities in 
Polk County. These similarities were the most apparent in the Saydel 
and Des Moines districts. In the Saydel district Dairy A and Dairy B 
have submitted identical bids on one or more products since 1974, 
indicating that for these products the daiires would react identically 
to changes in costs. This would not be puzzling if the two firms 
had been increasing prices to cover increasing costs, hnf in 1975 both 
firms lowered their prices by less than the stated decrease in the 
cost per half pint. It is interesting that each firm had the same 
reaction. 
In addition, there were many similar reactions by these two 
firms in the Des Moines district. Perhaps the most interesting is how 
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each reacted in such a similar fashion during the winter bidding period 
of 1976 after Dairy D had become a successful bidder in the summer. It 
is not surprising that each firm would react to increased competition; 
however, it is surprising that each firm lowered their prices by 
approximately the same amount even though the cost per half pint had 
risen from the summer bidding period. It is difficult to conceive that 
the firm, if acting noncollusively, would have such similar reactions 
to a change in the structure of the Polk. County market. 
These similarities in Polk County compliment the similarities of 
the two firms' bidding patterns discussed earlier. At the very 
least one would have to conclude that market information is easily 
accessible by both Dairy A and Dairy B and interpreted by both firms 
in a very similar fashion. Before presenting the conclusions of this 
chapter, the next section will discuss the observed relationship 
between industrial structure and industrial performance in this study. 
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Industry Performance in a Sealed Tender Market 
This study analyzed the pricing behavior of firms in the same 
product market but in two different geographic markets characterized by 
different market structures. In Polk County the dairy processing 
industry is highly concentrated and can be described as a duopoly. 
On the other hand, in Linn County there are three dairy processors 
and several dairy distributors. In addition, there are several other 
firms which sell fluid milk products in the Linn County area. There can 
be little doubt that the Linn County market is relatively less concentrated 
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than the Polk County market. The bids submitted to these two area's 
school districts did reveal some indications of the differential 
performance of the firms participating in these two markets. 
Given the degree of market stability and the numerous bidding patterns 
observed in the Polk County school district market, it would appear that 
the high level of concentration made possible coordination in this market 
by Dairy A and Dairy B. On the other hand, the lower degree of market 
stability and absence of bidding patterns in the Linn County school district 
market would lead one to conclude the lower level of concentration in this 
area made market coordination more difficult and perhaps impossible. 
Hence, the Linn County school district market appeared to be more competi­
tive than the Polk County school district market. This difference in 
industry structure and industry conduct was reflected in the level of 
prices charged for half pint dairy products in the two markets. Earlier, 
it was shown that the Polk County school districts generally paid higher 
prices than the districts located in Linn County. If the firms in the 
two areas are of comparable efficiency, then Dairy A and Dairy B not only 
charged higher prices, but also received higher profits by exerting 
monopoly power. 
Economic theory suggests that in order for a firm to charge a 
higher price and thereby increase its profits, the firm must restrict 
its output which causes resources to be misallocated. Therefore, it 
would appear that there is an inefficient allocation of resources in 
the Polk County school district market. However, one could hardly 
assert*that resources are being efficiently allocated in Linn County 
without further information; one could simply conclude that the prices 
164 
charged by the firms in the Linn County area are closer to the 
prices that would prevail in a competitive market than those charged in 
Polk County, and hence, fewer resources are being misallocated in Linn 
County than in Polk County. 
Unfortunately, the course of this study did not seek to reveal any 
theoretical or empirical relationship between industry structure and 
the other aspects of industry performance, such as progress and equity, 
in a sealed tender market. The participation of firms of an industry in 
a sealed tender market may only represent a small percentage of the 
firms' total sales; therefore, it would be difficult to discern a 
relationship between industry structure and these other aspects of 
performance. However, the restriction of output sold in a sealed tender 
market to effect higher prices and higher profits from the firm's 
participation in this market would cause an inefficient allocation of 
resources in this market. 
This chapter has presented and analyzed market information concerning 
the sale of half pint dairy products in a sealed tender market to school 
districts located in Polk County, Linn County, and Ames. The object 
of this study was to determine the nature of the pricing behavior of 
the participants in these markets, and this section will briefly summarize 
the preceding analysis to explain the basis of this chapter's conclusions. 
The structure of the Des Moines area dairy processing industry was 
compared to the profile of the conspiracy-prone industry presented in 
Chapter 2. The available sarket information indicated that this area's 
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industry had many characteristics in common with this profile. The 
Des Moines area dairy processing industry has few firms selling 
relatively homogeneous products with the demand for these products 
being relatively inelastic, especially in the school district market. 
The level of concentration in the Des Moines area market is very high, 
and Chapter 5 indicated a possibility that there exist barriers to 
entry by potential competitors. 
While the dairy processing industry in the Cedar Rapdis area shares 
some of these characteristics, the greater number of firms selling 
packaged fluid milk products indicates that the Cedar Rapids area market 
is relatively less concentrated than the Des Moines area market. Given 
the number of firms and lower level of concentration, the Cedar Rapids 
dairy industry does not match the profile of the conspiracy-prone 
industry as well as the Des Moines area industry. 
An analysis of market shares and market stability in the Polk County 
school district market and the Linn County school district market revealed 
that in the Polk County market there had been a tendency for Dairy A and 
Dairy B to evenly divide the market between themselves during the 
period 1972-73 to 1977-78. In addition, the market shares of Dairy A 
and Dairy B had been relatively stable throughout the period, with each 
generally supplying the same quadrants or districts year after year. 
Although the relative size of the Cedar Rapids contract biased the 
Herfindahl index and the correlation coefficients among market shares 
over time, the market shares of the participants did change from year 
to year, indicating a more competitive market. 
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The distributions of winning bids in Polk County and Linn County 
revealed that Polk County school districts generally, with few 
exceptions, paid higher prices for half pint dairy products than 
did Linn County school districts. This simply reflected the exertion 
of monopoly power by Dairy A and Dairy B in the Polk County school 
district market. 
As summarized earlier, the analysis of bids submitted to Polk County 
school districts and to the Ames district revealed many interesting simi­
larities in the pricing behavior of Dairy A and Dairy B. Some of these 
similarities may be explained in part by the following. Given the nature 
of the Des Moines area dairy processing industry, it is quite likely that 
the dairies have similar cost structures and have, over the years, acquired 
market information regarding each other. In addition, the varying dates 
of the school districts contracts allows each to acquire bid information 
given the practice of public disclosure of bids. These conditions can 
greatly explain the ability of each firm to submit bids that are very 
close CO rne nrner fs-1-m'ç bids. Further, the tcr.dcr.cy fcr ccch firm 
to maintain similar price differentials among various pairs of products 
may be simply a common industry practice as some of the firms participating 
in the Linn County area also at times maintained similar price differentials. 
However, it is difficult to justify the ability of each firm to 
continuously manipulate their bids as they have in the Des Moines district. 
Either market information is much better than can be imagined to enable 
tacit collusion or the firms are engaging in overt collusion. In addition, 
the occurrence of identical losing bids on several occasions can only be 
explained by coincidence or by an agreed upon losing bid as part 
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of a collusive arrangement. 
Although there were a few occurrences of identical bidding and 
common price differentials among pairs of products, there were no 
apparent bidding patterns observed in the bids submitted to the Linn 
County school districts. Given the market conditions, the changing 
firm market shares, and the lack of bidding patterns, one can only 
conclude that the Linn County market is more competitive than the 
Polk County market. 
The final part of the bid analysis attempted to determine any 
consistency in the reaction of firms to changes in the cost of raw 
milk in a half pint of processed milk. No consistent behavior was 
found in the reactions of the firms participating in the Linn County 
market, and only a few similarities were observed in the Polk County 
market. Perhaps the most interesting similarity in Polk County was 
the very similar reaction adopted by Dairy A and Dairy B following 
the successful entry of Dairy D in 1976. 
In sum, it would appear that many aspects of collusive behavior are 
present in the Polk County school market. The industry structure is 
conducive to conspiracy, there is an apparent sharing of the market and 
relative stability in the market shares of Dairy A and Dairy B, and 
the pricing behavior of the two firms is very similar. Of course, 
many of these conditions would be observed where tacit collusion in 
practiced, so it is difficult to make a definitive conclusion. However, 
the recurring ability of Dairy A and Dairy B to submit bids that are very 
close to one another for all products and continually win the same 
contracts could suggest more than just tacit collusion. 
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CHAPTER VII. SU^ÎMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Collusive pricing behavior has frequently been detected in markets 
vhere scaled bj-ds are soliciteu by & purclictsj-ng agency i-n an actcmpt co 
minimize the cost of purchasing many products. Where the purchasing 
agency makes public disclosure of the distribution of bids received from 
the participating firms, the possibility of overt collusive behavior is 
greatly enhanced as the disclosure of the bids received reduces the cost 
of policing a collusive arrangement. Such disclosure allows the conspiracy 
to determine if the participants are adhering to the price and/or market 
sharing agreement and to take action against those participants who are 
not adhering to the agreement. The objective of this case study was to 
analyze the pricing behavior of dairy processing firms in Iowa school 
districts where sealed bids are solicited on dairy products, and this 
final chapter will summarize the methodology and major findings of this 
study. In addition, some suggestions will be offered in regard to the study 
of uriciii^ behavior in sealed tenner markprq. 
A review of the bids received on half pint dairy products by 
school districts located in Polk County suggested that collusive pricing 
behavior could be a possible explanation for the similarity of the 
bids received by these districts during the period 1972 to 1978. However, 
before any conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of pricing behavior, 
it is necessary to make a comprehensive study of the market environment 
in which the firms operate. Therefore, it was necessary to first 
understand the nature of collusive behavior and to develop a framework 
for analysis ot pricing oehavior. 
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In Chapter 2 the literature regarding the nature of collusive 
behavior was reviewed. Collusive behavior on the part of firms in 
an industry offers potentially higher profits if the participants 
can find an efficient means of maintaining the agreement. Any 
price fixing ring must be able to establish and maintain a price 
above the competitive level, to allocate the market shares of the 
participants, and to police the arrangement so that price cutting does 
not upset the market allocation agreement. This last function imposes 
a cost upon the price fixing ring, and certain industry characteristics 
have been identified that either reduce the cost of enforcement or 
increase the cost of foregoing a collusive agreement. 
The industry characteristics that tend to reduce the cost of 
enforcement include a small number of firms in an industry where the 
level of concentration is high, a relatively simple, homogeneous 
product, the existence of barriers to entry and few potential competitors, 
similar cost structures among the industry members, little or no product 
and/or process technological change, an inelastic demand for the industry's 
product, and the sale of the industry's product in a sealed tender 
market. On the other hand, the industry characteristics that tend to 
increase the cost of not engaging in collusive behavior in any industry 
include a lumpiness and infrequency of orders and a small number of 
buyers. These two sets of industry characteristics make up a profile of 
a conspiracy prone industry and can be used to identify industries 
where collusive behavior is possible and therefore determine which 
industries warrant closer investigation of their firms' pricing behavior. 
170 
An analysis of the pricing behavior of the firms in an industry 
is essentially a study of market conduct, and in many cases the 
conduct of the firms in an industry is not directly observable. 
Therefore, the conditions of the market and the structure of 
the industry influence the conduct of the firms in the industry. Those 
conditions which influence the market demand for a product and the 
market supply of a product have an effect upon the structure of 
industry, and the structure of an industry influences the market conduct. 
Thus, to make some inferences about market conduct, it is necessary 
to study the basic conditions of a market and the structure of the 
industry. 
Chapter 3 presented some measures of monopoly power that would 
reflect the structure of an industry and in some cases the performance 
of an industry. In addition, the concept of market stability was 
discussed as a means of determining the degree of competition in 
a market. Where these measures can be calculated, one can gain an 
understanding of tne structure and the performance of industry and the 
degree of competition that exists in a market. If information regarding 
the basic conditions of a market and the structure of industry indicate 
that the industry matches the profile of a conspiracy prone industry, 
then further analysis of the pricing behavior of the firms is warranted. 
The pattern recognition approach was used in this study of sealed 
bidding behavior to determine if the firms' pricing behavior could 
be explained only by overt collusive conduct. Given an industry 
structure that appears prone to engage in price fixing and/or output 
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sharing, this approach searches for bidding patterns that are not 
consistent with independent firm behavior. In particular, this 
study sought to identify s-^ch patterns as consistent indentical 
bidding, common price differentials between various pairs of half 
pint dairy products, common price differentials between the winning 
bid and losing bids for each product, identical price reactions to 
changes in the cost of raw milk, and any other patterns in the bids 
that could not be explained as rational, independent, economic business 
behavior. If the industry appears to be conspiracy prone, if there 
is evidence of market sharing and a high degree of stability in 
firm market shares, if there is evidence that prices are higher than 
would exist in a competitive situation, and if there are numerous 
bidding patterns that cannot be explained by independent profit 
maximizing behavior of the firms in the industry, then there is a 
strong indication that the firms are engaging in overt collusion. 
In order to determine if prices are excessively high and if 
some of the bidding patterns are simply not common industry practices, 
it is necessary to collect data from other geographic markets where 
the market is considered to be more competitive. These markets can 
then serve as competitive benchmarks and can enable the bids from 
several geographic markets to be compared. In addition to the bid 
data collected from Polk County, bid data was also collected from 
school districts located in Ames and Linn County. The Linn County 
school districts were included since the Linn County market appeared 
more competitive; during the 1972 to 1978 period there were more 
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participants seeking the districts' contracts, and in addition, there 
was some potential competition. The Ames district was included 
because the firms participating in the Polk County market also 
submitted bids to this district, along with the Ames dairy distributor; 
this allowed further analysis of the behavior of the Polk County 
participants when there was an additional participant in the market. 
Before reviewing the bid data from the above districts, some 
background information on the dairy processing industry was presented; 
Chapter 4 discussed the structural evaluation of the national dairy 
processing industry, while Chapter 5 discussed the structure of the 
Des Moines area dairy processing industry. There is no true national 
dairy processing industry as most dairy markets tend to be local in 
nature due to the cost of refrigerated transportation. However, 
extensive merger activity in the dairy industry has caused the level 
of concentration in most local markets to become high. Although 
technological innovations have increased the size of the minimum 
efficient plant, these changes alone cannot explain the high levels 
of concentration in most markets. 
In addition, there have been other changes that have had an 
important effect upon the structure of the dairy industry. The 
diminishing importance nf retail home delivery and the increasing 
importance of large wholesale accounts have made it increasingly 
more difficult for smaller, less efficient firms to remain price 
competitive with the larger dairy processors. Also, the size of many 
wholesale accounts has made it impossible for some smaller firms to 
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fulfill the needs of the account and has become a barrier to entry 
for many potential competitiors in the dairy industry. However, one 
important competitive influence in the market has been the backtsrd 
integration into dairy processing by some larger supermarket chains. 
The threat of further backward integration and the associated loss 
of wholesale accounts may continue to have a healthy, competitive 
influence in the dairy market. 
The structure of the Des Moines area dairy processing industry is 
very similar to that of most other local markets. The industry in 
Des Moines can be described as a duopoly with two firms controlling 
well in excess of ninety percent of the Des Moines area market. There 
had been a number of small processors and a larger, national concern 
operating in Des Moines prior to 1972, but these firms have ceased 
operations leaving only three dairy processors in Des Moines. However, 
one of these firms is quite small and only markets its products in 
four of its stores. 
The two large dairy processors each operate one plant in the 
Des Moines area, with each plant processing more quarts per day than 
necessary to achieve economies of large scale production. This would 
indicate that the Des Moines area market could support a few more 
finnsj however, there has been no entry of firms into the Des Mcincc 
area on a large scale. Unlike other local markets, none of the 
regional food chains have backward integrated into dairy processing; but 
one supermarket chain does transport processed milk into the Des Moines 
area from the chain's processing plant in Omaha. However, the annual 
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volume of milk transported into Des Moines by the chain has represented 
only a small percentage of fluid milk consumption in Des Moines in 
the recent past. Therefore, one would expect that the excessive 
level of concentration in the Des Moines market would allow the two 
larger firms to engage in some type of tacit or overt collusion. 
Chapter 6 began with a comparison of the Des Moines area dairy 
processing industry with the profile of the conspiracy prone industry 
and continued with an analysis of the bid data and other relevant 
market information collected from the school districts in Ames, Polk 
County, and Linn County. Given the small number of firms participating 
in the Polk County school district market and the level of concentration 
in the Des Moines area dairy processing industry, one can conclude 
that this industry does match the profile of the conspiracy prone 
industry. The firms in the Des Moines market are likely to share 
similar cost structures since the price of raw milk is regulated by the 
federal government, the labor force hired by each firm is unionized, 
and much of the machinery used in dairy processing is produced by 
relatively concentrated industries. Further, the pace of technological 
change has not been rapid enough to cause instability in the dairy 
market, and the demand for fluid milk products, especially by school 
districts, is relatively inelastic. Although there is a variety of 
dairy products, each product tends to be quite homogeneous. One 
can argue that many of these points would also characterize the Linn 
County area dairy industry; however, there have been more established 
firms and more potential competition in this market than exists in Folk 
County. 
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The conclusion to Chapter 6 presented a detailed summary of the 
findings of the analysis of the market information and the bid data, so 
only a brief discussion of this study's results will follow. First, 
the market share of the firms participating in the Polk County market 
and Linn County market were computed. These market shares were computed 
only for the half pint dairy products purchased by the school district, 
but these estimations revealed that in Polk County there was a tendency 
for the two large Des Moines area firms to share the school district 
market. In addition, there was a high degree of market stability 
in Polk County, indicating the lack of vigorous price competition. 
During the period 1972 to 1978 not only did these two large firms 
tend to share the contracts but also, with few exceptions, they won 
the same school district contracts year after year. On the other 
hand, in Linn County there was some shifting of contracts from one 
participant to another and the market shares of the firms did change 
from one schoolyear to the next. In addition, it was not apparent 
that the firms participating in Linn County were able to share the 
market as evenly as the Des Moines area firms did in Polk County. 
Â comparison of the distributions of winning bids for each half pint 
dairy product for the Polk County and Linn County markets revealed that 
generally the Polk County school districts paid higher prices for 
half pint dairy products than did the Linn County school districts. 
This simply reflects an exertion of monopoly power by the two 
Des Moines area firms. 
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A review of the bids received by the schools located in Ames, 
Polk County, and Linn County also revealed that many varied bidding 
patterns existed among the bids submitted by the two Des Moines 
area lirms in Polk County and Ames. However, there were few patterns 
in the bids submitted to the Linn County school districts. Some 
of the patterns in the Polk County bids might have an economic 
justification, but many others could only be explained as coincidence 
or extensive market information sharing by the two firms that resulted 
in some form of collusion. For a more complete review of the patterns 
discovered in the Polk County bid data, one can see the conclusion of 
Chapter 6. 
In addition to a review of the bids, there was also a comparison 
of how each firm responded to changes in the cost of raw milk. Again, 
there were a few cases where the two Des Moines area firms had very 
similar reactions to changes in the cost of raw milk, and the reader 
can find a more extensive discussion of these similarities in the 
conclusion of ('hspt^r b. 
The findings of this study at the very least indicated there is 
little open price competition for the dairy contracts in Polk County 
and in Ames. The evidence also suggests that the functions of a 
price fixing ring have been fulfilled in the Polk County market. The 
prices paid by the Polk County school districts during the period 1972 
to 1978 were higher than the prices paid by Linn County school districts. 
The market shares of the two Des Moines firms in Polk County and the 
stability of these market shares suggest some form of market sharing. 
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Finally, the willingness of the Polk County school districts to 
release the distribution of bids following the award of the contract 
certainly lowers the cost of enforcing an agreement. In sut., zuch 
of the evidence suggests that the two Des Moines area firms have 
engaged in something more than mere tacit collusion. 
During the preparation of this study there were several problems 
encountered in the collection of data and information from the 
various school districts. Many districts maintain only incomplete 
files on the bids they receive on various types of products, and 
this certainly hinders the preparation of a comprehensive study. 
Currently, the Iowa Department of Public Instruction collects data 
only on the weighted average monthly price of all half pints purchased 
by school districts. When the school district purchases more than 
one type of dairy product, it is impossible to study the pricing 
behavior of firms. The author strongly suggests that the Iowa Department 
of Public Instruction begin collecting the distribution cf all bids 
received on each half pint dairy product so that this data could be 
used to monitor the bids submitted to Iowa School districts for 
detection of possible bid rigging practices. More generally, all 
public agencies should collect bid data on all products sold on a 
sealed bid basis. 
Also, the likelihood of successful bid rigging might be reduced if 
the school districts or any other public purchasing agency would 
discontinue the practice of making the bids received on various products 
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a matter of public record. This would make it more difficult for 
a price fixing ring to enforce its agreement as there would be 
more uncertainty about the prices submitted by each firm. This 
practice along with the systematic collection and at least random 
review of bid data by the state of Iowa would certainly threaten 
the continued existence of many price fixing rings in sealed tender 
markets in Iowa. 
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APPENDIX B. TABLES CONTAINING A SUMMARY OF THE BID DATA 
AND ASSOCIATED PRICE DIFFERENTIALS 
Table B. la. Summary of Polk County àre.i bids in 1972 
Distrd ct Date 
Bid 
Conditions 
Ankeny 7-06-72 Firm, cooler 
no straws 













B A V 
Chocolate pt. 
B A V 
Skim h pt. 
.066 .0658 




.071 .07 .0695 .06 .06 .0525 
Xm .07 .06 
,071 .06 
,071 .07 .06 .06 
Johnston 8-07-72 firm, straws 
cooler 
North Polk 8-01-72 firm, straws 
cooler 
Southeast 5-15-72 firm, straws 
Polk cooler 
Urbandale 7- 72 firm, straws 
cooler 
West 7- 72 firm, straws 


















This bid is for chocolate two percent rather than whole chocolate milk. 
Table B.lb. Polk County dairy bid differentials in 1972 
Chocolate Skim Chocolate 2% 
Homo p;enized Homogenized HomoRenized 
District Date BAV BAV BAV 
Dos Moines: 6-30-72 
Northeast .005 .0035 .006 -.006 -.0065 
Southeast .005 .0035 -.006 -.0065 
Northwest .005 .0045 -.006 -.0055 
Southwest .005 .0045 -.006 -.0055 
Johnston 8-07-72 .005 .005 
Southeast 
I'olk 
5-15-72 . 005 
West 
Des Moines 
7- 72 -.006 -.0072 













_ Homogenixed h pt. 



















Indicates winning bid. 
WB 



















. 00  
,0015 
.0075 





This differenl;ial is for chocolate two percent milk. 
Table B.2a. Summary of Linn County ar(;a bids in 1972 
Bid _ Homogenized ^ pt. Chocolate ^  pt. 
District Date Conditions Z N OPQRAZNOR 
Alburnett 8- 1 2  fim, some . . 0 6 7 5  
coolers 
Cedar Rapids 7- 1 2  flim, .0625 .0635 .0635 .067 .066 .0665 
coolers 
Center Point 7-12-72 firm, .063 .0635 .063 .067 .066 .067 
coolers 
Mount Vernon 8- 72 firm, .0635 .0635 .0635 
cooler:; 
North Linn firm .0625 
.06717 .066 
.00025 — 
Table B.2b. Llnn County dairy bid differentials in 1972 
Chocolate Homogenized ^ pt« 
District Z N OR 
Alburnett . 00:25 
Cedar Rapids . 00'* 5 .0025 .003 
Center Point . 00'» .0025 .004 
Table 15.2c. Price differentials between winning bid and losing bids in Linn County in 1972 
Homogenized h pt. Chocolate h pt. 
District Z N 0 P Q R Z N 0 
Cedar Rapids WB^ .001 .001 WB -.001 -.0005 
Center Point .000 .0005 \<Y\ .000 -.001 WB 
Mount Vernon .000 .000 WB 
^Indicates winning bid. 































Homogenized h pt. 
B A 
firm, straws .0735 
cooler 
firm, coolers .0725 .075 
no straws 
firm, coolers .0725 .075 
no straws 
firm, coolers .075 .073 
no straws 
firm .075 .073 
firm, straws .0765 .0735 
cooler 
firm, cooler .0725 
firm, cooler .07 
firm, cooler .0725 
firm, cooler .075 .0697 
firm, straws .0765 .0712 
cooler 


























.0742 .073 .0784 .0772 .0669 .0652 
.00163 .00168 .00152 .00118 .00274 .00048 
This bid is for chocolate two percent rather than whole chocolate milk. 







































,01  - .008  







Table B.3c. Price differential between winning bid and losing bids In Polk County In 1973 
Homogeniy.ed h pt. Chocolate H pt. Sklm ^ pt. 
District B A B A B A 
Des Moines : 
Northeast WB^ .0025 WB .00 WB .00 
Southeast WB .0025 WB .00 WB .00 













 WB ,00 WB 
Johnston .003 WB .003 WB 
Urban dale: .0053 m .0053 WB .0053 WB 
West .0053 WB .0053 WB .0053 WB 
Des Moines 
^Indicates winning bid. 
^This is for chocolate two percent milk. 
Table B.4a. Summary of Linn County area bids in 1973 
Bid Homogenized h pt. Chocolate % pt. 
District Date Conditions ZNOPQA ZOP 
Alburnett 8- 73 firm, some 
coolers 
.067 .07 
Cedar Rapids 7- 73 firm, coolers .0674 .0637 .0717 .0679 
Center Point 4-1:1-•73 firm, coolers .065 .0675 .069 .072 
Linn-Mar 6-2:!-•73 firm, coolers .069 .0687 
Mount Vernon 8- 73 escalator, 
coolers 
.068 .0718 .0695 









Table B.4b. Linn County dairy bid differentials in 1973 
Chocolate Homogenized 
District Z 0 
Alburnett .003 
Cedar Rapid» .0043 .0042 
Center Point .004 .0045 
Linn-Mar . 005 .003 
Table B.4c. Price differential between winning bid and losing bids in Linn County in 1973 
Homogenized Chocolate 
District Z N 0 P Q Z 0 
Cedar Rapids .0037 WB^ .0038 WB 
Center Point WB .0025 TO .003 
Linn-Mar .0003 WB .0023 WB 
Mount Vernon -,00]îi .0023 WB 
^Indicates winning bid. 





























































2% h pt. 
B A 
Skim h pt. 
B A 













































































































Table B.5c. Price differential between winning bid and losing bids in Polk County in the 
summer of 1974 
Homogenized 
2% H Pt. 
Chocolate 
2% J5 pt. Skim h pt. 
Homogenized 
h pt. 
District B A B A B A 15 A 
Ankeny . 0002 
lies Moines: 
Northeast WB .0005 WB .0005 WB .0005 
Southeast WB .0005 WB .0005 WB .0005 
Northwest .0005 V/B .0005 WB .0005 WB 
Southwest .0005 WB .0005 WB .0005 WB 





WB -.005^ WB 
Southeast 
Polk WB . 0025 WB .0025 WB .0025 
Urbandale .001 WB .001 WB .0002 WB 
West .0002 WB .0002 WB .0002 WB 
De {J Moines 
Indicates winning bid. 
This differential is for whole chocolate milk. 



































Homogenized h pt. 
,0759 
.0825 






















Table  15 ,6a .  (Cont . )  
District 














Mean bid .0855 .0998 


















Homogenized 2% pt. 













.0732 .0809 .0778 .0782 
.0025 .0026 .0005 .00175 












Chocolate 2% ^ pt. 
Z P A 
07 75 .0823 ,085 







Skim H pt, 
N 
.0675 .0772 .0725 
Table B,6b. Linn County dairy bid differentials in 1974 
Chocolate Homogenized 
Z N ' 5 P A District 
Homogenized 2% 
Homogenized 













































Z N P 
-.0049 -.0056 -.005 







Table B.6c. Price differential between winning bid and losing bids in Linn County in 1974 
District 
Homogenized h pt. Chocolate h. pt. 
Z 
Alburnett .0081 
Cedar Rapid» WB -.0012 0052 
Center Point WB 0077 
College WB .0015 .0067 
Linn-Mar WB .001] ,0063 
Lisbon WB .Oil 























''indicates winning bid. 
Table  B .6c .  (Cont . )  
Difitrlct 
Homogenized 22_ p t .  
Z P N A 
Alburnett WB 










Chocolate 2% h pt. 





Skim % pt. 
N 
m ,005 .0047 
Table B.7a. Summary of Polk County area bids in the winter of 1974 
Homogenized Chocolate Skim 
Bid 2% h pt. ?.% pt- h pt. 
District Date Conditions B A B A B A 
Des Moines: 11-06-74 
Northeast firm, coolers .0825 .083 .09 .0905 .077 078 
Southeast firm, coolers .0825 .083 .09 .0905 .077 078 
Northwest firm, coolers .0825 .082 .09 .0895 .0775 077 
Southwest firm, coolers .0825 .082 .09 .0895 . 0775 077 
Mean .0825 .0825 .09 .09 .07725 . 0775 
Standard deviation .0005 .0005 .00025 . 0005 
Table B.7b. Polk County dairy bid differential s in the winter of 1974 
Choc. 2%-Homogenlzed 2% Skim -Homogenized 2% 
District B A B A 
Des Moines: 
Northeast .007!i .0075 -.0055 -.005 
Southeast .007s .0075 -.0055 -.005 
Northwest . 007!) .0075 -.005 -.005 
Southwest .0075 .0075 -.005 -.005 
rable B.7c. Price differential between winning bid and losing bids in Polk County in the 
winter of 1974 
Homogenized 2% ^ pt. Chocolate 2% H pt. Skim h pt. 






























^Indicates winning bid. 
Table B.8a. Sunmiarj of Polk County aiea bids in the summer of 1975 
Bid 
Conditions 
Homogenized 2% % pt. Chocolate 2% pt. Skim h pt. 
Diîitr Let Da te B A D B A D B A D 
Ankeny 6-20-75. escalator, 
coolers 
.0825 .081 
Des Moines 7-23-75 
Northeast firm, coolers .0825 .0835 .08 ^09 .091 .087 .0775 .0785 .076 
Southeast firm, coolers .0825 .0835 _^09 .091 .0775 .0785 
Northwest firm, coolers .083 .0825 .08 .091 .091 .087 .078 .077 .076 
Southwest firm, coolers .083 .0825 .091 .021 .078 1^ 21 
Johnston 8-18-75 escalator, 
straws, coolers 
.0835 .09 
North Polk 8-12-75 escalator, 
straws, coolers 
.0775 .081 .086 .086 .0725 .076 
Sayde] 5-12-75 escalator, 
coolers 





.085 .0725 .08 
Urbandale 7-09-75 escalator, 
coolers 





.0825 .081 .09 .086 .0775 .076 
Mean bid .0816 .0825 .09 .0894 .0762 .0776 
Standard deviation .00206 .00129 .00148 .00247 .00236 .00137 
























Mean bid .0842 .087 









































































Table B.8c. Price differential between winning bid and losing bids in Polk County in the 














Northeast WB .001 -.0025 WB . 001 -.003 WB .001 -.0015 
Southeast WB .001 WB . 001 WB .001 
Northwest .0005 WB -.0025 .00 WB -.004 .001 WB -.001 
Southwest .005 WB .00 WB .001 i-re 
North Polk WB ,0035 WB .0035 WB .00 .0035 
Sayde] WB .00 WB .0025 
Southeast 
Polk WB .007 5 WB .0075 WB .0075 
Urbandale .0015 WB .0015 WB .004 WB 
West 
Des Moines .0015 WB .004 WB .0015 WB 
^Indicates winning bid 




















8- 75 escalator, 
coolers 



















, 08  
.0835 .0806 
.0699 .0701 ,07 
.0764 .0715 ,076 
,0775 .0814 .078 

















Chocolate -s pt. 













Chocolate 2% h pt. 
Z P A T 
Skim h pt. 
Z P A 
.0793 .0885 .0906 
.0743 .0764 .0775 
.0812 .078 .081 .0724 .069 .071 
UJ 
.0783 .0795 .0823 
.0029 .0033 .0046 











Z P ^ 
Homogenized 2% -
Homogenized 











,0061 -.0077 -.004 















Z P / 
-.004 -.0025 .005 







Homogenized % pt, 
Z P A 
WB . 0081 
WB .0018 -.0(1:! 
,0049 WB .004 
Chocolate h pt. 
Z P A 
Homogenized 2% ^ pt. 






































^Indicates winning bid. 















Homogenized 2% ^  pt. Chocolate 2% ^  pt. 

































Choc. 2%-Homogenized 2% 

















. 0055 -.003 
Table B.lOc. Price differencial between winning bid and losing bids in Polk County in the winter 
of 1975 
Homogenized 2% ^  pt. Chocolate 2% ^  pt. Skim ^ pt. 
District B A D B A D B A D 
D(îs Moines: 
Northeast Wfl® .0015 WB .0015 WB .00 
Southeast WIl .0015 WB .0015 WB .00 
Northwest .0005 WB .00 WB .001 WB 
Southwest .0005 WB .0005 .00 WB -.001 .001 m .003 
^Indicates winning bid. 
Tablt! B. lia. Summary of Polk County area bids in the summer of 1976 
Bid Homogenized 2% h pt. 
District Date Conditions B A D T B A 
Ankeny 7-30-76 escalator, 
coolers 
.0915 .0885 .099 .096 
Bondiirant-
Farrar 
8- 76 escalator, 
straws, coolers 
.0865 .09 .094 .0975 
Des Moines: 7-20-76 
Northeast firm, coolers .0875 .089 .088 .095 .098 
Southeast firm, coolers .0875 .089 .095 .098 
Northwest firm, coolers .089 .088 .097 ^096 
Southwest firm, coolers .089 .088 .097 .096 
Johnston 7-19-76 escalatoi-, 
straws, coolers 
.0925 .0895 
North Polk 8-10-76 escalator, 
straws, coole: ,3 
.0865 .0925 .094 .0975 






Urbandale 8-18-76 escalator, 
coolers 





.0925 .088 .0865 .091 .10 .0955 
Chocolate 2% ^ pt. 
D 
,0955 
.0893 .0894 .0865 
.00235 .00155 
.0969 .0968 .094 
.00294 .00166 
Table  B . l l a .  (Cont ; . )  








Northwest .084 .082 
Southwest .084 .082 
Johnston 
North Polk .0815 .09 
Saydel 
Southeast .0815 .083 
Polk 
Urbandale .0875 .083 .081! 
West .0875 .083 .083 5 
Dtîs Moines 
Mean bid .0839 .0939 .0815 
Standard 
deviation .0023 .0025 
Homogenized h pt. 





,0975 .093 .0915 
086 .0975 .093 .0915 .096 
.00939 .0947 .0915 
.0029 .0017 

















Homogenized 2% ~  
Homo g eni?:ed 
















































,0075 -.005 -.005 
005 
005 -.005 
Table B.llc. Price, differential between winning bid and losing bids in Polk County in the 
summer of 1976 
District 
HomoRenlzed h pt. 
B A D 
Homogenized 2% ^ pt. 
Ankeny .003 WB 
Bondurant-
Farrar 
WB^ .0033 WB .0035 
Des Moines; 
Northeast WB .0015 
Southeast WB .0015 
Northwest .001 WB 
Southwest .001 WB 
Johnston .003 WB 
North Polk WB .003% WB .006 
Saydel WB .000 
Southeast 
Polk 
WB .006 WB .006 
Urbandale .006 .0015 WB .006 .0015 
West 




^Indicates w:aining bid. 
Table li.llc. (Cont.) 
District 
































































Alburnett 8- 76 
Cedar Rapids 8- 76 
Center Point 6-14-76 
College 7- 76 
Linn-Mar 8-02-76 
Lisbon 8- 76 





































































Table B.12a.  (Cont.)  
District 
Homogenized 2% h P':. 
Z P A T 
Chocolate 2% ^  pt. Skim h pt. 
Alburnett 
Cedar Rapids .0774 






















.10  .0923 ,08 ,079 .0875 .08 
Mean bid .082 .0855 .0868 .08:'. .0867 .0893 .0968 .0889 
Standard .0039 .0048 .0058 .0046 .0041 .0061 .0033 .0052 
deviation 
Table H.12b. Linn County dairy bid differentials in 1976 
District 
Chocolate-Homogenized Chocolate 2%-Homogenized 2% 
Z P T S N Z P T A U 
Alburnett .0086 .004 
Cedar Rapids .005 .005 .0063 
Center Point .0065 
College .0035 .0069 .C075 .004 .0022 .0075 .0125 
Linn-Mar .0035 .0021 .0075 .0075 
Lisbon .005 .005 .005 
Mount Vernon .005 .005 
North Linn .005 .005 
Homogenized 2%-Homogenized 
P "T A 
Skim-Homogenized 











- .005 -.0075 
-.005 -. 005 0065 -.0039 -.005 -.0048 






































Z P A U 






WB .0136 .0013 














Table B.13a. Summary of Polk County area bids In the winter of 1976 
Bid Homogenized 2% Chocolate 2% Skim 
Condi- h pt. h pt. % pt. 
District Date tions B ' A  D T B A D T B ADT 
Des Moines: 11-30-76 firm, 
coolers! 
Northeast _.OJU^ .085 .0925 .079 .08 
Southeast j^0!)4 .085 .09 .0925 .079 .08 
Northwest .0845 .084 .0916 .0915 .0795 .0788 
Southwest .0845 .084 .087 .0885 .0916 .0915 .096 .099 .0795 .0788 .08 .0825 
Mean bid " " . 08425 '.'5845 .0908 .092 .07925 .0794 
Standard deviation .00025 .0005 .0008 .0005 .00025 .0006 
Table H.13b Polk CiTunty dairy bid differentials in the winter of 1976 
Choc. 2%-Homo'enized 2% Skim-Homogenized 2% 
District B A D T B A D T 
Des Moines: 
Northeast .006 .0075 -.005 -.005 
Southeast .006 .0075 -.005 -.005 
Northwest .0071 .0075 -.005 -.0052 
Southwest .0081 .0075 .009 .0105 -.005 -.0052 -.007 -.006 
Table B.13c. Price differential between winning bid and losing bids in Polk County in the 
winter of 1976 
Homogenized 2% pt. Chocolate 2% ^ pt. Skim ^2 pt. 
District B A D T B A D T B A D T 
Des Moines: 
WB" .001 Northeast m .0025 WB .001 
Southeast WB .001 WB .0025 WB .001 
Northwest . 0005 WB .0001 WB .0007 WB 
Southwest .0005 WB .003 .004 5 .0001 WB .0045 .0075 .0007 WB .0012 .0037 
Indicates winning bid. 
Table B.14a. Summary of Polk County area bids in the summer of 1977 
Bid Homogenized 2% k; pt. Chocolate 2% pt. 
District; Date Conditions B A D T B A D T 
Ankeny 7-27-77 firm, escalator, 
coolers 









firm, cooler» .087 .0884 .088 .088 .0945 .096 .0975 .0955 
Southeast firm, coolers .087 .0884 .0945 .096 
Northwest firm, coolers .0885 .0869 .096 .0945 
Southwest firm, coolers .0885 .0869 .088 .088 .096 .0945 .0975 .0955 
Johnston 7-26-77 escalator, 
straws, coolers 
.0885 .088 .096 . 0955 
North Polk 8-09-77 escalator, 
straws, coolfrs 
.087 .09 . 0945 .0975 






Urbandale 8-05-77 escalator, 
coolers 
.087 .0845 .086 .0945 . 0924 .0965 
West 
Des Moines 













































.082  .082 
Mean bid .0824 .0829 
Standard deviation .00065 .0016 






.08 .089 .0899 .089 
.08 .0835 .096 .0959 .093 .0935 
.0815 .0832 .0922 .0937 .091 
.0015 .0002 .0022 .0022 .002 


















































































Table H.14c. Price differential between winning bid and losing bids in Polk County in the 
summer of 1977 
Homogenized h pt. Homogenized 2% h pt. 
District B A D T B A D T 
Ankeny .0015 I# .001 
Bondurant-
Farrar 
WB .003 WB .003 
Des Moines: 
Northeast .0014 .001 .001 
Soutlieast m .0014 
Northwest .0016 WB 
Southwest .0016 WB .0011 .0011 
Johnston . 0005 WB 
North Polk WB .0005 WB .003 
Sayilel WB .000 .001 
Sout;heast 
Polk WB .003 1-/B .003 
Urbandale -.0009 WB 0009 .0021 WB .0011 
West 
Des Moines 
.0001 WB 0029 -.0024 .0001 WB .0001 .0016 
^Indicates winning bid. 
Table B.l4c. (Coiit.) 
Chocolate 2% % pt, 
District 


































































, 001  
,0015 




























Homogenized 2% h pt, 
W 
eiscalator, .086 .0936 
some, coolers 




escalator, .0763 .0795 
coolers 






































Table;  B.15a.  (Cone.)  
District 
Chocola1:<i ^ pt, 
W X 














.0901 .0895 .0939 









.0909 .079 .096 
.093 .087 
.0773 .0859 .0865 
.0839 .086 .088 .0915 
.092 .092 
.0924 .092 
,0863 .0871 .08725 .0917 
,0062 .0049 .00075 .0029 
,0834 .0883 
Skim 'i pt, 
Linn-Mar .0689 .072 .0779 .0815 
Table. B. 15b. Linn County dairy bid differentials in 1977 
Chocolate-Homogenized Chocolate 2%-HomoRenized 2% 
District Z P T A S X W Z P T A X W 
Cedar Rapids .007 .0018 .0075 
Center Point .007 .005 
College .002] .005 .005 .0075 .0052 .001 .0064 .0086 
Linn-Mar .005 .0061 .005 .005 
Lisbon .005 .005 .005 .005 
Mount Vernon .005 .005 .005 .0075 
North Linn .005 .005 .005 
Homogenized 2-Homogenized 
P  T ' A  S  X  W 
Skim-Homogenized 2% 























-.01 -.079 -.005 .0051 





























.0119 WB"" .017 
WB .006 
WB .0086 






Homogenized 2% Skim 
Z P T A S X W Z P T A 
Alburnett WB .0076 
Cedar Riipids .0067 WB .0113 
Center Point WB .006 
College WB .0032 .0016 .0025 .0035 
Li.nn-Ma r WB .001 .0076 .0041 WB .0031 .0126 .009 
Li sbon .00 WB 
Mount Vernon .0029 WB 
North Linn .0059 .0059 WB 
Chocolate 
Z P T A. S X W 
Alburnett WB .0056 
College WB -.0006 .0038 .0032 .0025 
Lisbon .000 WB 
Mount. Vernon .0029 WB 
North Linn .0057 .0057 WB 
'^Indicates winning bid. 
Table B.16a. !)ummary of Polk County îrea bids in the winter of 1977 
Bid Homogenized 2% h pt. Chocolate 2% pt. Skim % pt".. 
District Date Conditions B A T B A T B A T 
Des Moines: 12-8-77 firm, coolers 
Northeast .087 .0884 .09255 . 0945 .096 .10 .082 .0834 .0875 
Southeast .087 .0884 . 0945 .096 .082 .0834 
Northwest .088 .0869 .0925 .0955 .0945 .10 .083 .0819 .0875 
Southwest .088 .0869 .0955 .0945 .083 .0819 
Mean bid .0875 .0877 .0925 .095 .09525 .10 .0825 .08265 .0875 
Standard deviation .3005 .00075 ,0005 .00075 .0005 .00075 














Choc. 2%-HomORenized 2% 























Price different;ials between winning bid and losing bids in Polk County in the 
winter of 1977 
Homogenized 27, h pt._ 
B' A f 
Chocolate 2% -'j pt. 
B A T  
































Indicates winning bid, 
Table B.17a. Summary of bids In the. Ames Community School District 
Bid Homogenized ^ pt. Homogenized 2% ^ pt. Chocolatn ^  pt. 
Date Condition;; BAYBAYBAY
5-72 firm .0675 .067 .0725 
5-73 firm .07 .07 .075 
5-74 escalator .09 .09 .09 .085 .085 .085 
5-75 escalator .085 .084 .085 .08 .08 .0765 
6-76 escalator .095 .095 .095 .09 .09 .09 
7-77 escalator .0935 .093! .0935 .0885 .0885 .0885 
Chocolate 2/ h pt. Skim h pt. 
5-74 .09 .09 .085 .08 .083 .08 
5-75 .085 .09 .08 .075 .07 .0725 
6-76 .0975 .097! .0975 .0855 .0815 .085 
7-77 .096 .096 .096 .0835 .083 .0785 
Table B.17b. Daliy bid differentials in Ames 
Chocolate- Chccolate 2% - Skim- Homogenized 2% 
Homogenized Honogenlzed 2% Homogenized 2% Homogeni zed 
Year B A Y b " ~A  Y  B  A  Y  B  A  Y  
1972 .005 .005 
1973 .005 .005 
1974 .005 .005 .00 -.005 -.002 -.005 -.005 -.005 -.005 
1975 .005 .01 .0035 -.005 -.01 -.004 -.005 -.004 -.0085 
1976 .0075 .0075 .0075 -.0045 -.0085 -.005 -.005 -.005 -.005 
1977 .0075 .0075 .0075 -.005 -.0055 -.01 -.005 -.005 -.005 
238 
APPENDIX C. TABLES CONTAINING A COMPARISON OF THE CHANGE IN THE 
BID PRICE AND THE COST OF RAW MILK IN A HALF PINT OF PROCESSED MILK 
Table C.la. Comparison of change ir bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1972 to 
1973 for whole homogenJ2;ed milk 























































































, 0 0 2  
,0049 



























Table C.lb. Comparison of change in bid price and change in l:he cost per half pint from 1972 to 
1973 for whole chocolate milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in cost 
Polk County 






Southeast Polk 6-28-73 
Linn County 
Alburnett 8- 73 
Cedar Rapids 7- 73 

























































Table C.lc. Comparison of change In bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1972 to 
1973 for skim milk 
District 
I'olk County 









Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost 
11 .065 .005 
A .065 .005 
E; .065 .005 
A .065 .005 
E. .065 .005 
k  .065 .005 
E .065 .005 
A. .065 .005 
H .0715 ..01 
A .0662 .0062 
.03804 
.03787 
Change in cost 
,00378 
00371 
Table C.2a. Comparison of cban|;e Ir bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1973 to 
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Table C.2b. Comparison of change Ir bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1973 to 
1974 for whole chocolate, milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change In Bid Cost Change in cost 
].lnn County 
ALburnett 8- 74 Z .0825 .0125 .04107 .00312 
Cedar Rapids 8- 74 Z .0875 .0158 .04107 .0035 
P .0863 . 0184 
Center Point 8-13-74 Z .085 .016 .04107 .00463 
0 .0845 .0125 
Linn-Mar 8-16-74 Z .0864 .0124 .04107 .00366 
P .0875 .0158 
Table C.2c. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1973 to 
1974 for skim milk 
District Date Dairv Bid Change in bid Cost Change in cost 
I'olk County 
Des Moines: 8-20-74 
Northeast B .075 .01 
A .0755 .0105 
Southeast B .075 .01 
A .0755 .0105 
Northwest B .075 .01 
A .0745 .0095 
Southwest B .075 .01 
A .0745 .0095 
Urbandale B .075 .005 
A .0748 .101 
West Des Moines B .075 .0035 







Tab].e C.3a. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from July, 1974 
to November, 1974 for homogenized two percent milk 
District Date Ds Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 
Dos Moines: 11-06-74 .04358 .00204 
Northeast E ;  .0825 .0025 
A .083 .0025 
Southeast 11 .0825 .0025 
A .083 .0025 
Northwest El .0825 .0025 
k  .082 .0025 
Southwest h  .0825 .0025 
A .082 .0025 
Table C.3b. Comparison of change Ir bid price and change In the cost per half pint from July, 1974 to 
November, 1974 for chocolate two percent milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 
Di2s Moines: 11-06-74 .04358 .00204 
Northeast IS .09 .001. 
A .0905 .005 
Southeast l \  .09 .005 
A .0905 ,005 
Northwest 11 .09 .005 
A .0895 .005 
Southwest F; .09 .005 
A .0895 .005 
Table C.3c. Corapfirison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from July, 1974 
to November, 1974 for skim milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Rid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 
Des Moines: 11-06-74 .04358 .00204 
Northeast 15 .077 .002 
A . 078 .0025 
Southeast R .077 .002 
A .078 .0025 
Northwest 1! .0775 .0025 
A .077 .0025 
Southwest I( .0775 .0025 
A .077 .0025 
Table C.4a. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half piat from 1974 to 1975 
for whole homogenized milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in cost 
Polk County 
North Polk 8-12-75 

















Alhurnett 8- 75 
Center Point 8-09-75 
College 7- 75 
Linn-Mar 7-30-75 
Lifsbon 8- 75 











































Table C.4b. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1974 to 
1975 for whole chocolat;(; milk 
District Date DfIry Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in cost 
liinn County 
Alburnett 8- 75 X .0825 .00 .04537 .0043 
P .089 ,00 
Conter Point 8-09-75 2: .0829 -.0021 .04537 .0043 
College 7-- 75 z; .0829 -.003 .04488 .00048 
I- .0828 -.0047 
A .083 -.0035 
Linn-Mar 7-30-75 Z, .0862 -.0002 .04488 .00381 
[' 
.083 -.0045 
Lisbon 8- 75 P .089 .0035 .04537 .00097 
Table C.Ac. Comparison of change in bid price and change in l;he cost per half pint from 1974 to 
1975 for skim milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in cost 
Polk County 





Southeast Polk 8-01-75 

















































Table C.4d. Comparison of Che change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1974 to 














West Des Moines 




































































. 00  
.0005 













































Table C.4e. Comparison of 1:he change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1974 to 
1975 for chocolate two percent milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 






West Des Moines 
Linn County 
Cedar Rapids 





































. 0 0  
.0005 























Table C.5a. Comparison of chan;;e in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from July, 1975 
to December, 1975 for homogenized two percent milk 
District Date Daii;y Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 
Des Moines; 12-08-75 .05388 .00852 
Northeast 1} .088 .0055 
\ .0895 .006 
Southeast 8 .088 .0055 
A .0895 .006 
Northwest 8 .089 .006 
.0885 .006 
.089 .009 
Southwest ) .089 .006 
A .0885 .006 
Table C.5b. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from July, 1975 
to Deicember, 1975 for chocolate two percent milk 
District Date Dg.iry Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
I'olk County 
Des Moines: 12-08-75 .05388 .00852 
Northeast 11 .0955 .0055 
A .097 .006 
Southeast B .0955 .0055 
A .097 .006 
Northwest B .097 .006 
A .097 .006 
D .096 .009 
Southwest Ei .097 .006 
k .097 .006 
Table C.5c. Comparison of change in bid price and change in I:he cost per half pint from July, 1975 
to December, 1975 for skim milk. 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in cost 
Polk County 
Des Moines: 12-08-75 .05388 .00852 
Northeast n .083 .0055 
A .083 .0045 
Southeast 11 .083 .0055 
h .083 .0045 
Northwest li .084 .006 
h .083 .006 
D .086 .01 
Southwest h .084 .006 
A .083 .006 
Table C.6a. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1975 to 
1976 for whole homogenJ 5;ed milk 















































































Table C.6b. Comparison of change in bid price and change in I:he cost per half pint from 1975 to 
1976 for whole chocolate milk 
District Date ^ Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
I.ini 1 County 
Alburnett 8- 76 2: .091 .0085 .05187 .0065 
F' .09 .001 
College 7- 76 z .093 .0101 .05176 .00688 
p 
.0869 .0041 
Lisbon 8- 76 p .098 .009 .05187 .0065 
Mount Vernon 8-09-76 p .098 .009 .05187 .0065 
hj 
Ln 
Table C.6c. Compai-ison of change in hid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1975 to 
1976 lor skim milk 









West Des Moines 
Linn County 
Linn-Mar 











































. 00  
.001 



















Table C.6d. Comparison of 
1976 for honiog . i/ed 
District: Date 
in bid price and change 
two percent milk 
Da. Bid 
in the cost per half pint from 1975 to 















































































































































Table C.6e. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1975 to 
1976 for chocolate two percent milk 



















































































































Table C.7a, Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from July, 1976 
to November, 1976 for homogenized two percent milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 
Dtîs Moines: 11-30-76 .05312 .00086 
Northeast B .084 -.0035 
A .085 -.004 
Southeast b .084 -.0035 
A .085 -.004 
Northwest b .0845 -.0045 
A .084 -.004 
Southwest b .0845 - .0045 
•\ .084 -.004 
Table C.7b. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from July, 1975 
to November, 1976 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Folk County 
Dos Moines: 11-30-76 .05312 .00086 
Northeast B .09 -.005 
A .0925 -.0055 
Southeast B .09 -.005 
A .0925 -.0055 
Northwest B .0916 -.0054 
A. .0915 -.0045 
Southwest B .0916 -.0054 
A .0915 -.0045 
Table C.7c. Comparison of change in bid price and change in I:he cost per half pint from July, 1976 
to November, 1976 for skim milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 
Des Moines: 11-30-76 .05312 .00086 
Northeast B .079 -.0035 
\ .08 -.003 
Southeast a .079 -.0035 
\ .08 -.003 
Northwest i .0795 -.0045 
\ .07R8 -.0032 
Southwest 5 .0795 -.0045 
A .0788 -.0032 
Table C.8a. Comparison of change In bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1976 
to 1977 for whole homogenized milk 
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Table C.8b. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1976 to 
1977 for whole chocolate milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Linn County 
College 7- 77 7. .0901 -.0029 .05348 .00172 
P .0895 -.0026 
Lisbon 6- 77 P .097 -.001 .05337 .0015 
Mount Vernon 6- 77 P .0974 -.0006 .05337 .0015 
North Linn 5- 77 P .097 -.002 .05182 -.00155 
S .0913 -.0012 
Table C.8c. Comparison of change In bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1976 to 
1977 for skim milk 
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Table C.8d. Comparison ol: change in bid price and change in thcï cost per half pint from 1976 to 
1977 for homogenized two percent milk 










North Polk 8-09-77 
Saydel 5-23-77 
Southeast Polk 8-01-77 
Urbandale 8-05-77 
West Des Moines 8-05-77 










































































































Table C.8d. (Cont;.) 
District Date 
J,inn County 
Cedar Rapids 7- 77 
Center Point 7-21-77 
College 7- 77 




6- 7 7 
Bid Change in Bid Cost CIlange in Cost 
0839 .0064 .05361 .00112 
0772 -.0138 
0885 .0111 
086 .001 .05361 .00097 
0763 -.0027 .05361 .00173 
0795 .002 
0779 -.0031 
0789 -.0076 .05361 .00162 
0799 -.003 
083 -.0055 
087 -.001 .05350 .00151 
0874 -.. 0006 .05350 .00151 
Table C;.8e. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from 1976 
to 1977 for chocolate l:\fo percent milk 
Pistrict Date D;liry Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 
Ankeny 7-27-77 B .095 -.004 .05398 .00172 
A .0935 -.0035 
Bondurant- Fa r r a :: 7-08-77 B .0945 .0005 .05398 .00161 
A .0975 .00 
Des Moines: 7-01-77 .05398 .00086 
Northeast B .0945 .0045 
A .096 .0035 
Southeast B .0945 .0045 
A .096 .0035 
Northwest B .096 .0044 
.0945 .003 
Southwest E .096 .0044 
A .0945 .003 
D .0975 .0015 
North Polk 8-09-77 R .0945 .0005 .05388 .00151 
A .0975 .00 
Saydel 5-23-77 B .096 -.0015 .05231 -.00157 
A .096 -.0015 
Urbandale 8-05-77 B .0945 -.0055 .05388 .00151 
A .0924 -.0031 
D .0965 .0025 
West Des Moines 8-05-77 .0945 -.0055 .05388 .00151 
,\ .0944 -.0011 
0 .0975 .0035 
•r .096 -.0025 
Table C.8e. (Cont.) 
District 








7- 77 .0909 
]' .079 
T .096 
7-21-77 2: .093 








6- 77 p .092 
6- 77 p .0924 




























Table C.9a. Comparison of change in bid price and change In the cost per half pint from July, 1977 
to December, 1977 for homogenized two percent milk 
District Date Delry Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 
Dos Moines: 12-08-77 .05463 .00075 
Northeast L-; .087 .00 
.0884 .00 
T .0925 .0045 
Southeast B .087 ,00 
k .0884 .00 
Northwest B .088 -.0005 
A .0869 .00 
Southwest B .088 -.0005 
A. .0869 .00 
Tabic C.9b. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from July, 1977 
to December, 1977 for chocolate two percent milk 
District Da_^!_ Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 
Dos Moines: 12-08-77 .05463 .00075 
Northeast B .0945 .00 
A .096 .00 
r .10 .0045 
Southeast B .0945 .00 
A .096 .00 
Northwest B .0955 -.0005 
A .0945 .00 
Southwest 8 .0955 -.0005 
A .0945 .00 
Table C.9c. Comparison of change in bid price and change in the cost per half pint from July, 1977 
to December, 1977 for skim milk 
District Date Dairy Bid Change in Bid Cost Change in Cost 
Polk County 
Des Moines: 12-08-77 .05463 .00075 
Northeast B .082 .00 
A .0834 -.0001 
T .0875 .0045 
Southeast B .082 .00 
A .0834 -.0001 
Northwest 8 .083 -.0005 
A .0819 -.0001 
Southwest .083 -.0005 
A .0819 -.0001 
